Normativity and Representation in Kant's Theory of Cognition by Hutton, James Stanley
  
Normativity and Representation 
in Kant’s Theory of Cognition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
James Stanley Hutton 
Pembroke College, University of Cambridge 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
August, 2019
  
 
 
iii 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation examines various aspects of normativity and representation as they figure in 
Kant’s theory of cognition. In particular, I argue that Kant holds that certain forms of 
representational content constitutively depend on normative constraint. This applies to all of 
the kinds of content that can be captured by concepts (viz. ‘kind’-properties, and the objective 
temporal structures that correspond to the “categories”). Since we perceptually represent 
objects as exhibiting these features, even the activities that produce perceptions must be 
normatively constrained. Nevertheless, representation per se does not depend on normative 
constraint: Kant holds that non-human animals can represent objects, suggesting that he 
endorses forms of ‘non-conceptual content’ that don’t depend on normative constraint. 
 Chapter 1 explores the preconditions for representing objective temporal sequence, as 
outlined in the Second Analogy. I argue that Kant’s notion of the “necessitation of the 
subjective order of perceptions” must be understood as a form of normative necessity, so 
representations of objective temporal sequence constitutively depend on normativity. 
 Chapter 2 continues the discussion of the Second Analogy by exploring the 
connection between causation and lawfulness. I argue that Kant holds that the concept of 
<causation> contains the notion of lawful connection. He therefore has sound reasons for 
asserting the Strong Causal Principle (that every event is produced according to a universal 
causal law) on the basis of the Second Analogy’s argument. 
 Chapter 3 examines the role of schemata in Kant’s theory of cognition. Assuming that 
schemata are rules for synthesis of the imagination, I argue that they should be understood as 
akin to maxims: mentally represented rules that bring our activities into contact with 
intersubjective normative standards. I argue that, by bringing synthesis under normative 
constraint, schemata enable intuitions to represent their objects as bearing ‘kind’-properties. 
 Chapter 4 discharges the assumption that schemata are rules for synthesis of 
imagination, through close reading and criticism of alternative interpretations. 
 Chapter 5 examines Kant’s views about animal minds and what they tell us about his 
theory of human cognition. I argue that he genuinely credits animals with intuitions of 
objects. Nevertheless, there are still good motivations for thinking that all human intuitions 
are produced by the understanding, and that it makes human and animal intuitions different in 
kind. 
 The Conclusion brings together material from the preceding five chapters to discuss 
the extent to which Kant endorses a ‘normative theory of representation’.  
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Preface 
This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of 
work done in collaboration. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is 
being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University 
of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution. I further state that no substantial 
part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for 
any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other 
University or similar institution, except that Chapter 3 is a descendent of an essay submitted 
for the degree of MPhil at the University of Cambridge. This dissertation does not exceed the 
word limit of 80,000 words. Chapter 1 is based on a paper forthcoming in the European 
Journal of Philosophy.
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Log Logik 
MAN Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaften 
MS Die Metaphysik der Sitten 
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Refl  Reflexionen 
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V-Lo/Busolt Logik Busolt 
V-Lo/Dohna  Logik Dohna-Wundlacken 
V-Lo/Wiener  Wiener Logik 
V-Met-K 3E/Arnoldt  Ergänzungen Kant Metaphysik K3 (Arnoldt) 
V-Met-L1/Pölitz  Kant Metaphysik L1 (Pölitz) 
V-Met-L2/Pölitz  Kant Metaphysik L2 (Pölitz, Original) 
V-Met/Mron  Metaphysik Mrongovius 
V-Met/Volckmann Metaphysik Volckmann 
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H Rostocker Anthropologiehandschrift (7:395–415) 
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Introduction 
This dissertation consists of five chapters on diverse topics from Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy. Each chapter is written to function as an article in its own right: each addresses a 
different question, rather than forming a step in one overall argument; each presents a self-
contained argument, rather than presupposing familiarity with the others. Nevertheless, a 
number of interrelated themes link the chapters together. 
The first theme, pursued in Chapters 1 and 2, concerns causality, particularly as it 
figures in Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience. I focus on the importance of conceptual 
claims about the concept <cause>. In Chapter 1, this leads me to the conclusion that it is the 
inferential role of the concept <cause>, and the structure of epistemic normativity it brings 
with it, that is crucial for Kant’s account of how we can perceive objective temporal 
sequences. Chapter 2 examines the connection between causation and lawfulness. Again, I 
argue that our focus should primarily be on how Kant understands the concept of <cause>. 
By looking at diverse works, but especially the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, I 
argue that Kant thinks that the lawfulness of causal connections is analytically contained in 
the concept <cause>. I use this finding to suggest a resolution to a long-running debate over 
the strength of Kant’s conclusion in the Second Analogy. 
The second recurring theme, pursued in Chapters 3 and 4, is Kant’s notion of 
‘schemata’: the “representation[s] of general procedure[s] of the imagination” (A140/B180) 
which supposedly mediate between concepts and intuitions. In recent years, Kant-scholars 
have done a lot to deepen our understanding of how concepts relate to intuitions and how the 
imagination is involved in cognition. Yet the vast majority of these authors have failed to 
incorporate schemata into their accounts. Chapter 3 takes as its starting point the idea that 
schemata are rules for synthesis of imagination. I argue for a novel account of how schemata 
make cognition possible, centring on the need for synthesis of imagination to be normatively 
constrained. Chapter 4 carries out the necessary exegetical work to discharge the assumption 
that schemata are rules for synthesis of imagination. In the process, I try to cut through some 
of the infamous obscurity of the Schematism chapter. 
A third theme, in play throughout the whole dissertation, is the old issue of how to 
understand two of the central dualities in Kant’s theory of cognition: the distinction between 
sensibility and understanding and the distinction between intuitions and concepts. Chapter 1 
explores this by looking at why the understanding must be involved when we perceive 
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objective temporal sequences. Chapters 3 and 4 develop an account of the conditions under 
which an object given in intuition is classifiable under some concept. Along the way, those 
chapters offer an account of how rules provided by the understanding structure the 
imagination’s synthesis of sensible material. Chapter 5 engages directly with the ongoing 
‘Nonconceptualism Debate’, by critically engaging with the claim that Kant’s views about 
animal minds support the independence of our intuitions from the understanding. 
The fourth and final theme—and the overarching interest that has led me to explore 
the Second Analogy, schemata and the Nonconceptualism debate—concerns the normative 
constitution of representational contents. Kant has long been claimed as a forefather by 
modern proponents of “normative theories of representation”.1 For the most part, this 
attribution has been made in the absence of sustained exegetical argument,
2
 and it therefore 
remains highly controversial among Kant-scholars. My hope is that by engaging carefully 
with the details of Kant’s position, I have been able to bring out more fully some of the 
nuances of his views than these existing discussions. I also hope to have provided a stronger 
evidential basis for this whole approach to Kant. Chapter 1 provides a detailed, textually 
informed argument for the conclusion that, when perceptions represent objective temporal 
sequences, this constitutively depends on synthesis being structured by epistemic norms. 
Chapter 3 argues for the broader conclusion that intuitions would lack ‘conceptual content’ if 
their production were not subject to normative constraints—intuitions produced by merely 
associative mental operations would ipso facto fail to represent objects as exemplifying kind-
properties and objective temporal structures, and hence would not be classifiable under 
concepts. However, Chapter 5 shows that creatures whose mental activities are purely 
associative and not normatively structured are nevertheless capable of having mental 
representations of objects. As I argue in the Conclusion, this shows that Kant does not hold 
that all representational contents constitutively depend on normativity; he endorses a kind of 
‘non-conceptual content’ that is not normatively constituted. 
A kind of motto for my strongly exegetical approach to the themes of normativity and 
representation in Kant’s theory of cognition is provided by Umberto Eco’s claim, that: 
                                                 
1
 See especially Sellars (1967), McDowell (1994) and Brandom (1994). 
2
 Landy (2015) and Pollok (2017) explore the themes of representation and normativity in Kant with a more 
exegetical bent than the authors mentioned in the previous footnote. However, both have been criticized—to my 
mind rightly—for failing to offer arguments for their central exegetical assumptions (cf. Choi, 2017; Watt, 
2017). 
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If it seems that Kant said something similar [to a theory which seems promising 
today], the task of a philosophical discourse is to take another look at Kant’s point of 
departure and to see what group of problems he had been wrestling with, because his 
experience can teach us something too. We might still be the unwitting children of his 
errors (just as we are of his truths), and knowing this might help us avoid making 
analogous errors or thinking that we have just discovered something that he suggested 
two hundred years ago. (Eco, 1997, p. 7)
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1 
Epistemic Normativity in Kant’s 
Second Analogy 
Abstract: In the Second Analogy, Kant argues that, unless mental contents involve 
the concept of causation, they cannot represent an objective temporal sequence. 
According to Kant, deploying the concept of causation renders a certain temporal 
ordering of representations necessary, thus enabling objective representational 
purport. One exegetical question which remains controversial is this: how, and in 
what sense, does deploying the concept of cause render a certain ordering of 
representations necessary? I argue that this necessitation is a matter of epistemic 
normativity: with certain causal presuppositions in place, the individual is obliged to 
make a judgment with certain temporal contents, on pain of irrationality. To make this 
normatively obligatory judgment, the subject must place her perceptual 
representations in a certain order. This interpretation fits Kant’s text, his 
argumentative aims, and his broader views about causal inference, better than rival 
interpretations can. This result has important consequences for the ongoing debate 
over the role of normativity in Kant’s philosophy of mind. 
1. Introduction 
This article has two aims: one narrow, one broad. The narrow aim is to resolve an 
interpretative dispute about Kant’s Second Analogy. The Second Analogy gives an account 
of how we can perceive temporal sequences. However, disagreement remains over the details 
of the mental operations required for perception to have objective temporal content. In 
particular, it remains controversial how, according to Kant, deploying the concept of 
causation renders a certain subjective “order of perceptions” “necessary” (A193/B238); and 
with what kind of modality this subjective order of perceptions becomes necessary. Building 
on existing scholarship, I argue that Kant’s account turns on the inferential role of the concept 
of causation. Moving beyond existing scholarship, I argue that this inferential necessity 
applies to the sub-doxastic level of perceptions as well as to judgments, and that the modality 
in question is that of epistemic normativity. 
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This narrow exegetical conclusion connects with a broader debate about the role of 
normative notions in Kant’s philosophy of mind. Recent decades have seen numerous 
attempts to interpret the project of the Critique of Pure Reason (henceforth ‘KrV’) as 
fundamentally normative in character. Allison argues that it “involves a radical 
reconfiguration of epistemic norms” and “serves as the epistemological counterpart of the 
shift from heteronomy to autonomy, which is […] the essence of Kant’s ‘revolution’ in 
ethics” (2004, p. xvi). O’Neill holds that, for Kant, a “critique of pure reason” is a “(quasi-
)juridical or political task” (1989b, p. 9).  McDowell reads Kant as attributing a normative 
status to all contentful mental representations, thereby giving a promising account of the 
relation between mind and world (1994). More recently, Pollok has argued that the central 
claim of Kant’s theoretical philosophy is that “synthetic judgments a priori must be 
acknowledged as the fundamental norms for our mathematical and empirical cognitions” 
(2017, p. 2). These normative interpretations of Kant’s project have primarily been advanced 
on the basis of general considerations about the KrV. Allison and O’Neill highlight broad 
structural similarities between Kant’s project in the KrV and his practical philosophy. O’Neill 
also cites Kant’s general methodological statements in the motto and prefaces to the KrV, and 
in its Doctrine of Method; as well as his obscure doctrine that practical reason has “primacy” 
over theoretical reason (KpV 5:119). O’Neill, McDowell and others also point to Kant’s 
extensive use of juridical metaphors both in characterizing his own project and in 
distinguishing it from the non-normative systems of Locke and Leibniz; and McDowell 
makes much of an alleged comparison between the “spontaneity” of the understanding and 
the freedom of practical reason. Pollok’s interpretation is also based on a normative reading 
of spontaneity (2017, p. 67) and on interpreting Kant’s remarks about the “transcendental 
unity of apperception” as a claim about the normative “imputability” of judgments (2017, p. 
64). 
The problem with relying on such ‘big picture’ considerations is that they leave 
indeterminate the scope of normativity in Kant’s project. Illustrating this dramatically, these 
normative interpretations differ widely over the breadth of normative import they find in KrV. 
O’Neill holds that only Kant’s regulative principles and “maxims of judgment” are normative 
in character (1989b, p. 19), a position also endorsed by Mudd (2016, p. 12). Allison and 
Pollok hold that all of Kant’s principles—the regulative principles of reason; the principles of 
the understanding; and even the principles of mathematics and science—are normative. 
Meanwhile, McDowell reads Kant as assigning a normative status to every intentional state, 
including intuitions. (Pollok appears also to hold that the “determination of sensibility” is 
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subject to normative constraint (2017, pp. 19, 224), but that this activity is inseparable from 
judgment (2017, pp. 19, 226).) To move forward, such approaches must be augmented with 
detail-oriented, bottom up investigations, which examine the viability of normative readings 
of particular aspects of Kant’s philosophy. 
Adding to the urgency of adopting a detail-oriented approach, Tolley (2006) has 
shown that there are tight limitations on the kinds of normative reading that are tenable. 
Focusing on Kant’s logic, Tolley argues that the mind must be capable of deviating from a set 
of laws, if those laws are to serve as normative imperatives for the mind’s operations. The 
devil is likely to lie in the detail of any normative reading, so proponents of normative 
interpretations must carefully specify the type of normativity in question and the relation 
between the normative standards and the actual operations of the mind. Existing work that 
exemplifies a detail-oriented approach includes O’Neill’s discussion of the “maxims of 
common human understanding” (1989, pp. 25f.); Ginsborg’s reading of Kant on empirical 
concept formation (1997); Mudd’s account of the normativity of the regulative principles 
(2016); and Tolley’s (2006), Lu-Adler’s (2017) and Leech’s (2017) discussions of 
normativity in Kant’s logic. The latter four are especially clear in detailing the relation 
between normative rules and mental activities. The present article advances the debate over 
normativity in Kant’s philosophy of mind in the same way: by offering a bottom-up account 
of the role of normativity in the mental activities discussed in the Second Analogy. My 
exegetical conclusion has important consequences for identifying the range of mental 
operations which, according to Kant, are subject to normative constraint. It shows that the 
mental operations responsible for “empirical cognition” must be subject to normative 
standards; and that this includes certain activities of the “power of the imagination”, by 
means of which a temporal structure is imposed on sensible material (thus providing some 
support for views like McDowell’s and Pollok’s, according to which the “determination of 
sensibility” is subject to normative standards). 
My argument runs as follows. Section 2 sketches the argument of the Second Analogy 
and locates the factor requiring further elucidation: the necessitation of a subjective ordering 
of perceptions. Section 3 presents the two major routes to explaining this notion—causal and 
conceptual accounts—and presents grounds for pursuing the latter. Section 4 provides 
compelling textual evidence for the existing view that it is the inferential role of the concept 
of cause that equips it for enabling objective temporal representation; and moves beyond 
existing scholarship to explain how this could impose necessity on a subjective ordering at 
the pre-judgmental level of perceptions. I argue that, on Kant’s account, a subject who makes 
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the presuppositions that Xs cause ABs
1
 and that X obtains is thereby “inferentially 
necessitated” to draw the conclusion that event AB occurs. Moreover, making the empirical 
judgment that AB occurs requires an act of synthesis in which the subject places her 
perceptions in a certain order, so this synthesis is also necessitated in the same sense. Section 
5 clarifies the notion of “inferential necessitation”. The text of the Second Analogy and 
Kant’s characterizations of logical laws strongly suggest that causal presuppositions make it 
normatively necessary for the subject to judge that AB occurs, and hence to place her 
perceptions in a certain order. In contemporary parlance, the necessity of the “order of 
perceptions” is a matter of epistemic normativity. Section 6 deals with an objection to the 
claim that inference could be subject to normative standards. Section 7 concludes by tracing 
the consequences of the article’s findings. 
2. The Argument of the Second Analogy 
The Second Analogy examines the preconditions for representing objective temporal 
sequence. Let’s illustrate the problem with an example: Jones watches his beloved snowman 
melt. For this to happen, Jones must have a mental representation with three features: (1) it 
must represent the initial state, i.e. the snowman standing tall; (2) it must represent the 
subsequent state, i.e. the melted snowman; and (3) it must represent the initial state as 
preceding the subsequent state. The problem is to explain how a mental state could represent 
(3), i.e. the objective temporal relation between the two states. 
 Kant’s discussion begins with a negative point: representation of objective temporal 
relations cannot be achieved simply by the fact that the representations of the two states occur 
successively in the mind. Although Jones perceives the snowman standing tall at t0; and 
perceives the melted snowman at t1, this mere successiveness is insufficient for the 
representation of objective temporal sequence, because successiveness is ubiquitous: “[t]he 
apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive” (A189/B234).2 Perceptual 
contents occur sequentially in the mind even when they represent coexistent, enduring 
features, as when one successively sees the different parts of a large house (A190/B235, 
A192f./B237f.). Since perceptions are always successive, even when the states perceived in 
fact coexist, successiveness of perceptions cannot have the semantic significance of denoting 
                                                 
1
 I follow Burge (2010) in using underlining to denote mental contents. 
2
 Cf. B233, A190/B235, A198/B243 and A201/B246. 
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objective succession, as opposed to coexistence.
3
 Kant emphasizes that it is the 
“arbitrariness” of the subjective sequence that renders it insufficient to carry objective 
representational purport: “The subjective sequence […] alone proves nothing about the 
connection of the manifold in the object, because it is entirely arbitrary.” (A193/B238) This 
arbitrariness results from the fact that, according to Kant, temporal relations among 
perceptual contents are introduced by the faculty of imagination, which is capable of placing 
them in any order: 
Connection [e.g. of “two perceptions in time”] is not the work of mere sense and 
intuition, but is here rather the product of a synthetic faculty of the imagination, which 
determines inner sense with regard to temporal relations. This [i.e. the imagination] 
[…] can combine the two states in question in two different ways, so that either one or 
the other precedes in time. (B233, cf. A201/B246)  
To illustrate, let’s return to Jones. At t0, Jones has a perception of the snowman 
standing tall (A), and at t1 of the melted snowman (B). A necessary condition of Jones’s 
representing the event of the snowman melting is that, while seeing the melted snowman, he 
is also conscious that previously the snowman was standing tall. This would, according to 
Kant, require Jones’s imagination to reproduce the perceptual content A, placing it before the 
perception of B in Jones’s inner sense. Yet the imagination has the power to freely combine 
sensory material. At t1, when it is in possession of all the relevant sensory material, the 
imagination can thus produce either subjective ordering—A then B, or B then A—with equal 
ease. Unless something removes this arbitrariness of subjective order, the subjective order 
cannot have the semantic significance of denoting the objective order in which states succeed 
each other. 
Kant’s positive account is that when the subjective order of perceptions is a necessary 
order, it can have the significance of denoting an objective temporal relation. Under certain 
conditions, the subjective order is irreversible—not arbitrary but necessary. This enables the 
perceptual representation of objective sequence. Cases in which we represent events as 
happening are distinguished by the fact that there is only one order in which the perceptual 
contents can be arranged: 
                                                 
3
 I hereby adopt a semantic rather than epistemic reading of Kant’s point, pace Beck (1978) and Guyer (1987). 
Watkins (2005) argues that epistemic readings of the Second Analogy will inevitably result in circularity, a 
contention borne out by Van Cleve’s (1999, pp. 128–32) attempt to repair Beck’s epistemic reading. 
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If in the case of an appearance that contains a happening [i.e. an event] I call the 
preceding state of perception A and the following one B, then B can only follow A in 
apprehension, but the perception A cannot follow but only precede B. (A192/B237) 
Kant illustrates this with the example of “a ship driven downstream” (A192/B237). In such 
cases, the subjective order is “determined”, “bound down” or rendered “necessary”, so that 
we are “necessitate[d] [...] to observe this order of the perceptions rather than another” 
(A196/B242; cf. A193/B238, A198/B243). This makes possible the representation of 
objective sequence. To enable objective temporal representation, something must render the 
subjective order of perceptions necessary. 
 This brings us to our central exegetical questions. What does it take for a subjective 
order of perceptions to be rendered necessary? What kind of mental operations are required, 
and how do they impose necessity on the subjective order? Furthermore, what kind of 
necessity is thereby imposed? My aim is to provide detailed answers to each of these 
questions. 
 Before proceeding, I will lay down a desideratum for the adequacy of any 
interpretation. Kant’s discussion of objective temporal representation forms part of his 
argument for a synthetic a priori principle, viz. the Causal Principle (i.e. that, within the 
domain of appearances, every event has a cause). Therefore, we should strongly prefer 
interpretations which fit Kant’s account of the necessitation of the subjective order into an 
internally coherent argument for the Causal Principle. 
3. Causal vs. Conceptual Interpretations of the Necessitation of a 
Subjective Order 
I now present the two families of interpretation that have dominated the literature, vis-à-vis 
the necessitation of the subjective order. Note that much of the work on the Second Analogy 
avoids taking a stand on the nature of this necessitation, focusing instead on the relationship 
between perceiving particular events and discovering specific causal laws (e.g. Buchdahl, 
1969b; Friedman, 1992a) or whether Kant’s conclusion has ontological or merely 
epistemological import (e.g. Guyer, 1987, ch. 10; Watkins, 2005, ch. 3) without detailing the 
theory of mental operations underlying Kant’s discussion. The work which does give an 
account of the necessitation of a subjective order falls neatly into two camps. Causal readings 
hold that it is the causal relations between the perceived states and the subject’s perceptions 
that fix a certain subjective order of perceptions as necessary. Conceptual readings hold that 
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it is the conceptual role of the concept of causation which imposes necessity on an order of 
perceptions. My aim in this section is to justify pursuing a conceptual reading by exhibiting 
grounds for scepticism about causal readings. Readers already convinced that the necessity of 
the subjective order arises due to the conceptual role of the concept of cause may skip to 
Section 4. 
The most famous among causal readings is Strawson’s (1966, pp. 133–140). 
Strawson argues that the causal dependence of perception upon worldly states, along with 
some modest assumptions about the causal chains involved, entails that, whenever we 
perceive an event, the subjective order of perceptions is causally necessary.
4
 However, he 
holds that the only way to get from this result to the Causal Principle is via a “non-sequitur of 
numbing grossness”. According to Strawson, Kant simply conflates the causal necessitation 
of the subject’s perception of the event with the causal necessitation of the event itself. The 
same charge of non sequitur is found in the causal readings of Lovejoy (1906), Pritchard 
(1909, pp. 288–91), Broad (1978, p. 168) and Walker (1978, p. 100). In accordance with the 
aforementioned desideratum, we should strongly prefer alternative readings if they are able to 
provide an interpretation with greater internal coherence. 
Beck’s (1978) causal reading seeks to avoid saddling Kant with a non sequitur. Beck 
argues that we must postulate causal connections between observed events, not just between 
those events and our perceptions, in order to recognize their objective order. His 
reconstruction runs as follows: 
1. Our subjective order [A then B] fails to differentiate between two objective 
orders—AB and BA. To recognize5 objective order AB, we need some way of 
ruling out the possibility that B precedes A. 
2. Supposing that A causes B is necessary and sufficient for ruling out the 
possibility that B precedes A (1978, p. 133), because “the schema of the concept 
[of causation] is [AB]-irreversibly” (1978, p. 151). 
3. Therefore, we can rule out the possibility that B precedes A if and only if we 
suppose that A causes B. 
                                                 
4
 Strawson describes the subjective order as being a matter of “logical” rather than “causal” necessity (1966, p. 
136) but since it is contingent on facts about the causal processes which produce perception, it is more 
accurately classified as causal necessity. Cf. Van Cleve (1973, p. 82). 
5
 I use the term “recognize” in order to gloss over the fact that Beck gives the argument an epistemic rather than 
semantic reading. Cf. fn. 3. 
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4. Therefore, we can recognize the objective order AB if and only if we hold that A 
causes B. 
This is a definite advance on Strawson: from (4) it follows that all recognizable temporal 
sequences are causal sequences—a promising step towards proving the Causal Principle. 
However, Beck’s reconstruction is inadequate in other respects. One glaring problem is that 
(2) is indefensible. That events of type A cause events of type B does not entail that B cannot 
precede A. Consider an oscillating system (e.g. a pendulum), in which one half of the cycle (a 
swing to the left) gives rise to an event qualitatively identical to the one that caused it (a 
swing to the right).
6
 Perhaps Beck’s reading can be rescued by reading A and B as referring 
to event-tokens rather than -types. It seems doubtful that this could be Kant’s meaning given 
his frequent insistence that what is required is a causal “rule” (e.g. A193/B238). Moreover, 
there are further interpretative problems which this would not fix. Beck’s reconstruction 
centres on a model in which we determine the order of two events by identifying a causal 
relation between them; in contrast, the dominant focus of Kant’s treatment is the case in 
which we identify an objective change, i.e. a single event, due to its being caused by some 
other state or event (cf. Guyer, 1987, p. 240). Therefore, we should not be satisfied with 
Beck’s reconstruction. 
Van Cleve (1999, pp. 128–32) attempts to repair Beck’s reconstruction by adopting 
the model of a cause triggering a change from A to B, rather than a causal relation between A 
and B, and by revising the notion of “irreversibility” at issue. However, in his revised 
reconstruction, it is the conceptual role of causal presuppositions, rather than de facto causal 
relationships, which imposes the required structure of necessity on the subjective order. 
Therefore, Van Cleve in effect abandons the causal reading in favour of a conceptual 
approach.
7
 
No attempt to explain the necessitation of a subjective order as arising from causal 
relations between the perceived events and the subject’s perceptions has succeeded in finding 
an internally coherent argument for the causal principle, despite repeated attempts.
8
 This is in 
sharp contrast to conceptual readings, which have found much to endorse in Kant’s 
argument. According to conceptual readings (e.g. Allison, 2004; Longuenesse, 2005; 
Melnick, 1973), when Kant speaks of the order of perceptions as being irreversible, this is not 
                                                 
6
 Cf. Van Cleve (1999). 
7
 In any case, Van Cleve argues that the argument as he reconstructs it is not cogent. 
8
 Further grounds for pessimism about ‘causal necessitation’ readings are provided by Van Cleve’s (1973, pp. 
84–7) criticism of Dryer. 
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a matter of causal necessitation of the acts of perceiving. Instead, it is an upshot of the 
conceptual role of the concept of cause. On this view, the mental operation of applying the 
concept of cause imposes necessity on the temporal order of one’s perceptions. 
Recent versions of the conceptual reading (Allison, 2004, p. 252; Longuenesse, 2005, 
p. 241) have converged on a coherent reconstruction of Kant’s argument for the Causal 
Principle: 
1. To represent an event, the subjective order of perceptions must be irreversible. 
2. For the subjective order of perceptions to be irreversible, they must be subsumed 
under the schema of causality. 
3. Therefore, application of the schema of causality is a necessary condition for the 
experience of an event. 
4. Therefore, restricting the domain to appearances (i.e. objects of possible experience), 
every event has a cause. 
This reconstruction is well supported textually. Longuenesse (2005, pp.253–8) identifies five 
expositions of this form of argument in the Second Analogy chapter, on the basis of close 
reading. 
It is a considerable strength that conceptual readings allow for a highly coherent 
reconstruction, well supported by the text. However, thus far they have been less successful 
in spelling out the nature of the necessitation of the subjective order. Allison provides little 
explanation, simply stating that necessity is introduced when we “subsume [perceptions] 
under […] the schema of causality” (2004, p. 252). Longuenesse gives more explanation, but 
recent scholarship has deemed her account to be “less than pellucid” (Osborne, 2006, p. 420). 
Therefore, in what follows, I will pursue a conceptual reading, with the aim of explaining 
fully how the concept of cause generates this necessitation and what form of necessity arises. 
4. Subjective Necessitation as Inferential Necessitation 
Our aim is to understand how deploying the concept of cause imposes necessity on the 
subjective order of perceptions. I begin by looking for textual clues. 
4.1 Textual Evidence 
The Second Analogy chapter contains five expositions of Kant’s argument for the Causal 
Principle. These share a common argumentative structure, but Kant adds various pieces of 
additional information with each attempt. In particular, the second and third expositions of 
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the argument
9
 provide more detail about how the mind operates in cases where it succeeds in 
representing an event or objective sequence. 
If, therefore, we experience that something happens, then we always presuppose 
[voraussetzen] that something else precedes it, which it follows in accordance with a 
rule. […] [O]nly under this presupposition [Voraussetzung] alone is the experience of 
something that happens even possible. (A195/B240) 
As soon as I perceive or presuppose [voraus annehmen] that there is in this sequence 
a relation to the preceding state, from which the representation follows in accordance 
with a rule, I represent something as an occurrence. (A198/B243) 
In both passages, Kant states that cases of successful event-representation are distinguished 
by the subject making a certain sort of “presupposition”. This presupposition (i) concerns the 
existence of some “preceding state”; and (ii) there is “a rule” such that, given the preceding 
state, the event must follow. When we compare (ii) with Kant’s analysis of the concept of 
causation, we see that it is simply the presupposition that the preceding state causes the event. 
Kant describes the “schema of cause” as “the real upon which, whenever it is posited, 
something else always follows. It therefore consists in the succession of the manifold insofar 
as it is subject to a rule” (A144/B183). (Kant equates the term “succession” with “change” 
(B233), which the First Analogy has shown to be equivalent to “event”.) So what Kant is 
saying is that in order for a subject to represent the event AB, she must presuppose (i) that 
some state X obtains, and presuppose the causal rule (ii) that Xs cause ABs.
10
 For example, in 
order for Jones to represent the snowman melting, Jones must presuppose that some state 
obtains with respect to the snowman, and that this kind of state causes such objects to melt. It 
might be that Jones already believes a causal rule, such as that sunshine causes objects made 
of snow to melt, and judges that the sun is shining on the snowman on the basis of perception. 
(This explains Kant’s phrasing, “perceive or presuppose”, in the third exposition 
(A198/B243).) But Kant also allows the possibility that the subject does not know what state 
causes the event (A199/B244), in which case the content of Jones’s presuppositions would be 
                                                 
9
 Second exposition = A194f./B239f.; third exposition = A198-201/B243-6. I follow Longuenesse’s numbering 
(2005, pp. 253–8). 
10
 I set aside the fraught question of how Kant gets from causal rules to universal causal laws. In my view, Kant 
holds that the concept of causation analytically entails causation according to universal laws (B5, A91/B124, G 
4:446, KU 5:195, RGV 6:35). Cf. Chapter 2. 
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that some unknown state obtains with respect to this snowman and the causal rule that that 
type of state causes snowmen to melt.
11
 
How do subjects select specific causal presuppositions, and what is their justification 
in doing so? Kant’s answer comes not in the Second Analogy but in his account of the 
“regulative principles” in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and the Introduction 
to the Critique of Judgment. Kant gives a normative account rather than a description of our 
actual hypothesis-forming process (KU 5:182). He provides a transcendental argument for 
our entitlement to select more “unified” theories, e.g. by preferring theories that describe a 
world governed by a smaller number of more general causal laws (A650/B678; KU 5:182).
12
 
Kant insists (A651/B679) that we do not antecedently perceive events to which we try to fit 
our hypotheses. Instead, the very process of converting sensory material into representations 
of events must take place against a background of framing causal hypotheses, which always 
remain subject to later revision. Both in selecting and in revising our bodies of causal 
hypotheses and judgments about events, we tend to prefer simpler, more unified theories, and 
are entitled to do so. A full understanding of Kant’s account of hypothesis-formation would 
require arbitrating the debate over the move from causal rules to universal laws: do subjects 
begin with mere causal rules which are only later replaced by universal laws, or does the 
Second Analogy already entail a subject forming hypotheses about universal laws? I lack 
space to resolve this here (cf. fn. 10; Chapter 3). 
                                                 
11
 Must the subject’s causal assumptions match the physical laws which Kant (in Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science) argues are transcendentally necessary? In my view, Kant holds that all subjects’ perceptions 
necessarily conform to these laws and that the transcendental philosopher can discover this fact and these laws 
by reflecting on the preconditions of experience (as Kant does in Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science). 
Nevertheless, this is compatible with many subjects failing to believe those laws, or even believing divergent 
laws, e.g. Aristotelian physics. Therefore, Kant does not hold that subjects always make causal assumptions that 
are in line with the physical laws derived in Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (though any 
assumptions contrary to them will in fact be false). 
12
 These sections deal most explicitly with reason’s attempts to unify the judgments and concepts delivered by 
the understanding, but Kant also writes that the “regulative use” of the “transcendental ideas” “direct[s] the 
understanding to a certain goal respecting which the lines of direction of all its rules converge at one point” 
(A644/B672) and that “without [“the law of reason to seek unity”] we would have […] no coherent use of the 
understanding” (A651/B679). In other words, the drive towards unity is operative at the initial stage of forming 
causal hypotheses (examples of which are given at A646/B674 and A662f./B690f.), not just the subsequent 
stage of revising these in pursuit of systematicity. 
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We now have a partial account of the mental activities that enable the representation 
of objective temporal sequence: to represent an event AB, the subject must presuppose X and 
Xs cause ABs. However, further clarification is still needed. How and in what sense do these 
causal presuppositions render a certain ordering of perceptions necessary? 
4.2 Causation and Hypothetical Inference 
Some commentators have suggested that the inferential role of cause is what equips it to 
enable temporal representation. Melnick emphasizes that “a causal law is precisely a rule that 
allows us, on the basis of features of appearances, to conclude to a certain temporal ordering 
of appearances” (1973, p. 91). Longuenesse (2005) espouses a similar view, though some 
critics have found her proposal hard to decipher (Osborne, 2006, p. 420). This subsection 
defends the view that the inferential role of cause is crucial, while Section 4.3 goes beyond 
existing proposals to explain how this relates to the pre-judgmental level of the ordering of 
perceptions. 
There is considerable textual evidence that it is the logical structure which the concept 
of cause embodies and the form of inference it supports which is decisive. Kant draws a close 
connection between the concept of causation and the logical structure of the hypothetical 
conditional. In his derivation of the Table of the Categories (A80/B105) from the Table of 
Judgments (A70/B95), the pure concept of cause and effect corresponds to the logical 
structure of the “hypothetical” proposition (A70/B95, A73/B98). Kant’s hypothetical 
conditional expresses a non-truth-functional “connection [Verknüpfung]” between its 
antecedent and consequent, which Kant calls “consequence [Consequenz]”. When the 
antecedent holds, the consequent also holds, and the former is the “ground [Grund]” of the 
latter (Log 9:105f.; cf. Longuenesse 2005, pp. 236–8). According to Kant, causal judgments 
are a species of hypothetical judgments. Therefore, to make the causal judgment that X 
causes Y is a fortiori to make the hypothetical judgment that if X, then Y (where this 
involves a non-truth-functional grounding connection).  
In its schematized form, the concept of causation adds further spatio-temporal content 
to this logical structure. Specifically, the antecedent is restricted to “the real” (A144/B183), 
i.e. states of objects “in time” (A143/B182); the consequent is restricted to temporal 
“successions” (A144/B183), which Kant equates with “changes” or “events” (see above); and 
the grounding connection between them (i.e. “consequence”) is restricted to a certain 
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direction in time, such that the event “follows” the triggering state (A144/B183).13 As with all 
categories, this process of schematization leaves the “logical meaning” of the concept of 
cause intact—it in no way lessens the connection between causal judgments and hypothetical 
judgments. Schematization merely adds extra content, which “restricts” the sphere of 
possibilia falling under the concept, whilst enabling the application of these pure concepts to 
objects of experience (A146f./B185f.). 
Given that causal judgments embody hypothetical conditionals, it follows that they 
support a kind of inference, namely the hypothetical syllogism. In the Jäsche Logic, Kant 
describes how hypothetical conditionals support two valid forms of inference: modus ponens 
and modus tollens (9:106). As one would expect given the intimate relation between 
causation and the hypothetical conditional, Kant frequently associates causal judgments with 
just these kinds of inference. He writes that the “concept of cause” is the concept of 
“something that allows an inference to the existence of something else” (A243/B301); that it 
is “required” for us to be able to “infer a consequence from the existence of given 
determinations of things” (KpV 5:51, Kant’s emphasis); and that “what the concept of cause 
says” is “that one thing [is] such that, if it is posited, a second thing must thereby necessarily 
be posited” (Prol 4:257; cf. G 4:446). He equates the applicability of the “concept of 
causality” with the viability of inferences of the form “because one thing A is posited, 
another thing B must also necessarily be posited” (KpV 5:53).14 Commenting on the 
Prolegomena passage, Longuenesse notes that Kant’s phrasing “reproduces, almost word for 
word, Christian Wolff’s description of the inference in modus ponens in a hypothetical 
syllogism”, viz. “If, in a hypothetical syllogism, the antecedent is posited, the consequent 
must also be posited” (2005, p. 235). 
Kant’s view is that the judgment that Xs cause ABs involves the same logical content 
that is involved in the hypothetical conditional if X, then AB. A fortiori, this causal judgment 
is subject to the same inference-rules as the hypothetical conditional. In particular, it supports 
an inference in modus ponens: if a subject believes that Xs cause ABs, and now posits that X 
obtains, then she “must necessarily posit” that AB occurs. 
                                                 
13
 Kant holds that most effects start as soon as their causes are present, but that since events have a temporal 
duration, they nevertheless “follow” their causes in an important sense (A202f./B247–9). 
14
 Kannisto (2017, pp. 510–2) argues that causal inferences are not possible until the move from causal rules to 
universal causal laws has been made. The passages cited, which demonstrate that for Kant the mere applicability 
of the concept of cause supports hypothetical inferences, suggest either that Kannisto is wrong to ascribe this 
view to Kant or that the concept of cause entails lawful causation (cf. fn. 10). 
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What are the consequences of this for our understanding of the Second Analogy? We 
can now clearly see the relation between the causal presuppositions identified above and the 
representation that AB occurs. The presuppositions that Xs cause ABs and that X obtains 
serve as the premises of a hypothetical syllogism, of which the judgment that AB occurs is 
the conclusion. This reading is supported by Kant’s use of the language of a hypothetical 
syllogism in modus ponens in the fourth exposition
15
 of the argument of the Second Analogy: 
“something [i.e. some state] […] precedes, and when this is posited, the other [i.e. the event] 
must necessarily follow.” (A201/B246) Any subject who assents to those presuppositions 
must draw the conclusion that AB occurs.  To capture Kant’s language of what the subject 
“must necessarily posit”, we can say that it is “inferentially necessary” for a subject who 
makes these presuppositions to draw the conclusion that AB occurs.  Returning to our 
example, now that Jones believes (i) that the sun is shining on this snowman and (ii) that 
sunshine causes snowmen to melt, it is inferentially necessary for him to draw the conclusion 
(iii) that this snowman melts. 
We now have a well motivated account of how the conceptual role of cause imposes a 
kind of necessity on the subject’s mental activities. When she deploys the concept in certain 
causal presuppositions, it becomes inferentially necessary for her to judge that a certain event 
has occurred. We are well on our way to a fully explicit account of how the concept of cause 
can render the subjective order of perceptions necessary, but some questions still remain. 
Firstly, how does the inferential necessitation of making a judgment relate to the ordering of 
perceptions (Section 4.3)? Secondly, what kind of modality is at stake in this notion of 
inferential necessity (Section 5)?  
4.3 Inferential Necessitation of a Subjective Order of Perceptions 
In the previous subsection, I argued that the causal presuppositions X obtains and Xs cause 
ABs make the judgment that AB occurs inferentially necessary. Does this suffice for 
rendering the subjective order of perceptions necessary? What we have said so far has dealt 
only with the doxastic level of “judgments [Urteile]”, while Kant’s argument seems to turn 
on the sub-doxastic level of “perceptions [Wahrnehmungen]”. Kant holds that inferences 
always operate at the level of judgments (Log 9:114), so it is not obvious how the inferential 
role of these causal presuppositions could relate to the level of “perceptions”. My task in this 
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 Fourth exposition = A201f./B246f.. Cf. fn. 9. 
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subsection is to explain how the inferential necessitation of a judgment translates into the 
necessitation of a subjective order of perceptions. 
One possibility is to revise our interpretation of the argument, taking Kant’s subject 
matter to be the necessitation of judgments, rather than the necessitation of an ordering of 
perceptions. On this reading, having explained the inferential necessity of judging that AB 
occurs, our interpretative task would be complete.
16
 There is some support for this approach: 
Kant’s stated aim in the Analogies of Experience is to establish claims about “empirical 
cognition” (B218-9; Prol 4:310), which is usually taken to imply that he is operating at the 
level of judgments. Nevertheless, the text of the Second Analogy makes it clear that the 
necessitation of the pre-judgmental activity of “apprehension” is central to Kant’s concerns. 
Kant’s discussion turns on the order of “perceptions” being irreversible, not just on certain 
judgments being necessary (A192/B237); on the “subjective order of apprehension” and with 
the subjection of apprehension to a rule (A193/B238; A195/B240; A200/B245). Moreover, 
Kant holds that the result of the Second Analogy is “the formal condition of all perception” 
(A199/B244). To deny that Kant is concerned with the necessitation of a subjective order of 
perceptions, we would have to interpret him as continually misstating his point.
17
 
Furthermore, a key conclusion of the Transcendental Deduction was that “all synthesis, 
through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the categories” (B161). 
Accordingly, it is natural to expect implications for the synthesis of apprehension within the 
System of Principles.
18
 Unless it proves completely impossible to find one, we should seek an 
explanation of how the inferential necessitation of a judgment brings with it the necessitation 
of a subjective order of perceptions. 
The key to understanding this connection is Kant’s view that empirical judgments 
involve the synthesizing of perceptions: “[e]xperience is an empirical cognition, i.e., a 
cognition that determines an object through perceptions. It is therefore a synthesis of 
perceptions […] [and] contains the synthetic unity of the manifold of perception in one 
consciousness” (B218, cf. A764/B792). Kant holds that judgments about specific worldly 
states, objects and events, such as the judgment that AB occurs, must be “empirical 
cognitions”, which, as this passage explains, means that they must involve the synthesizing of 
                                                 
16
 For independent reasons, Allison takes this route (2004, p. 230). 
17
 Commenting on Kant’s use of the phrase “rule of apprehension” (A191/B236), Allison accuses Kant of being 
“misleading” (2004, p. 234). However, he seems to underestimate the frequency of passages that jar with his 
reading. 
18
 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
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sensible material. This is an upshot of Kant’s view that the representations of the 
understanding cannot have “relation to an object” unless they stand in the right relation to 
sensibility: “we cannot cognize any object […] except through intuitions that correspond to 
those concepts.” (B165; cf. A50/B74) Without taking a stance on what kind of content 
intuitions have or what is required for an intuition to “correspond” to a concept, we can say 
that for the “empirical cognition” that AB occurs to be possible, the subject must produce a 
perception which corresponds to it, by synthesizing sensory material. 
 What kind of “synthesis of perceptions” might be required to produce a perception 
corresponding to the judgment that AB occurs? Presumably, it would consist of a perception 
of A and a perception of B. These perceptions would have to be put together into a 
temporally structured whole, with the temporal dimension provided by the form of inner 
sense. In other words, to produce a perception corresponding to the judgment that AB occurs, 
the subject would have to “place” a perception of A before a perception of B. This act of 
arranging perceptions into a certain form would be part of the “synthesis of apprehension”, 
carried out by the “power of imagination”. In our example, Jones’s “power of imagination” 
would “place” a perception of the snowman standing tall prior to a perception of the melted 
snowman, on the canvas provided by the a priori intuition of time. This picture fits well both 
with Kant’s descriptions of the imagination’s synthesizing activities prior to the formation of 
judgments (A98–103, B151–6, B160f.); and with Kant’s repeated descriptions in the Second 
Analogy of a “synthesis of apprehension” in which the “power of the imagination” “places” 
or “connects perceptions” (B223) in a certain “order” (B223; A193/B238).19 
Given that this activity of placing the perception of A before the perception of B is 
required for the activity of judging that event AB occurs, it is intuitively plausible that any 
                                                 
19
 Does this view of the imagination’s activities commit me to a “conceptualist” interpretation of Kant? No. The 
account does not deny that the content of intuitions includes features which cannot be represented by concepts 
(cf. Allais, 2009; Tolley, 2013). Nor does it claim that individual intuitions would be impossible without acts of 
synthesis (cf. McLear, 2014; Tolley, 2013). Nor does the account deny that temporally extended sequences of 
intuition could be produced without a contribution from the understanding—intuitions could be placed in a 
temporal sequence by merely associative processes (cf. Hanna, 2005). However, I do read Kant as insisting that 
those associative processes would not produce perceptions with objective temporal contents, an interpretation 
which seems obligatory for understanding the Second Analogy. The account is therefore not entirely neutral 
about the relation between sensibility and understanding: I maintain that perceptions produced in the context of 
activities that also implicate the understanding can have a certain kind of content which perceptions produced 
independently of the understanding would lack. However, this thesis is quite compatible with all but the most 
extreme of non-conceptualist positions. 
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forms of necessity applying to the latter would also apply to the former. If a subject must 
judge that AB occurs, she must a fortiori perform the mental activities constitutive of making 
that judgment. Now, as argued in the previous subsection, when the subject makes 
presuppositions of the form X and Xs cause ABs, this makes it inferentially necessary for the 
subject to judge that event AB occurs. Therefore, it follows that making those presuppositions 
also makes it inferentially necessary for the subject to place the perception of A before the 
perception of B.
20
 When this act of synthesis is a constituent part of forming a judgment, and 
the judgment in question is one that is inferentially necessary, the synthesis is not an arbitrary 
act stemming from idiosyncrasies of the subject. Rather, it is necessary in just the same sense 
that the judgment itself is necessary. The presuppositions that render the judgment 
inferentially necessary also render the subjective order of perceptions inferentially necessary: 
the activity of placing the perceptions in that order becomes something that the subject must 
do, given her assent to the premises of the causal inference. 
We now have a full account of the mental activities which, according to Kant, render 
the representation of objective temporal order possible: the subject makes certain causal 
presuppositions; these presuppositions render it inferentially necessary for the subject to draw 
the conclusion that a certain event occurs, and thereby render inferentially necessary the 
particular subjective order of perceptions that is required for drawing that conclusion. In the 
next section, we look more closely at the central term in this account, namely inferential 
necessitation. 
5. Inferential Necessitation is Normative Necessitation 
In what sense, for Kant, must a subject assent to the conclusion of a causal inference for 
which she believes the premises? In what sense must she place her perceptions in the 
subjective order that is “inferentially necessary”? This section argues that the ‘must’ is 
normative. The necessitation of judging that AB occurs, and of performing the acts of 
synthesis constitutive of making that judgment, is a matter of epistemic normativity. 
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 If inferential necessitation behaves like an alethic necessity operator, then this is a consequence of the 
Distribution Axiom: □J (“Judging AB is inferentially necessary.”), □(J→P) (“In order to judge AB, one must 
place A before B.”), □(J→P)→(□J→□P) (an instance of the Distribution Axiom) ⊢ □P (“Placing A before B is 
inferentially necessary”). Alternatively, if inferential necessitation behaves like a deontic obligation operator (as 
I will argue), then the same follows by an analogue of the Hypothetical Imperative: One ought to judge AB. 
Placing A before B is a necessary means to judging AB. If one ought to φ, then one ought also to carry out the 
means necessary for φ-ing.  Therefore, one ought to place A before B. 
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“Normativity” is not a term used by Kant (though he does use the term “norm” in the 
sense of “model or guideline for assessment”21); so let me first pre-empt the worry that it is 
anachronistic to claim that normativity plays a central role in the Second Analogy. Normative 
facts or statements are those which deal in ‘oughts’, ‘shoulds’, reasons, duties, etc. In several 
contexts throughout his critical philosophy, Kant draws distinctions between what, in modern 
parlance, we can call the normative and the non-normative. Consider the contrast between 
“natural philosophy” and “moral philosophy” presented in the Groundwork: “the first 
[determines certain laws] as laws in accordance with which everything happens, the second 
[determines certain laws] as laws in accordance with which everything ought to happen” 
(4:387f.). Another such contrast occurs when Kant introduces the “maxims of the power of 
judgment”: “they do not say what happens, i.e., in accordance with which rule our powers of 
cognition actually perform their role and how things are judged, but rather how they ought to 
be judged.” (KU 5:182) Other cases in which Kant draws this distinction include his remarks 
about the nature of logic (see below); the kind of necessity to which aesthetic judgments are 
subject (KU 5:239); and perhaps (though this is controversial) the famous distinction between 
“questions about what is lawful (quid juris)” and “[questions] which concern the facts (quid 
facti)” (A84/B116, amended), i.e. the distinction between the way we use certain concepts 
and the way that we would be “justified” to use them (A84/B116).  The modern term 
“normativity” gives us a useful way to designate one side of Kant’s contrast, picking out 
claims concerning what we “ought” to do or would be “justified” in doing, rather than what 
merely is. 
I now explain the proposal that causal presuppositions normatively necessitate a 
judgment and a fortiori an ordering of perceptions. What difference do the causal 
presuppositions make, vis-à-vis the judgment that AB occurs? One important factor is that a 
subject who believes that X and that Xs cause ABs has conclusive reason to believe that AB 
occurs: those presuppositions justify that conclusion. The proposal is that for the judgment to 
be inferentially necessitated is for it to be justified in this way. 
Is there any basis for ascribing this kind of view to Kant? The first piece of evidence 
is that Kant explicitly talks in terms of “justification” within the Second Analogy:  
[A] rule is always to be found in the perception of that which happens, and it makes 
the order of perceptions that follow one another (in the apprehension of this 
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appearance) necessary. […] This connection must therefore consist in the order of the 
manifold of appearance in accordance with which the apprehension of one thing (that 
which happens) follows that of the other (which precedes) in accordance with a rule. 
Only thereby can I be justified in saying of the appearance itself, and not merely of 
my apprehension, that a sequence is to be encountered in it, which is to say as much 
as that I cannot arrange the apprehension otherwise than in exactly this sequence. 
(A193/B238, emphasis added) 
Here, Kant begins by repeating the claim that the representation of events is only possible 
when the “order of perceptions” is rendered “necessary”. Next, he asserts that this necessity 
can only be created by positing a causal connection between a state “which precedes” and the 
event itself. Finally, Kant explains that the difference made by positing this causal relation is 
that the subject is “thereby justified” in making the claim that an event has occurred. 
Explicitly, it is the epistemic or justificatory role of the causal presuppositions that is crucial 
in rendering the “order of perceptions” “necessary”. 
This language of “justifying” is repeated in his second exposition of the argument:  
If, therefore, we experience that something happens, then we always presuppose that 
something else precedes it, which it follows in accordance with a rule. For without 
this I would not say of the object that it follows, since the mere sequence in my 
apprehension, if it is not, by means of a rule, determined in relation to something 
preceding, does not justify any sequence in the object. (A195/B240, emphasis added) 
Without making the causal presuppositions, Kant writes, the subject would not be justified in 
making a claim that there is a “sequence in the object”, i.e. an objective order of states. The 
difference that the presuppositions make is a matter of what they “justify”. These passages 
strongly support the conclusion that the causal presuppositions’ “necessitation” of a particular 
ordering of perceptions is a matter of epistemic normativity. 
The same conclusion is also supported by Kant’s apparently normative conception of 
the laws of logic. As argued in Section 5, the necessitation of a judgment by causal 
presuppositions turns on the inference-rules governing the hypothetical conditional. In the 
Jäsche Logik we find the following characterization of the rules of logic: 
Logic is […] a science of the correct use of the understanding and of reason in 
general, not subjectively, however, i.e., not according to empirical (psychological) 
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principles of how the understanding does think, but objectively, i.e., according to 
principles a priori for how it ought to think. (9:16, amended, emphasis added) 
In logic [...] the question is not about [...] how we do think, but how we ought to think 
... In logic we do not want to know how the understanding is and does think and how 
it has previously proceeded in thought, but rather how it ought to proceed in thought. 
(9:14, emphasis added) 
In both passages, Kant draws the normative/non-normative distinction and firmly locates the 
laws of logic on the normative side. Tolley has raised doubts over whether these remarks 
about the nature of logic represent “Kant’s ‘considered’ or ‘mature’ (‘Critical’) position” 
(2006, p. 398). (Tolley also raises substantive concerns, which are discussed below in Section 
6.) However, the hypothesis that these remarks are remnants of a pre-Critical view is belied 
by the existence of similar remarks in lecture-transcripts from the Critical period: 
We can divide the laws of our understanding in the following way[:] 
1. Rules for how we think. 
2. Rules for how we ought to think. 
Sometimes we think completely wrong-headedly. This use can never agree with the 
rules. This is the misuse of the understanding and is excluded here. Logic teaches the 
latter [i.e. “rules for how we ought to think”], namely, how to use the objective rules 
of our understanding. (V-Lo/Wiener 24:791) 
Logical rules are not ones according to which we think, but according to which we 
ought to think. (V-Lo/Dohna 24:694) 
Kant holds that we often fail to think in accordance with the logical laws laid out in the 
course of the lectures. But the principles of logic are not descriptions of how we happen to 
think. Rather, they constitute standards for how we ought to think. Kant links this normative 
conception of logic with his notion of “critique”: 
[Logic] is useful and indispensable as a critique of cognition, however, or for passing 
judgment on common as well as on speculative reason, not in order to teach it, but 
only to make it correct and in agreement with itself. (Log 9:20, Kant’s emphasis; cf. 
Log 9:15, Log 9:16, V-Lo/Wiener 24:792, V-Lo/Dohna 24:694f.) 
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Far from being a remnant of Kant’s pre-Critical thought, his normative conception of logic is 
intimately connected with his mature conception of philosophy as providing a critique of our 
mental faculties. The procedure appears to be this: first, we reflect on the nature of the 
understanding and identify principles that are universally valid, rather than being plausible 
only due to some bias that we happen to have.
22
 Next, we use this body of principles as a 
“doctrine” for “critiquing” the actual patterns of thought of ourselves and others. This step 
may be supplemented by empirical discoveries about what errors we are most prone to make. 
Kant terms this empirically informed project “applied logic” (A53/B77, Log 9:18). We would 
therefore be unjustified in taking Kant’s remarks on the normativity of logic to be a remnant 
of his pre-Critical views. Rather, we should try to accommodate Kant’s mature 
characterization of logic as another facet of his critical project, in which reflecting on the 
nature of our faculties provides us with certain epistemic standards, which can then be used to 
root out error. Kant holds that the principles of logic, and a fortiori the rules of hypothetical 
inference, are normative in character, providing standards of “how we ought to think” (Log 
9:14). 
To sum up the argument of this section, we have found significant textual evidence 
that inferential necessitation is a form of epistemic normativity. This evidence was found 
both in the Second Analogy and in Kant’s general statements about the nature of logical laws. 
The sense in which Jones must draw the conclusion of a hypothetical syllogism when he 
believes its premises is that he ought to draw that conclusion, and will be open to epistemic 
criticism if he does not. Making causal presuppositions imposes a normative structure on the 
subject’s mental operations. It is this normative necessity that removes the arbitrariness of 
these operations, thereby enabling objective purport. Once Jones presupposes that the sun is 
shining on the snowman and that sunshine causes snowmen to melt, his judgment that the 
snowman melts is not made arbitrarily but on the basis of a conclusive reason. Similarly the 
synthesis of perceptions required to make that judgment—placing a perception of the 
snowman standing tall before a perception of the melted snowman—is not an arbitrary 
activity stemming from the subjective constitution of Jones’s mind, but an activity that is 
normatively necessary. This normatively necessary subjective order is the feature of Jones’s 
perception in virtue of which it represents an objective temporal sequence. 
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Section 6. 
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6. Objection: Normativity and the Possibility of Deviation 
We found ample textual evidence that inferential necessity is normative. However, Tolley 
(2006) argues that we cannot coherently attribute to Kant the claim that logical rules are 
normative. This section deals with Tolley’s objection. 
Tolley argues that Kant is committed to the following claims: 
1.  For a rule to be normative for a subject, it must be possible for the subject to 
deviate from that rule. 
2. It is not possible for thinkers to deviate from the rules of logic. 
From these commitments, it follows that it would be incoherent for Kant to hold that the rules 
of logic are normative for thinkers. I will not question Kant’s commitment to (1),23 but will 
argue that Tolley is wrong to attribute (2) to him. 
What would it mean for a thinker to deviate from the laws of logic? Focusing on the 
laws relevant to our topic, logic sets out which forms of inference are valid. To deviate from 
these laws would simply be to make an invalid inference. If Kant holds that it is possible for 
thinkers to make invalid inferences, then he is not committed to (2). 
Is there evidence that Kant thinks that it is possible to make an invalid inference? 
Kant’s discussion of “logical illusion” in KrV clearly shows his commitment to the idea that 
we sometimes make invalid inferences, which offend against certain logical rules: “Logical 
illusion, which consists in the mere imitation of the form of reason (the illusion of fallacious 
inferences [Trugschlüsse]) arises solely from a failure of attentiveness to the logical rule” 
(A296/B353). Consequently, one of the tasks of formal logic is to “discover false illusion in 
the form of syllogisms” (A333/B390). Similarly, at least some of the errors Kant identifies in 
the Dialectic arise from fallacious inference—the Paralogisms are the result of making a 
“fallacious inference [Fehlschluss]” due to an ambiguous term in the premises (A341/B399); 
and similarly the “cosmological syllogism” which produces the ‘Antinomies’ is a “mistake” 
arising from an ambiguous term. The Hechsel Logic also shows Kant describing formally 
invalid inferences not as impossible but as “erroneous or false”: 
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defends the normativity of logic in Kant by decoupling normativity and possible deviation in this way. 
However, since I interpret inferential necessitation as imperatival, I accept (1) for the purposes of discussion. 
Epistemic Normativity in Kant’s Second Analogy 
27 
 
In regard to truth, the syllogismus is divided into true, and erroneous or false. An 
inference can be false, in such a way that the error lies either in materia or in forma. 
The inference suffers from an error […] in forma if the consequentia is drawn falsely 
from true premises. (V-Lo/Hechsel, LV 2:455) 
The propositions in an inference can be true, but the inference can nonetheless be 
false as to form, i.e., a fallacy. (V-Lo/Hechsel, LV 2:469) 
Kant consistently endorses the possibility of deviating from the laws of valid inference, and 
hence denies (2) vis-à-vis these rules. Indeed, the notion that humans are naturally driven to 
certain violations of the rules of correct inference is central to his conception of reason. It 
follows that there is no reason to think that Kant denies that the rules for valid hypothetical 
syllogisms can be violated by thinkers.
24
 We can reject Tolley’s argument against the 
normativity of this logical rule and uphold the suggestion that the causal presuppositions X 
and Xs cause ABs make it normatively necessary for the subject to judge that AB occurs. 
 Tolley backs up his claim that it is impossible for thinkers to deviate from the rules of 
logic by contrasting the activity of thinking with the activities governed by moral laws (2006, 
p. 374). In the moral case, humans have a capacity to choose freely whether or not to obey 
the laws, while in thought we seem to have no such “Willkür-correlate”. How can we 
reconcile this point with the thesis that rules of causal inference are normative? For our 
purposes it makes sense to discuss this vis-à-vis causal inference, rather than reasoning in 
general. Is there a “Willkür-correlate” in play in the domain of causal inference? 
 To answer this question, we need to understand what kind of “Willkür-correlate” is 
required for normative constraint. Kant elucidates the term “choice [Willkür]” as “[t]he 
faculty of desire […] [i]nsofar as it is joined with one’s consciousness of the ability to bring 
about its object by one’s actions” (MS 6:213). This capacity is called free if it “can be 
determined by pure reason”, i.e. if it is capable of selecting maxims on the basis of their 
adherence to the moral law. But in humans, “choice [Willkür]” is also influenced by 
“sensible” factors, namely “inclination, or sensible impulse”. As Tolley acknowledges, it is 
the fact that the faculty of desire is subject to these “possibly obstructive forces” (2006, p. 
373) that makes deviation from the moral law possible and thereby renders the moral law 
imperatively normative. We might be tempted to think that it is the element of “choice” that 
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renders the moral law normative. However, Kant’s position is that the combination of 
determination by a (self-imposed)
25
 law and influence by “possibly obstructive forces” is the 
key ingredient for normativity. This is made manifest by Kant’s explicit application of 
normative standards to other activities that are not within the purview of the “faculty of 
desire”, notably aesthetic judgments (KU 5:239) and the systematizing activities of reason 
and reflective judgment (KU 5:182; Mudd, 2016). For Kant, normative constraint does not 
depend on the presence of a capacity for choice, but rather on the presence of “possibly 
obstructive forces”. 
 Are “possibly obstructive forces” in play in the domain of causal inference? Yes. As 
discussed, making causal judgments about particular objects is not possible without a 
contribution from sensibility. It is for this reason that, in order to move from the premises X 
and Xs cause ABs to the conclusion AB occurs, a subject must carry out a certain synthesis of 
perceptions. Kant states in the introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic that once 
sensibility is in the frame, a force is in play that can cause the mind to deviate from the “laws 
of the understanding” (A350f./B294f.; cf. Log 9:53f.). Indeed, Tolley accepts that his 
argument has no force for domains in which the understanding works in tandem with other 
faculties such as sensibility (2006, pp. 374, 399) and freely admits that logical rules may be 
normative when “applied” to those domains. Tolley fails to consider the possibility that the 
self-same formal laws which are discovered in pure logic might be normative for human 
subjects applying those laws in empirical judgment, but I see no reason for ruling this out. In 
the context of causal inference, sensibility constitutes the “possibly obstructive force” that 
makes deviation from logical rules possible, and thereby qualifies them as normative. 
7. Conclusion 
The necessitation of an ordering of perceptions is a form of inferential necessitation, resulting 
from the subject’s causal presuppositions. This inferential necessitation is a form of epistemic 
normativity. The interpretation for which I have argued makes good sense of Kant’s text, fits 
well with his argumentative aims and coheres closely with his broader position on the nature 
of causal inference. If correct, this interpretation shows that normative notions are in play 
right in the heart of Kant’s Transcendental Analytic and that his conception of cognition turns 
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at a crucial point on the idea that the mind’s operations are normatively structured: it is this 
very normative structure, imposed by causal presuppositions and rules of logical inference, 
that enables the representation of objective temporal sequence. What’s more, I have argued 
that to understand Kant’s text, we have to see this normative structure as extending beyond 
the level of judgment and encompassing the “synthesis of apprehension” carried out by the 
imagination, in which sensible material is placed in a temporal order. I have therefore found 
support for Pollok’s (2017) view that, for Kant, the “determination of sensibility” is subject to 
normative standards. 
 To further clarify this conclusion and to pre-empt misunderstandings, let me 
emphasize what this conclusion is not. I have not argued that the Causal Principle is itself a 
normative principle. On the interpretation I have given, it is alethically necessary that, for all 
events AB and all subjects S, AB is only perceptible to S if S judges AB to be caused. A 
subject who places a perception of A before a perception of B without presupposing that 
something causes event AB does not thereby produce a perception of AB that is defective in 
some respect, but fails to produce a perception with objective temporal content. Therefore, 
the Causal Principle is a non-normative, alethic modal principle about perceptible events. 
Thus,  my interpretation of the Second Analogy should not be taken as supporting Allison’s 
(2004, p. xvi) and Pollok’s (2017, p. 2) view that “synthetic judgments a priori” such as the 
Causal Principle serve as “norms” for cognition. On my view, it is adherence to the Causal 
Principle, not being assessable with regard to it, that conditions the possibility of objective 
temporal contents, and hence of objectively valid judgments about events. In this I agree with 
Pollok’s claim that adherence to such principles is constitutive of “objective validity” in 
theoretical cognition (2017, pp. 10, 140f.); however, I see no reason to follow Pollok in 
claiming that the Causal Principle serves as a norm for judgments more broadly, e.g. the 
judgment that God spontaneously created the world (2017, pp. 10, 140f.). As I see it, neither 
the Transcendental Dialectic nor Kant’s positive account of rational faith bears out the claim 
that judgments can be shown to be defective simply by pointing out their deviation from 
“principles of pure understanding” (which are in any case restricted to the domain of 
appearances).
26
 
Nevertheless, the interpretation for which I have argued provides some support for an 
extremely wide-ranging interpretation of the role played by normativity in Kant’s philosophy 
of mind. We have explored one area in which Kant insists that necessitation of the mind’s 
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operations is required for objective representation, and found that the necessitation in 
question is provided by normative structures. Therefore, at least in the case of objective 
temporal contents, we have found Kant espousing the view that the contentfulness of mental 
states—of perceptions as well as judgments—depends on their having a particular normative 
status. 
This specific thesis linking objective content to normative necessitation suggests that 
we should explore a more general thesis, like the view attributed to Kant by McDowell 
(1994), according to which normative necessitation is required for all kinds of objective 
content. The Second Analogy turns on the premise that the subjective order of perceptions 
cannot have objective purport if it is arbitrary, but there is textual evidence that Kant is 
committed to the general thesis that objective purport requires a necessitation of the mind’s 
activities. In the Second Analogy it is normative necessitation that removes the arbitrariness; 
so perhaps when Kant writes that “our thought of the relation of all cognition to its object 
carries something of necessity with it […] which is opposed to our cognitions being 
determined at pleasure or arbitrarily [aufs Geratewohl, oder beliebig]” (A104), he means that 
all relation to objects requires normative necessitation (cf. A108, B218f., A191/B236).
27
 On 
the other hand, it may be that only syntheses of “connection [Verknüpfung, nexus]” and not of 
“composition [Zusammensetzung, compositio]” require normative constraint in order to 
produce representations with objective purport—a possibility suggested by Kant’s 
characterization of the former as “not arbitrary [nicht willkürlich]”. If so, it would only be the 
representation of necessary connections (rather than contingent existences) which requires 
normative constraint.
28
 Such questions require further investigation. Starting points for 
expanding this investigation might include exploring whether normative notions are at work 
in the other Analogies of Experience and the rest of the System of Principles; and providing a 
clearer account of how normative guidance of the “synthesis of apprehension” is possible.
                                                 
27
 Cf. Ginsborg (2008, p. 73). 
28
 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility. 
 31 
 
2 
Kant’s Move from Causal Rules to 
Universal Laws: A Deflationary 
Interpretation 
Abstract: In the Second Analogy, Kant argues that every event has a cause. Scholars 
disagree about the import of this conclusion: does Kant argue only for the Weak 
Causal Principle that every event has some cause, or for the Strong Causal Principle 
that every event is produced according to a universal causal law? Existing 
interpretations have assumed that, by Kant’s lights, there is a substantive difference 
between the two principles. I argue that this is false: Kant holds that the concept of 
cause contains the notion of lawful connection, so it is analytic that causes operate 
according to universal laws. Indeed, in his moral philosophy, this forms a key premise 
in his derivation of the Categorical Imperative. Consequently, Kant’s move from 
causal rules to universal causal laws is much simpler than it has previously been taken 
to be: given his commitments, to establish the Weak Causal Principle is eo ipso to 
establish the Strong Causal Principle. 
1. What Does the Second Analogy Try to Prove? 
In the Second Analogy, a central and crucial chapter in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 
argues for the principle that every event (in the world of appearances) has a cause. Recent 
decades have witnessed a prolonged debate about the import of this conclusion. Does Kant 
seek to establish only 
Weak Causal Principle: Every event has some cause; 
or the apparently stronger 
Strong Causal Principle: Every event is produced according to a universal causal 
law, i.e. every event belongs to a kind K and has a cause belonging to a kind L, such 
that necessarily every instance of kind L causes an event of kind K? 
Scholars remain divided. Given the centrality of the Second Analogy, it is worth pursuing the 
matter further. I will argue that the three dominant interpretative positions on this issue are 
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mistaken. They all face textual problems, but more importantly they all rely on the 
assumption that, for Kant, there is a substantive difference between the Weak and Strong 
Causal Principles. However, as I will argue, there is ample textual evidence that Kant holds 
that the concept <cause> contains the notion of lawful causal connection, making it analytic 
that causes operate according to universal laws. This leads to a reassessment of the Second 
Analogy’s import, its relation to other parts of Kant’s work and the place of lawfulness in 
Kant’s philosophy as a whole. 
Let me orient my proposed interpretation within the existing scholarship. One group 
of interpreters holds that the Second Analogy tries to establish the Strong Causal Principle, 
but is inadequate for this purpose.
1
 According to these interpreters, the chapter contains at 
best an argument for the Weak Causal Principle, but Kant mistakenly slides from this to the 
Strong Causal Principle. Call this the “INADEQUACY” interpretation. A second group of 
interpreters maintain that Kant is well aware that the Second Analogy can establish only the 
Weak Causal Principle, and that the argument for the Strong Causal Principle occurs 
elsewhere. Proponents of this reading disagree over where the argument for the Strong Causal 
Principle is located, but agree that it is not found in the Second Analogy chapter.
2
 Call this 
the “ELSEWHERE” interpretation. A third interpretation argues that there is a substantive 
argument for the transition to the Strong Causal Principle within the Second Analogy chapter, 
which most commentators have missed.
3
 Call this the “SUBSTANTIVE” interpretation. 
On my “DEFLATIONARY” interpretation, Kant’s move from causal rules to causal laws 
is much simpler. Since the concept of <cause> contains the notion of a lawful causal 
connection, to establish the Weak Causal Principle (that every event has a cause) is a fortiori 
to establish the Strong Causal Principle (that every event is produced according to a universal 
causal law). Kant has adequate justification for the move from causal rules to universal laws, 
but this rests neither on arguments outside the Second Analogy nor on a hidden substantive 
argument within that chapter. Instead, it is an almost trivial consequence of his understanding 
of the concept <cause>. Moreover, I argue that building lawfulness into the concept <cause> 
is not an ad hoc manoeuvre on Kant’s part, but an outgrowth of his fundamental assumptions 
about the mind’s a priori concepts and the nature of necessity. 
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 This view is defended by Lovejoy (1906, p. 399), Strawson (1966, pp. 137f.), Dodge (1982) and Watkins 
(2005, pp. 215f., 289f.). 
2
 See Buchdahl (1969a, pp. 651–6, 1969b, pp. 343f., 355–74), Beck (1978, pp. 126–9, 1981, pp. 46–56), 
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3
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To what extent is my proposed interpretation new? This kind of reading is briefly 
considered by Allison, but quickly dismissed (2004, pp. 258f.).
4
 Allison attributes this 
interpretation to Friedman, who indeed cites some of the passages which I argue support the 
DEFLATIONARY interpretation (1992, pp. 162, 192). However, Friedman is equivocal about 
Kant’s warrant for the move, also suggesting that the lawfulness of causes stems from his 
conception of “objective experience”, which Friedman’s Kant equates with scientific 
theorizing (1992, p. 186, 1994, p. 36).
5
 To my knowledge, the only commentator who has 
unequivocally proposed a DEFLATIONARY interpretation is Melnick (1973, pp. 130–5).6 
Perhaps due to the brevity of his discussion and his lack of argument against alternative 
readings, Melnick’s proposal has sunk more or less without a trace—I am unaware of any 
later discussions of this part of Melnick’s reading, and most work on the Second Analogy 
entirely overlooks the kind of view I defend in this article (e.g. Kannisto, 2017; Longuenesse, 
2005; Watkins, 2005). The DEFLATIONARY interpretation clearly stands in need of further 
defence. In giving a thorough defence of this neglected view, I hope to fill this important 
lacuna in Kant-scholarship. 
Before considering the relation between Weak and Strong Causal Principles, one 
might wonder how Kant establishes that every event has a cause in the first place. I have 
discussed this argument in detail elsewhere,
7
 and will here focus exclusively on Kant’s move 
from causal rules to universal laws. However, let me provide a brief summary of the main 
argument of the Second Analogy, in order to give some context: 
(1) For the representation of an event to be possible, something must remove the 
arbitrariness of the subjective order of perceptions; 
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 The only objection Allison gives turns on conflating the Strong Causal Principle with the epistemic claim that 
we are capable of discovering the particular law under which any event falls. Kannisto (2017, pp. 498–500) 
gives a helpful explanation of this conflation. 
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 One commentator reads Friedman as giving an ELSEWHERE interpretation, according to which “Kant 
establishes [the Strong Causal Principle] in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science” (Kannisto, 2017, 
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6
 Some remarks in O’Shea (1997) suggest that the lawfulness of causal rules follows from the concept of cause 
(e.g. p. 228). However, other passages suggest that it instead follows from substantive considerations about the 
counterfactual-supporting nature of causality (e.g. p. 222). 
7
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(2) The subjective order of perceptions can only be rendered non-arbitrary through 
deployment of the concept of cause (specifically, through presupposing that the 
event in question has a cause); 
(3) Therefore, all events must be represented as caused; 
(4) Therefore, in the realm of appearances, every event has a cause.8 
The discussion will proceed as follows. Section 2 offers grounds for dissatisfaction 
with the INADEQUACY, ELSEWHERE and SUBSTANTIVE interpretations, thus motivating the 
search for an alternative. Section 3 presents textual evidence that Kant holds that the concept 
<cause> contains the notion of lawfulness. This commitment plays a key role in Kant’s 
moral philosophy, specifically in his attempt to derive the Categorical Imperative from the 
concept <free will>. Section 4 considers the charge that, on this reading, Kant’s move from 
causal rules to laws rests on an ad hoc verbal stipulation. I argue that the conception of 
causality on which the move rests does inherit any arbitrariness inherent in Kant’s derivation 
of the Table of Categories. Nevertheless, it is neither ad hoc nor merely verbal. Rather, it is a 
consequence of Kant’s fundamental assumptions about our a priori concepts, about what 
features are definitive of causation, and about the connection between necessity and 
universality. Section 5 concludes by discussing further consequences for Kant-scholarship 
and for Kant’s contemporary relevance. 
2. Grounds for Dissatisfaction with Existing Interpretations 
In Section 1, I described three interpretative positions concerning what Kant is trying to 
prove in the Second Analogy: the INADEQUACY interpretation, the ELSEWHERE interpretation 
and the SUBSTANTIVE interpretation. This section argues that each interpretation has 
significant weaknesses. My aim is not to provide knock-down objections, but to identify 
grounds for dissatisfaction, warranting the search for an alternative. 
2.1 The INADEQUACY Interpretation 
Proponents of the INADEQUACY interpretation charge Kant with being confused about the 
import of his own argument. Lovejoy accuses Kant of committing “one of the most 
spectacular examples of the non-sequitur which are to be found in the history of philosophy” 
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 Similar reconstructions are defended by Allison (2004, p. 252) and Longuenesse (2005, p. 241). 
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(1906, p. 402, Lovejoy’s emphasis), a remark echoed by Strawson (1966, p. 138).9 Other 
commentators have offered explanations of why Kant might have been misled in this way, 
but also conclude that he is ultimately confused.
10
  
Of course, even the greatest philosophers make mistakes, so we should not rule out 
such an interpretation by fiat. Nevertheless, our task as historians of philosophy is to find the 
most coherent interpretation that remains faithful to the evidence—if a plausible 
interpretation can be found with greater internal coherence, then we are justified in preferring 
it. We ought to go on searching, rather than resting content with the INADEQUACY reading. 
2.2 The ELSEWHERE Interpretation 
The ELSEWHERE interpretation is more charitable to Kant. Instead of accusing him of 
overestimating the import of his arguments in the Second Analogy, its proponents take Kant 
to be undeceived: he knowingly argues only for the Weak Causal Principle in the Second 
Analogy, and provides the argument for the Strong Causal Principle only later. As noted, 
there are competing versions of the ELSEWHERE interpretation. Buchdahl (1969a, pp. 651–6, 
1969b, pp. 343f., 355–74), Beck (1978, pp. 126–9, 1981, pp. 46–56), Neiman (1994, pp. 51–
62), Bayne (1994, pp. 409f.) and Allison (2004, pp. 259f.) argue that the Strong Causal 
Principle is established (qua “regulative principle”) in the Appendix to the Transcendental 
Dialectic and the Introduction to the third Critique. In contrast, Kannisto (2017) locates the 
argument for the Strong Causal Principle in the Postulates of Empirical Thought. 
                                                 
9
 Note that the alleged “non-sequitur” is not a slide from the Weak to the Strong Causal Principle, but from the 
necessity of the order of perceptions of an event to the causal necessity of the event itself. Nevertheless, Lovejoy 
only denounces Kant’s pretensions to establish the Strong Causal Principle (1906, pp. 399f.) and Strawson 
allows that related considerations support “some kind and degree of [causal] order and regularity” (1966, p. 
144). The “non-sequitur” objection is therefore directed at the Second Analogy qua argument for the Strong 
Causal Principle. Thanks to Rae Langton for pressing me to clarify this. 
10
 Watkins shows how aspects of Kant’s conception of physics would substantiate the assumption that causation 
is always lawful. Nevertheless, Watkins concludes that this “does not actually add any argumentative support to 
Kant’s claim”, “[s]ince his account of physics depends on the metaphysical framework he is developing in the 
Critique” (2005, pp. 288–90). Beck also flirts with an INADEQUACY interpretation, suggesting an ambiguity in 
the meaning of “rule” as a potential explanation for Kant’s confusion (Beck, 1981, pp. 27f., 55). Dodge (1982) 
argues that a regulative principle related to the Strong Causal Principle can be established by similar 
considerations, but does not offer this as an interpretation of Kant, nor would this be an argument for the Strong 
Causal Principle per se. 
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Rather than arguing against these interesting and sophisticated proposals in turn, I will 
present evidence that casts suspicion on ELSEWHERE interpretations in general—evidence that 
Kant aims to establish the Strong Causal Principle within the Second Analogy. Consider this 
passage, in which Kant describes the kind of causal rule that an event must stand under in 
order to be representable: 
1. [T]here must therefore lie in that which in general precedes an occurrence the 
condition for a rule, in accordance with which this occurrence always and necessarily 
follows[.]” (A193/B238f., emphasis added) 
Kant states that prior to an event (i.e. an “occurrence”), there must be a type of state (i.e. “that 
which in general precedes”) such that there is a “rule” connecting the event to the precursor, 
i.e. a causal rule. This rule concerns what type of effect “always and necessarily follows” that 
type of state. Kant equates the term “law” with “necessary rule” (A216/B263, KU 5:184); 
therefore, by declaring that this causal rule concerns what “always and necessarily follows”, 
Kant is stating that it must be a causal law. To summarize Kant’s point, for an event to be 
capable of being represented, it must be produced according to a causal law. Right in the 
heart of the Second Analogy, Kant is committing himself to the Strong Causal Principle. 
Nor is this passage unrepresentative. Compare the following passages, also from the 
Second Analogy chapter: 
2. [The order of states in the object] can only acquire its determinate temporal position 
in this relation through something being presupposed in the preceding state on which 
it always follows, i.e., follows in accordance with a rule [such that] […]  if the state 
that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily 
follows. (A198/B243f., emphasis added) 
3. This rule for determining something with respect to its temporal sequence, however, 
is that in what precedes, the condition is to be encountered under which the 
occurrence always (i.e., necessarily) follows. (A200/B245f., emphasis added) 
4. [T]here is therein an order of the successive synthesis that determines an object, in 
accordance with which something would necessarily have to precede and, if this is 
posited, the other would necessarily have to follow[.] (A201/B246, emphasis added) 
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5. [I]f I were to posit that which precedes and the occurrence did not follow it 
necessarily, then I would have to hold it to be only a subjective play of my 
imaginings[.] (A201f./B247, emphasis added) 
Kannisto (2017, pp. 505–7), acknowledging the threat posed to the ELSEWHERE reading by 
such passages, tries to explain away Kant’s commitment to lawful causation by 
distinguishing causal relations between tokens and causal relations between types. Perhaps if 
Kant is talking about token causal relations, he can invoke a necessary connection without 
committing himself to a law?
11
 Whether or not this reply works on its own terms, it struggles 
to fit the text. The first, second and third passages refer to the event “always” following from 
the cause, a claim that would be unintelligible if these were one-off relations between token 
events. 
Therefore, the ELSEWHERE reading can only be upheld if we accuse Kant of 
repeatedly misstating the import of his argument. Once again, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that Kant simply made a mistake, but once again, the goal of finding a maximally 
coherent reading dictates that we continue examining alternatives. 
2.3 The SUBSTANTIVE Interpretation 
The SUBSTANTIVE interpretation, advanced by Longuenesse (2005), accepts that Kant is 
aiming to establish the Strong Causal Principle in the Second Analogy chapter, and tries to 
identify a hidden argument for that claim, which other commentators have missed. As is well 
known, the Second Analogy chapter presents a number of different expositions of an 
argument for the principle that every event has a cause. It is commonly agreed that most if 
not all of these expositions are identical in substance, with one exception. Numerous 
commentators, beginning with Adickes (1889), claim that a distinctive argument is presented 
at A199–201/B244–6.12 This alleged “argument from the nature of time” (Paton, 1936, p. 
253) runs as follows: 
                                                 
11
 Bayne (1994, p. 408) makes a similar proposal. Neither Kannisto nor Bayne acknowledges the full range of 
passages cited here. 
12
 Cf. Kemp Smith (1918, pp. 375f.), Paton (1936, pp. 253–5), Wolff (1963, pp. 272f.) and Thöle (1991, pp. 
205–11). Other commentators deny that there is a distinctive argument in these pages, with Guyer claiming that 
they contain “nothing but a somewhat elaborate way in which Kant states the conclusion” of his argument 
(1987, pp. 241f.). Cf. Allison (1983, p. 227) and Longuenesse (1998, p. 364), though Longuenesse’s later work 
reverses this position. 
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(1) Time cannot be perceived directly. 
(2) Nevertheless, perception must exhibit all of the formal properties that are essential to 
time. 
(3) Therefore, appearances must contain empirical corollaries of the formal properties of 
time. 
(4) Time essentially has the formal property that each moment is “determined” by the 
previous moment. 
(5) Therefore, appearances must contain an empirical corollary of the determination of 
each moment by a prior moment. 
(6) The only empirical feature that could serve as a corollary of the determination of each 
moment by a prior moment is that every alteration be determined by some previous 
state in accordance with a rule. 
(7) Therefore, every alteration in the world of appearances must be determined by some 
previous state in accordance with a rule. 
As Adickes succinctly puts it, “just as a prior time always determines the following time, in 
the world of appearances what has just happened fixes how things will happen next, 
according to a rule” (1889, p. 219). 
Of the interpreters who recognize a distinctive argument from the nature of time, most 
hold that it aims at the same conclusion as the other arguments in the Second Analogy 
chapter. On Longuenesse’s SUBSTANTIVE interpretation, however, the argument differs from 
the others not only in its mode of proof but in the conclusion it establishes: whereas the other 
expositions only support the Weak Causal Principle, the argument from the nature of time 
supports the Strong Causal Principle. She argues that the unity of time and the determinate 
position of each moment within the whole series require an empirical correlate and that this 
can only be the “preservation through time of any correlation that actually obtains” (2005, pp. 
250–2). If I understand it correctly, her argument is that, not only must the empirical world 
reflect the pure structure of time according to which each moment is determinately located 
after the preceding moment; moreover, the empirical features which allow for establishing 
the order of events (viz. the causal rules) must be invariant across the whole of time. Since 
<existence at all times> is the schema of necessity (A145/B184), this would entail that the 
causal rules must be necessary, i.e. that they must be laws. 
While Longuenesse’s reconstruction is ingenious and certainly Kantian in spirit, it is 
doubtful whether it is successful. If we countenance the possibility of causal rules that are 
less than universal in scope, it is unclear why invariant rules would be needed in order for 
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“appearances” to “determine their positions in time for each other”. So long as each event is 
bound down to a specific moment in time by a causal relation to a “previous state”, that 
would be enough to ensure that the structure of the world of appearances recapitulates the 
determinate ordering of moments that constitutes time itself. Pace Longuenesse, if there is a 
gap between causal rules and causal laws, then the alleged argument from the nature of time 
lacks the resources to bridge it. Moreover, it is doubtful that Kant’s text contains 
Longuenesse’s argument. In the relevant passage, he does emphasize that, for appearances to 
display the required structure, each event must stand in a causal relation to some “previous 
state”, and that this involves a “general rule” (A199f./B245). However, he makes no special 
mention here of the invariability or necessity of these rules. 
Another problem for Longuenesse’s SUBSTANTIVE interpretation is that, if the Strong 
Causal Principle is only established by the argument from the nature of time, and not by the 
other expositions contained in the Second Analogy chapter, we would expect Kant to assert 
the Strong Causal Principle only in connection with that argument. However, this is not what 
we find. Of the passages displaying Kant’s endorsement of the Strong Causal Principle within 
the Second Analogy (cited in Section 2.2), the first, second, fourth and fifth are presented as 
conclusions of arguments other than the alleged “argument from the nature of time”, with the 
first and second occurring before that argument is allegedly presented. Therefore, it is 
implausible that Kant intends the argument from the nature of time to be distinctively capable 
of establishing the Strong Causal Principle. The SUBSTANTIVE interpretation must ultimately 
accuse Kant either of being mistaken about what his arguments can establish or of being 
misleading in articulating their conclusions.  
 
One other interpretation which I set aside is Guyer’s (1987, pp. 237–66), according to 
which one must know the specific causal law under which an event falls in order to confirm 
the belief that the event occurs. This purely epistemic reading of Kant’s conclusion represents 
an implausible weakening of his stated aims—Kant claims that the Causal Principle 
established in the Second Analogy is a “formal condition of all perception” (A199/B244), 
rather than a condition for the confirmation of beliefs.
13
 
                                                 
13
 I therefore also set aside Kitcher’s discussion of the Second Analogy, which adopts Guyer’s reading (Kitcher, 
1990, pp. 174–7). For related criticisms of Guyer, see Allison (2004, pp. 256f.), Longuenesse (2005, pp. 232f.) 
and Watkins (2005, p. 198). 
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3. The DEFLATIONARY Interpretation of Kant’s Move 
In Section 2, I argued that none of the existing interpretations of Kant’s move from causal 
rules to causal laws is satisfying and that we should therefore be open to alternatives. In this 
section, I put forward an alternative, namely the DEFLATIONARY interpretation. However, my 
opinion is that the DEFLATIONARY interpretation is more than a promising alternative; it is 
mandated by unambiguous textual evidence. 
3.1 Textual Evidence 
The crux of the DEFLATIONARY interpretation is the following claim: according to Kant, it is 
analytic that causes operate according to universal laws, because the concept <cause> 
contains the notion that causal connections are universal laws. Therefore, from the claim that 
every event has a cause, it trivially follows that every event is produced according to a 
universal causal law. The move from Weak to Strong Causal Principles can be achieved by 
mere substitution of synonymous terms. This is demonstrated in numerous passages in which 
Kant talks about the concept of <cause>. Here are four telling remarks from the Critique of 
Pure Reason: 
[T]he very concept of a cause so obviously contains the concept of a necessity of 
connection with an effect and a strict universality of rule[.] (B5) 
[T]his concept [i.e. “the concept of cause”] always requires that something A be of 
such a kind that something else B follows from it necessarily and in accordance with 
an absolutely universal rule. (A91/B124, Kant’s emphasis) 
[T]he concept of cause, which asserts the necessity of a consequent under a 
presupposed condition (B168) 
[E]very effective cause must have a character, i.e., a law of its causality, without 
which it would not be a cause at all (A539/B567) 
The first two passages explicitly state that the concept of <cause> requires that causal rules 
be “absolutely universal”, and that this universal connection between cause and effect be 
“necessary”. As noted above, for Kant a “necessary rule” is a “law”, so these passages show 
Kant asserting that the concept of <cause> contains the concept of <lawful causal 
connection>. The third passage reaffirms that the necessity (and hence lawfulness) of causal 
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connections is part of the very concept of <cause>. The fourth explicitly puts the point in 
terms of laws.
14
 
Further evidence comes in the Prolegomena. In order to illustrate what content is 
added to a judgment through the inclusion of the concept <cause>, Kant contrasts causal 
judgments with judgments about constant conjunction: 
It is […] possible that in perception a rule of relation will be found, which says this: 
that a certain appearance is constantly followed by another (though not the reverse)[.] 
[…] Here there is of course not yet a necessity of connection, hence not yet the 
concept of cause. But I continue on, and say: if the above proposition, which is merely 
a subjective connection of perceptions, is to be a proposition of experience, then it 
must be regarded as necessarily and universally valid. But a proposition of this sort 
would be: The sun through its light is the cause of the warmth. The foregoing 
empirical rule is now regarded as a law, […] which requires universally and 
therefore necessarily valid rules. (Prol 4:312, emphasis added) 
Setting aside Kant’s controversial distinction between judgments of perception and 
judgments of experience, we can focus on what distinguishes the judgment that <x causes y> 
from the judgment that <xs are constantly conjoined with ys>. Kant writes that if we assert a 
“rule” linking xs and ys, without this “connection” being “nessess[ary]”, we have “not yet” 
deployed “the concept of cause”. When we move to the judgment that <x causes y>, this 
“empirical rule” linking xs and ys is “now regarded as a law”: deploying the concept of cause 
entails assuming that the rule connecting antecedent and consequent is a law, i.e. a necessary 
rule. Two passages from surrounding pages confirm that it is “the concept of cause” that 
brings the “necessity” (and ipso facto the lawfulness) of the linkage: 
That this heating necessarily results from the illumination by the sun is in fact 
contained in the judgment of experience (in virtue of the concept of cause) (Prol 
4:305n., emphasis added) 
The concept of cause contains a rule, according to which from one state of affairs 
another follows with necessity; but experience can only show us that from one state of 
                                                 
14
 This passage makes no reference to the concept of <cause>. However, here Kant is discussing what can be 
said about causation in general, whether in the phenomenal or noumenal realm. Since the only restriction on 
thoughts about noumena is the law of contradiction, the assertion quoted must be intended to be analytic. 
NORMATIVITY AND REPRESENTATION IN KANT’S THEORY OF COGNITION 
42 
 
things another state often, or, at best, commonly, follows, and it can therefore furnish 
neither strict universality nor necessity (and so forth). (Prol 4:315, emphasis added) 
Interestingly, such statements are not confined to Kant’s theoretical philosophy. 
Perhaps the clearest remark comes from the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: 
[T]he concept of causality brings with it that of laws in accordance with which, by 
something that we call a cause, something else, namely an effect, must be posited (G 
4:446) 
In Section 3.2 we will see the systematic weight this carries within Kant’s practical 
philosophy as a whole. First, a passage from one more work, Religion within the Boundaries 
of Mere Reason: 
To think of oneself as a freely acting being, yet as exempted from the one law 
commensurate to such a being […], would amount to the thought of a cause operating 
without any law at all […]: and this is a contradiction. (RGV 6:35) 
If a judgment’s negation is contradictory, then the judgment is analytic (e.g. B16f., 
A151f./B190f., Prol 4:267). Here Kant asserts that the judgment <there exists a cause that 
operates without a law> is contradictory. Ergo, for Kant, the judgment <all causes operate 
according to laws> is analytic. 
3.2 Causality and Lawfulness in the Groundwork 
We have seen numerous statements from four different works in which Kant affirms that the 
concept of cause contains the notion of lawful connection. Still, one might suspect that these 
are throwaway remarks, on which Kant would be unwilling to place the sort of argumentative 
weight required by the DEFLATIONARY interpretation. In this subsection, I will dispel that 
suspicion by showing that the analyticity of causes’ lawful operation plays a key role in a 
central argument of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 
Groundwork Section III begins with a derivation of the Categorical Imperative from 
the concept of <free will>. As we will see in a moment, a key premise in this derivation is 
that the concept of <free will> entails lawful causation. Kant then argues that rational beings 
“cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom” (G 4:448) and, combining these two 
results, concludes that agents must take themselves to be normatively bound by the 
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Categorical Imperative. We need not concern ourselves with the cogency of this broader 
argument—the thing to note is that the whole enterprise depends on the claim that “the 
concept of causality brings with it that of laws” (G 4:446).15 
 I quote the relevant passage at length. (Bracketed numbers refer to the reconstruction 
given below.) 
THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM IS THE KEY TO THE CLARIFICATION 
[ERKLÄRUNG] OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE WILL 
[1] Will is a kind of causality of living beings insofar as they are rational, and [2] 
freedom would be that property of such causality that it can be efficient independently 
of alien causes determining it, just as natural necessity is the property of the causality 
of all nonrational beings to be determined to activity by the influence of alien causes. 
The preceding clarification [Erklärung] of freedom is negative and therefore 
unfruitful for insight into its essence; but there flows from it a positive concept of 
freedom, which is so much the richer and more fruitful. Since [3] the concept of 
causality brings with it that of laws in accordance with which, by something that we 
call a cause, something else, namely an effect, must be posited, so freedom, although 
it is not a property of the will in accordance with natural laws, is not for that reason 
lawless but [C1] must instead be a causality in accordance with immutable 
[unwandelbaren] laws but of a special kind; for otherwise a free will would be an 
absurdity [Unding]. [2, stated negatively] Natural necessity was a heteronomy of 
efficient causes, since every effect was possible only in accordance with the law that 
something else determines the efficient cause to causality; [C2] what, then, can 
freedom of the will be other than autonomy, that is, the will’s property of being a law 
to itself? [4] But the proposition, the will is in all its actions a law to itself, indicates 
only the principle, to act on no other maxim than that which can also have as object 
itself as a universal law. This, however, is precisely the formula of the categorical 
imperative and is the principle of morality; hence [C3] a free will and a will under 
moral laws are one and the same [einerlei]. 
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 The importance of the premise that causes must be lawful is noted by O’Neill (1989, p. 53) and Korsgaard 
(1996, p. 163). 
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If, therefore, freedom of the will is presupposed, morality together with its principle 
follows from it by mere analysis [Zergliederung] of its concept. (G 4:446f., Kant’s 
emphasis) 
The argument in the passage can be reconstructed as follows: 
1. A free will is a kind of causality. 
2. A free will cannot operate according to laws imposed by external causes. 
3. All causes operate according to immutable laws. 
C1. Therefore, a free will is a causality that operates according to immutable laws. 
C2. A free will imposes a law on itself. 
4. If x imposes a law on itself, then it is bound by the Formula of Universal Law. 
C3. A free will is bound by the Formula of Universal Law. 
Each premise and each conclusion is intended to be analytic. Kant makes this explicit by 
characterizing the whole passage as a “clarification [Erklärung]” and as following “by mere 
analysis [Zergliederung]” of the concept <freedom of the will>. This analyticity is reaffirmed 
at almost every step: (1) results from a “clarification [Erklärung]” of “freedom”; our key 
thesis (3) is “[brought] with” “the concept of causality”; a free will contradicting (C1) is an 
“absurdity [Unding]”;16 (C3) concerns two terms being “equivalent [einerlei]” and is 
contrasted with the “synthetic proposition” that “an absolutely good will is that whose maxim 
can always contain itself regarded as a universal law”. If any of the premises of the argument 
were not analytic, then the conclusion would not be analytic either. 
Moreover, Kant would be unable to affirm the lawfulness of causes in this context if it 
depended on any substantive transcendental arguments concerning the nature of experience 
(as the ELSEWHERE and SUBSTANTIVE interpretations would have it). The argument focuses 
on a kind of causality distinct from the “natural necessity” of the world of appearances, so it 
is crucial that the very “concept of causality brings with it that of laws”.17 Therefore, the 
claim that the concept <cause> contains the notion of lawfulness turns out to have great 
systematic importance for Kant. Without it, he could not claim in this context that every 
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 In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defines an “absurdity [Unding]” as “the object of a concept that 
contradicts itself” (A291f./B348). 
17
 While natural causes are discussed here only to make a negative point, it is noteworthy that Kant insists that 
they “operate in accordance with natural laws”: the discussion makes it clear that lawfulness is a characteristic 
of the whole genus of causality, not a feature specific to either natural or autonomous causation. 
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cause operates according to “immutable laws” and Groundwork Section III’s attempt to give 
a transcendental argument for the Categorical Imperative would falter at the first step. 
In Section 3.1, I presented numerous passages from published works of the Critical 
period in which Kant explicitly affirms that the concept of <cause> contains the notion of 
lawful connection. In Section 3.2, I showed that this is no minor commitment, but one with 
great systematic importance in Kant’s moral philosophy. According to Kant, “x causes y” is 
synonymous with “x produces y in accordance with a universal causal law”. From this, it 
follows that 
Weak Causal Principle: Every event has some cause 
is synonymous with 
Strong Causal Principle: Every event is produced according to a universal causal 
law. 
The latter simply makes explicit what is already contained in the concept of <cause>. Kant’s 
move from causal rules to universal laws requires nothing more than the substitution of 
equivalent terms, or as Kant might say, the “clarification” of what is “already thought […] 
(though confusedly)” in the “component concepts” of the former (cf. A7/B10f.). Therefore, 
any reading of the Second Analogy which finds a coherent argument for the Weak Causal 
Principle ought to credit Kant with being entirely coherent in asserting the Strong Causal 
Principle on the same basis. In failing to recognize this, the INADEQUACY, ELSEWHERE and 
SUBSTANTIVE interpretations all assume that there is a substantive difference between Weak 
and Strong Causal Principles. We have now seen that Kant rejects this assumption. 
4. Causality, Shmausality 
In Section 3, I argued that Kant believes that the concept <cause> contains the notion of 
lawful causal connection. This renders it analytic that causes operate according to universal 
laws, thereby warranting the transition from the Weak to the Strong Causal Principle. Anyone 
who is willing to credit Kant with a cogent argument for the Weak Causal Principle ought to 
accept that, at least on his own terms, Kant is justified in asserting the Strong Causal 
Principle. The move from causal rules to causal laws is rendered seamless by Kant’s concept 
<cause>. This section considers an objection to Kant’s argument so construed. 
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The objection is this: even if Kant’s move from the Weak Causal Principle to the 
Strong Causal Principle is warranted given his way of setting up the debate, it does not follow 
that he is beyond reproach. What warrant does Kant have for setting up the debate in this 
way, i.e. in building the notion of lawfulness into the concept of <cause>? Is this not merely 
an ad hoc manoeuvre, an attempt to solve a substantive philosophical problem by stipulation?  
To put a sharper point on the objection, we can adapt an argument by Enoch (2006) 
against “constitutivist” theories in metaethics (i.e. theories that try to derive normative facts 
from the concept of agency). Enoch concedes for argument’s sake that the concept <agent> 
entails that agents have certain normative commitments. However, he proposes to think of 
himself not as an agent, but as a “shmagent”: something very like an agent, but without those 
normative commitments. The substantive conclusion that we are subject to certain norms 
cannot be established through the mere analysis of a concept. If you pack that content into a 
certain concept, I can always propose another concept without the extra baggage. 
Analogously, we could concede for argument’s sake that the concept of cause entails 
universally lawful connections. In that case, we can simply coin a new concept, <shmause>, 
with the same content as the concept of <cause> minus the implication of lawfulness. If, as 
the DEFLATIONARY interpretation contends, Kant’s move from the Weak to the Strong Causal 
Principle turns on the content of the concept of cause, then here is a new challenge. The 
DEFLATIONARY interpretation concedes that the arguments of the Second Analogy give no 
special reason to think that events must be produced in a lawful manner, other than that the 
concept <cause> is defined so as to have this consequence. It therefore seems that those 
arguments are compatible with a claim exactly like the Weak Causal Principle minus the 
implication of lawfulness: 
Shmausal Principle: Every event has a shmause. 
And from the Shmausal Principle, there can be no seamless transition to the Strong Causal 
Principle. Kant has won the right to the Strong Causal Principle by theft, not by honest toil. 
Consequently, so the objection goes, his argument for the Strong Causal Principle has no pull 
on us unless we restrict ourselves to his arbitrarily defined concept <cause>.
18
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 This reveals another parallel between the place of lawfulness in Kant’s metaphysics and in his practical 
philosophy—Enoch’s objection is targeted inter alia at Korsgaard’s Kantian constitutivism (cf. Enoch, 2006, p. 
179). 
Kant’s Move from Causal Rules to Universal Laws 
47 
 
 This line of objection seems right as far as it goes. However, it treats the argument of 
the Second Analogy as if it floated free from its broader context within the Critique of Pure 
Reason. Once we recognize this context, Kant’s move no longer seems ad hoc. Consider 
again the summary of the argument of the Second Analogy given in Section 1: 
(1) For the representation of an event to be possible, something must remove the 
arbitrariness of the subjective order of perceptions; 
(2) The subjective order of perceptions can only be rendered non-arbitrary through 
deployment of the concept of cause (specifically, through presupposing that the 
event in question has a cause); 
(3) Therefore, all events must be represented as caused; 
(4) Therefore, in the realm of appearances, every event has a cause. 
(2) asserts that the concept <cause> is the only tool we have that could perform the required 
function. In Kant’s words, “[t]he concept […] that carries a necessity of synthetic unity with 
it can only be a pure concept of understanding […] and that is here the concept of the relation 
of cause and effect, the former of which determines the latter in time” (B234, Kant’s 
emphasis). This is the step that warrants Kant in affirming that every event has a cause in his 
specific sense of the term “cause”—in affirming the Weak Causal Principle and its immediate 
consequence the Strong Causal Principle, rather than the Shmausal Principle. 
Kant’s text contains little explicit argument for the claim that only the concept of 
<cause> could play the mental role (viz. removing the arbitrariness of the subjective order of 
perception). Nevertheless, the context makes clear why he should think this: no other options 
are available. Firstly, no empirical concept could do the job. The arbitrariness of the order of 
perceptions must be removed for experience to become possible, but empirical concepts can 
only be acquired through experience; therefore, it would be viciously circular to claim that 
empirical concepts remove the arbitrariness of the order of perceptions. Secondly, no 
mathematical concept could play the role. Kant gives no explicit argument for this, but here is 
a line of thought based on the footnote at B201f.: since mathematical concepts concern only 
“compositions” rather than “connections” between appearances, they could not render a 
particular connection between perceptions of two different states necessary. The only 
remaining candidates are the categories and their schemata. Of the list of categories derived 
in the Metaphysical Deduction and their restrictions to the temporal realm in the Schematism, 
the only one that could plausibly render a temporal order of perceptions necessary is the 
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(schematized) concept of <cause>, which represents “the succession of the manifold insofar 
as it is subject to a rule” (A144/B183). 
From this final step, we can see that a key part of Kant’s argument is that we possess 
only a limited stock of non-mathematical a priori representations. The claim that only the 
concept <cause> can fulfil the required function is based on exhausting all available 
alternatives. This reveals why it would be unfair to accuse Kant of simply stipulating that we 
deploy the concept of <cause> (laden with the implication of lawfulness) rather than the 
concept of <shmause> in order to make perception of events possible: Kant does not 
stipulate the use of the concept of <cause>, but argues against a background in which it has 
already been established to his satisfaction that we possess an a priori concept of <cause> 
and no other a priori concept that could play an analogous role. 
In one sense, this shows that the ‘shmause’ objection is misconceived. Kant does not 
reach the Strong Causal Principle through terminological stipulation, but by applying his 
background theory of the mind’s a priori representations. However, in another sense this 
answer simply pushes the question back one step. Why does Kant claim that the concept of 
<cause> has this special status, of being one of our small stock of (non-mathematical) a 
priori concepts? And on what grounds does he assert that the concept <cause> is such that it 
renders it analytic that causes operate according to laws? 
Kant’s views about what a priori concepts we possess are presented in the 
Metaphysical Deduction (A66–83/B91–116). There, Kant tabulates the basic logical 
functions of judgment and derives the Table of Categories from these. It is an old accusation 
that this enumeration of the “functions of judgment” and derivation of the categories from 
these seems arbitrary, if not outright suspect. If Kant’s justification for endorsing the Strong 
Causal Principle ultimately depends on the Metaphysical Deduction, it inherits all of the 
dissatisfactions associated with the latter. We might also consider the possibility that Kant 
simply found it intuitively obvious that we possess an a priori concept of <cause>.
19
 If so, 
then the purpose of the Metaphysical Deduction is to explain this fact, not to convince us that 
it is true. In that case, the claim that we possess an a priori concept of <cause> would rank 
among the fundamental unargued assumptions of the Critical project. 
                                                 
19
 This hypothesis is supported by the sketches of Kant’s philosophical development given by Longuenesse 
(1998, pp. 347–58) and Watkins (2005, pp. 166–70), which present his belief in an a priori concept of non-
logical necessary connection (i.e. “real ground”) as one of the main driving forces behind Kant’s pre-Critical 
innovations and the genesis of the Critical project. 
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But why does Kant hold that this a priori concept of <cause> contains the notion of 
necessary and universal connection? Kant presents this conceptual claim as “obviously” (B5) 
true. He claims that if we leave out these features, e.g. by accepting Hume’s reduction to 
constant conjunction plus subjective expectation, then the concept of <cause> “would be 
entirely lost” (B5).20 Kant does not argue for this claim, so it too ranks among his 
fundamental assumptions. We might not share this assumption; nevertheless, we have surely 
all encountered the intuition that to accept a Humean reduction of causation would be 
tantamount to banishing genuine causal connections. The assumption, even though it is 
unargued, seems not ad hoc but philosophically respectable.
21
 
That takes care of Kant’s assumption that causal relations are eo ipso necessary 
connections. What about the universality of causal connections? In the Introduction to the 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant asserts that all necessary truths are universal in scope: 
“Necessity and strict universality […] belong together inseparably” (B4). He offers no 
argument for this claim either, so it appears that this is another fundamental assumption. 
Arguably, this is quite an attractive assumption. It seems plausible that particular and 
parochial necessary truths are always the consequence of general necessary truths which can 
be expressed without reference to particulars or spatio-temporal restrictions. 
To sum up the conclusions of this section, it would be erroneous to claim that Kant’s 
argument for the Strong Causal Principle is ad hoc. In the Second Analogy, Kant draws on 
background claims about the mind’s stock of a priori concepts. These claims in turn rest on 
Kant’s fundamental assumptions about the nature of causality and the connection between 
necessity and universality. We might not share Kant’s starting points, but we cannot fault him 
for having these basic commitments—all philosophical argumentation bottoms out in 
unargued premises at some point. 
                                                 
20
 Note that Hume himself agrees that it is part of the “idea of cause and effect” that there is a “necessary 
connexion” between the two (1738, p. 77), but holds that constant conjunction and subjective expectation are 
sufficient for necessary connection. (I here follow e.g. Millican, 2009 in rejecting the “New Hume” 
interpretation.) Kant’s disagreement with Hume on this point concerns whether mere (inductively discovered) 
constant conjunction and subjective expectation are sufficient for the necessity that is characteristic of causal 
relations. 
21
 Kant was probably right to believe that the audience he was addressing would find this assumption “obvious”. 
Cp. the reception of Hume’s work in 18th c. Germany described by Watkins (2005, pp. 364–73). 
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5. Conclusion 
I have argued that Kant holds that the concept of <cause> contains the notion of lawful 
causal connection. Therefore, for Kant, it is analytic that causes operate according to 
universal laws and his move from the Weak to the Strong Causal Principle requires no 
substantive argument. This reading is mandated by the numerous passages in which Kant 
states that the concept of <cause> entails a lawful connection between cause and effect, and 
the fact that this claim bears significant weight in his attempt to derive the Categorical 
Imperative from the concept of <free will>. Moreover, unlike competing interpretations, this 
reading fits with Kant’s stated conclusions in the Second Analogy and the absence of any 
substantive argument for the move from the Weak to the Strong Causal Principle. 
Let me clarify what the conclusion of the Second Analogy amounts to on my 
interpretation. I have argued that, if Kant has a cogent argument for the Weak Causal 
Principle, then given his background assumptions he is also warranted to assert the Strong 
Causal Principle. The Strong Causal Principle states that every event belongs to a kind K and 
has a cause belonging to a kind L, such that necessarily every instance of kind L causes an 
event of kind K. This is incompatible with there being brute causal relations between 
particulars or brute causal rules localized to certain spatio-temporal regions. Pace those 
interpreters who claim that it establishes only the Weak Causal Principle, the Second 
Analogy guarantees that the world of appearances consists of natural kinds related by causal 
laws with universal scope. 
Some commentators have assumed that if the Second Analogy establishes the Strong 
Causal Principle, it must tell us something about what the particular causal laws are. This, 
however, would be a mistake.
22
 The proposition <the world is governed by a set of causal 
laws> does not entail any particular laws. Kant holds that we can know a priori that there is 
some set of natural kinds related by causal laws, but it takes experience to discover what the 
laws are: “Experience must be added in order to come to know particular laws at all” (B165, 
Kant’s emphasis; cf. A127, A159/B198, A216/B263).23 In fact, establishing the Strong 
Causal Principle does not even provide us with a method for discovering particular laws 
through experience. The Strong Causal Principle states that nature is “uniform” in the sense 
                                                 
22
 Cf. Kannisto’s diagnosis of this mistake (2017, pp. 498–500). 
23
 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss how best to reconcile Kant’s claim that particular causal laws 
can be discovered only through experience with his claim that necessary truths can be known only a priori (e.g. 
B3). For discussion of this point see Friedman (1992a) and Allison (1994). 
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of being structured by universal laws, but it does not give us reason to prefer simpler 
explanations of our observations, nor a way to determine how broad the causal kinds are that 
structure the phenomena we observe. Kant’s argument for how we ought to frame and revise 
causal hypotheses comes only later, with the “regulative principles” given in the Appendix to 
the Transcendental Dialectic and the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. Consider the 
following passage from the latter: 
[T]he understanding says: All alteration has its cause […]. Now, however, the objects 
of empirical cognition are still […], as far as one can judge a priori, determinable in 
so many ways apart from that formal time-condition that specifically distinct natures 
[…] can still be causes in infinitely many ways; and each of these ways must (in 
accordance with the concept of a cause in general) have its rule, which is a law 
[…].Thus we must think of there being in nature, with regard to its merely empirical 
laws, a possibility of infinitely manifold empirical laws[.] (KU 5:183) 
Here, Kant describes what follows from the Causal Principle. He affirms that each cause must 
operate according to a law, but that there is no limit to how complex the laws could be. This 
presents a problem for our attempts to find out what the laws are. He goes on to argue that 
this problem can only be overcome on the assumption of regulative principles for judgment. 
Were we to conflate the Strong Causal Principle with an epistemic principle about how 
particular causal laws are known, it might be thought that this passage poses a problem; 
having distinguished what does and what does not follow from the Strong Causal Principle, 
we can see that these remarks fit perfectly well with the DEFLATIONARY interpretation.
24
  
My conclusion about the Second Analogy also has ramifications for how we should 
understand other parts of Kant’s work: proponents of the ELSEWHERE interpretation have 
                                                 
24
 On the present interpretation, does the conclusion of the Second Analogy rule out there being one-off causal 
connections, instantiated only once throughout all space and time? Allison (1994, p. 298) argues that, if it does 
not, then this supports that ELSEWHERE interpretation, because a law connecting single instances is not really a 
law. As explained, the Strong Causal Principle is incompatible with brute causal relations between particulars: 
all particular causal connections must be instances of universal laws which relate a kind of cause and a kind of 
effect. However, if it is metaphysically possible for there to be natural kinds which are instantiated only once in 
the actual world, then a sort of one-off causal connection would be possible. I am unaware of any passages in 
which Kant discusses this matter. If Allison is right that such a connection would not be a law, then the Strong 
Causal Principle rules out one-off connections; if one-off connections may still be laws, then they are 
compatible with the Strong Causal Principle. Either way, this does not constitute a point in favour of the 
ELSEWHERE interpretation. 
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argued that the lawfulness of causes is established in the Dialectic’s Appendix and the third 
Critique’s Introduction, or else in the Postulates of Empirical Thought. The present 
interpretation requires that we reject these accounts of what occurs in those sections. 
Firstly, we must reject the Buchdahl-Beck-Allison-Neiman reading of the Dialectic’s 
Appendix and the third Critique’s Introduction. On that reading, the understanding (through 
activities detailed in the Transcendental Analytic) yields experience of objects without 
representing them as lawfully connected. The systematizing activities of reason (described in 
the Dialectic’s Appendix) and/or reflecting judgment (described in the third Critique’s 
Introduction) take these experiences and produce a picture of a world governed by laws.
25
 On 
the reading I have defended, this cannot be right: any subject who has experience (of events) 
must already construe nature as operating according to universal causal laws. This suggests 
two possibilities about the relation between the activities of the understanding and those of 
reason/reflecting judgment. The first possibility is that the understanding operates alone to 
produce representations of lawfully connected phenomena, and that reason/reflecting 
judgment take these representations and revise them with the aim of producing a more 
parsimonious and unified theory. The second interpretative possibility is that the activities of 
reason/reflecting judgment are responsible for guiding the framing of hypotheses about the 
laws of nature, but that this is coeval with and necessary for the understanding’s production 
of experience. On this latter view (which I  briefly defended in Chapter 1), understanding and 
reason/reflecting judgment do not form two steps in a serial process, but rather two 
simultaneous and inextricably linked aspects of the process of experiencing the world. 
Similarly, my conclusion entails rejecting Kannisto’s (2017) account of what is 
established in the Postulates of Empirical Thought. Kannisto holds that, among other things, 
the section on the ‘Postulate of Necessity’ contains Kant’s argument for the Strong Causal 
Principle.  My argument for the DEFLATIONARY interpretation indicates that we should 
instead follow Friedman’s interpretation of the third postulate as detailing “a procedure by 
which empirical causal laws are themselves related to the a priori principles of the 
understanding so as to confer on them both necessity and intelligibility” (1992, p. 180). 
The conclusion for which I have argued also has consequences for two broader issues 
in Kant-scholarship. The first concerns Kant’s reconciliation of freedom and determinism. 
Some have attempted to reconcile Kant’s libertarianism with his determinism by ‘softening’ 
the latter. For example, Allais (n.d.) argues that Kant is not committed to the existence of 
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 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the relation between reason and reflecting judgment. 
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“global” causal laws. If the present interpretation is correct then, pace Allais, Kant holds that 
all events fall under strictly universal laws, and we should pursue other accounts of Kant’s 
compatibilism. The second issue concerns how to reconcile Kant’s determinism with his 
qualified endorsement of teleological explanations. Allison (1990, Chapter 4) argues that the 
apparent conflict can be dissolved because Kant is only committed to the regulative principle 
that we should look for laws of efficient causation, not the constitutive principle that nature 
operates according to such laws. If correct, my interpretation shows that, pace Allison, Kant 
is committed to the constitutive principle that every event is produced according to a 
universal causal law, and we should pursue other accounts of the relation between causal and 
teleological judgments. 
One final ramification concerns Kant’s contemporary relevance. In Section 4, we saw 
how his argument for the Strong Causal Principle depends crucially on its position within 
Kant’s broader project and on a number of fundamental, unargued assumptions. From a 
contemporary perspective, it is somewhat disappointing to find Kant’s move to the Strong 
Causal Principle relying above all on the specifics of Kant’s definition of causality, specifics 
for which he provides no argument. Indeed, there is a hint of irony in this, since Kant claims 
that “in philosophy the definition […] must conclude rather than begin the work” 
(A730f./B758f.). On the other hand, it would be unfair to criticize Kant for relying on a set of 
basic philosophical commitments—argumentation must always bottom out in unargued 
premises. It is an open question whether the reader shares Kant’s starting assumptions or not. 
Still, it is surely of great philosophical interest to have a clearer picture of what those starting 
assumptions are and how they support his bold conclusions. 
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3 
Perception and Rule-Following: The 
Role of Schemata in Kant’s Theory of 
Cognition 
Abstract: We encounter objects (e.g. daffodils) through perception, and we can 
subsequently have thoughts about them. To do so, we need to connect our perceptions 
with concepts. But how can there be relations of “fit” between perceptions and 
concepts, such that a given concept applies to some, but not all, perceived objects? 
According to Kant, we need a third mental representation—a “schema”—to mediate 
between the two. Despite much interest in Kant’s theory of cognition, this part of his 
account remains poorly understood. I argue that schemata form a central and well-
motivated part of Kant’s account: given his background commitments about 
representation and normativity (which remain largely attractive from a contemporary 
perspective), Kant is right to claim that cognition would be impossible without 
schemata. I endorse the existing view that schemata are rules for “synthesis of the 
imagination” (i.e. the process through which the mind converts sensory material into 
complex perceptions of objects), but argue that existing readings fail to explain the 
function of these mental rules. I therefore make the novel proposal that schemata 
impose a normative structure on the mind’s synthesizing activities. They play a role 
akin to “maxims” within Kant’s practical philosophy, connecting an individual’s 
synthesizing activities with normative standards. By doing this, they transform 
synthesis from a “subjective play of imaginings” into something that purports to 
represent mind-independent features. This makes it possible for perceptions to 
represent objects as bearing kind-properties, and thus fixes which perceptions are 
classifiable under which concepts. 
1. Introduction 
I see a daffodil. This puts me in a position to have various thoughts that I could not otherwise 
have had. (E.g. “This daffodil is a bit short of water.”) In general, our ability to have thoughts 
about the objects around us seems to rely on those thoughts being connected with sense-
perception. This idea is central to Kant’s theory of cognition—Kant holds that “cognition” 
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(i.e. thoughts about perceptible objects) can only arise when I unify an “intuition” (i.e. a 
perceptual representation of a particular) and a “concept” (i.e. a general representation 
deriving from the understanding). For example, in order to cognize a daffodil, I must perceive 
an object and classify it under the concept <daffodil>. 
But our thoughts will not purport to represent an objective world if we apply concepts 
willy-nilly. If I were to apply the concept <daffodil> indifferently to any object I perceived, 
this would be as good as not consulting perception at all. Similarly, if I can classify an 
intuition under the concept <daffodil> while you can faultlessly classify an identical intuition 
under the concept <pineapple>, then our thoughts don’t seem to be making contact with the 
objective, public world we share. Therefore, a further condition for cognition is that there 
must be standards of correctness governing the application of concepts to perceptions. In 
Kant’s terms, cognition requires not just any pair of concepts and intuitions, but an intuition 
“corresponding to” the concept (e.g. A50/B74f., B146). But what accounts for these relations 
of fit (or “correspondence”1) between intuitions and concepts?  
I will argue that to understand Kant’s account of this correspondence, we need to look 
to the mental representations he calls “schemata”. For Kant, a schema is a “third thing” 
(A138/B177) that somehow mediates between the concept and the intuition, without which 
“all concepts without distinction” “would lack significance [Bedeutung]” (A156/B195). Kant 
introduces schemata while addressing a specific problem about the a priori concepts he calls 
the “categories”,2 but he postulates schemata for every kind of concept that finds application 
in experience.
3
 A schema is described as the “representation of a general procedure of the 
imagination for providing a concept with its image” (A140/B179f.) and is supposed to bridge 
the gap between concepts and intuitions. My aim is to explain exactly what role this kind of 
mental representation is supposed to play in the mental activities of someone cognizing a 
daffodil; to explain how schemata bring intuitions into relations of correspondence with 
concepts; and to determine the extent to which Kant has good reasons for positing schemata. 
                                                 
1
 My use of the term “correspondence” is unrelated to “correspondence theories of truth”. “Correspondence” 
here refers to a relation of fit between two mental representations—an intuition and a concept—not between true 
thoughts or sentences and the things they represent. 
2
 The problem of “heterogeneity” (A137f./B176f.). 
3
 Kant posits schemata for “our pure sensible concepts”, i.e. mathematical and geometrical concepts 
(A140f./B180) and also insists that applying empirical concepts to objects of experience requires schemata 
(A141/B180). 
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To the extent that we think there is value in understanding Kant’s theory of cognition, 
these matters are worth pursuing. Additionally, I will consider Kant’s view from a 
contemporary vantage point, with the aim of showing not just what Kant thought but what 
relevance his thoughts still have. Schemata remain a poorly understood part of Kant’s theory 
of the mind. Commentators have long bemoaned the obscurity of the passages in which Kant 
introduces them;
4
 and in recent years, even those commentators most interested in the relation 
between intuitions and concepts have tended to set schemata aside.
5
 But Kant clearly presents 
schemata as central to his account of how intuitions relate to concepts, and by extension his 
whole theory of cognition. Consider this intriguing note written near the end of his life: “The 
schematism is one of the most difficult points of all. – Even Herr Beck6 struggles to find his 
bearings in it – I hold this chapter to be one of the most important” (Refl 6359, 18:686). 
I will argue that schemata form a central and well motivated part of Kant’s theory of 
cognition: given his background commitments about representation and normativity, many of 
which remain highly attractive, he is right to claim that cognition would be impossible 
without schemata. I endorse the existing view that schemata are rules for “synthesis of 
imagination” (i.e. the process in which the mind converts sensory material into complex 
perceptions of objects) but argue that the existing readings are inadequate. I make the novel 
proposal that the role of schemata is to impose a normative structure on synthesis of 
imagination. Schemata, I argue, guide our synthesizing in the same way that intentions guide 
our actions: in Kantian terms, a schema is essentially a “maxim” for synthesis of the 
imagination. For example, the schema of the concept <daffodil> is a mentally represented 
rule for producing intuitions of a certain character (about a foot tall, yellow blobs at the top, 
etc.). When you synthesize sensible material into a unified intuition of a daffodil, you do so 
“in accordance with” this represented rule, in the same way that your intentional actions are 
                                                 
4
 For indicative examples see Warnock (1949, p. 81) and Walker (1978, p. 88). Other notable moments in the 
long tradition of highlighting the Schematism chapter’s obscurity include Jacobi (1816, p. 96), Schopenhauer 
(1818, p. 533) and Adickes (1889, pp. 171–3). 
5
 E.g. McDowell (1994, 2009), Land (2006, 2011, 2014, 2015), Grüne (2009, esp. p. 213), Allais (2009, 2015, 
2017), Griffith (2012), Tolley (2013, 2017, 2018), Gomes (2014, 2016; Gomes & Stephenson, 2016) and 
McLear (2015, 2016b, 2016a). An important exception is Matherne (2014, 2015), whose interpretation I discuss 
below. See also the brief discussions of schemata in Ginsborg (1997, pp. 44f.) and Hanna (2005, p. 267). 
6
 Jakob Sigismund Beck (1761–1840), one of Kant’s students in Königsberg and later an important proponent of 
Kant’s philosophy. 
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carried out “in accordance with” maxims.7 In the practical domain, the fact that we act “in 
accordance with” maxims bring our actions into contact with normative moral standards; the 
purpose of schemata, I argue, is to bring our synthesizing activities into contact with 
normative epistemic standards—schema-guidance makes an individual’s synthesizing 
classifiable as appropriate in x and y respects, but inappropriate in z respect. In turn, this 
normative constraint makes it possible for one’s intuitions to represent features that could not 
be represented if they were produced merely by associative, idiosyncratic dispositions. By 
bringing synthesis under normative constraint, schemata enable intuitions to possess the kind 
of content that can match or fail to match a concept (“conceptual content”), thereby fixing 
which intuitions are classifiable under which concepts. In effect, schemata establish the 
relations of correspondence between intuitions and concepts that make cognition possible. 
I proceed as follows: in Section 2, I provide grounds for thinking that schemata are 
rules for synthesis of imagination, and clarify what this means. In Section 3, I argue that 
existing readings in this vein fail to explain adequately the role of schemata—they do not 
explain how schemata make cognition possible or why Kant would have postulated them. 
Section 4 examines Kant’s views about “practical propositions” for mathematical 
construction. These remarks suggest that schemata connect an individual’s synthesizing 
activities with normative standards, or so I argue. Section 5 sets out my account of how 
schemata underwrite correspondence-relations, drawing out the connections between 
normativity, ‘rule-following’ and objective representation. Section 6 deals with objections, 
pertaining to the unconsciousness of synthesis of imagination and the question of whether it 
exhibits the kind of freedom required for normative constraint. The Conclusion summarizes 
my interpretation and assesses Kant’s position from a contemporary perspective. Many of the 
motivations which led Kant to posit schemata still seem attractive. Therefore, we either need 
to follow Kant in postulating schemata or give serious thought to where we part ways with 
him. 
2. What Is A Schema? 
Before explaining the role of schemata, I need to explain what these mental representations 
are. This remains controversial, with conflicting accounts persisting in the literature. 
However, I believe there is overwhelming evidence that schemata are rules for synthesis of 
                                                 
7
 Cf. GMS 4:400n, 4:412. 
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imagination. Let me first explain what this means, before providing grounds for taking this to 
be Kant’s view. 
2.1 Explanation 
What would it mean for a schema to be a rule of synthesis of imagination? In this context, a 
rule is simply a mental representation of a repeatable process. Certain token-processes fall 
into kinds; there can be mental representations of these process-types; such representations 
can be called “rules”. (I intend the term “rule” to be neutral regarding the role these 
representations play, e.g. whether they merely describe a process-type or whether they play 
some role in bringing that process about.) 
It is a rather daunting task to explain Kant’s notion of synthesis of imagination, but let 
me attempt a brief (and hopefully relatively unpartisan) characterization. Kant conceives of 
sense-perception as a partly active process: rather than simply receiving perceptions of 
objects through the senses, the mind must work to convert an array of passively received 
“impressions” into a unified perception or “image” of an object (as a spatially structured, 
complex entity that endures through time).
8
 “Synthesis” is Kant’s general term for producing 
mental representations by putting together more rudimentary material (A77/B103), so he 
refers to this activity of combining impressions into perceptions as a kind of synthesis. He 
attributes the synthesis that precedes perception to the imagination. (For our purposes, we 
needn’t say much about the other defining characteristics of the faculty of imagination, and 
can just think of it as “the capacity to carry out this pre-perceptual synthesis”.) Perhaps the 
clearest way to sum up the essential features of synthesis of imagination is in functional 
terms: it is the mental operation that takes a plurality of “impressions” (Kant also calls this 
plurality the “manifold of intuition”) and produces a perception (or complex “intuition”): 
                                                 
8
 It remains controversial whether Kant thinks that a rudimentary, non-complex kind of perception is possible 
prior to this activity. See below. 
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The input to this process—the “manifold of intuition”—is the plurality of non-
representational states
9
 (“sensations”, “impressions”) that arise when the faculty of sensibility 
is affected by objects (A120f.). These can be equated with the physiological changes our 
sense-organs undergo when stimulated by objects.
10
 Kant holds that we can also synthesize 
intuitions of numbers and geometrical objects without drawing on sensations, in which case 
the structural features of the mind’s receptive capacities, i.e. the spatial and temporal “forms 
of intuition”, serve as a “pure” manifold of intuition (cf. A99f., B137). 
The output of synthesis of imagination is a complex intuition.
11
 An intuition is a 
singular representation of a particular object, a representation with spatial and temporal 
structure. When characterizing synthesis of the imagination, Kant gives the examples of 
perceiving a house (B162) and “drawing” lines and groups of dots in the mind’s eye (A102, 
B137f., A140/B179). In each case, the resulting intuition is complex in the sense that it has 
components, which each represent different features of the object. This complex structure can 
be mereological, as when the different parts of an intuition of a line each represent a different 
part of the line; and it can also be non-mereological, as when the visual and tactile sensations 
                                                 
9
 Note that some interpreters hold that these sensations jointly constitute a representation of an object, even prior 
to synthesis. See below. 
10
 Kant talks about “impressions” in physiological terms in his Anthropology (7:176). Cf. Horstmann (2018, pp. 
18f.). 
11
 Kant also uses the term “image” to describe the representations produced through synthesis (cf. A120, 
A140/B179f.). He glosses “image” as “an intuition that contains a manifold in certain relations” (ÜE 8:201f.). 
Cf. Matherne (2015). 
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that make up my intuition of a lump of cinnabar jointly represent the lump as red and as 
heavy (cf. A100f.). 
From a modern standpoint, Kant seems absolutely right to claim that sense-perception 
requires active mental processing. One of the main tasks of contemporary cognitive science is 
to trace the series of activities which take us from sensory stimulation to complex perceptual 
representations of objects. (For a classic example, cf. Marr, 1982.) We can think of Kant’s 
term “synthesis of imagination” as an early formulation of the still-current idea that 
perception requires pre-perceptual processing (and I will sometimes use the latter phrase 
when considering Kant’s account from a contemporary vantage point). 
Let me flag up a complication arising from Kant-scholarship. It is controversial 
whether Kant thinks that all of our intuitions depend on synthesis of imagination, or whether 
we possess some intuitions prior to synthesizing. Some “Nonconceptualist” interpreters hold 
that the “manifold of intuition” constitutes an intuition even prior to synthesis (despite the 
fact that the individual “sensations” that make it up are non-representational).12 Nevertheless, 
these interpreters agree that synthesis is required in order to reach intuitions that represent 
their objects as complex, and hence the kind of intuitions that are candidates for being 
subsumed under concepts.
13
 The (alleged) intuitions that precede synthesis exhibit a kind of 
“sensible unity”, but they do not present us with objects as unified complexes of features, and 
hence not as things bearing properties. Consequently, all parties agree that the intuitions 
which “correspond” to concepts—the kind of perceptual states that allow us to have thoughts 
about objects—are products of synthesis. The dispute over whether, for Kant, any intuitions 
can precede synthesis is important, but it can be set aside for our purposes. We can just focus 
on the fact that synthesis is required for producing intuitions which are complex (in the sense 
just described), while remaining neutral over whether a simpler kind of intuition is possible 
without synthesis. 
We can now spell out what it would mean for a schema to be a rule of synthesis of 
imagination: it would mean that a schema is a general representation of a procedure for 
converting non-intentional sensory stimulation (“sensations”) into a unified perception of an 
object (a complex intuition). Returning to our example of seeing a daffodil, the “manifold of 
intuition” consists of the many firings of photoreceptors caused by light reflected from the 
                                                 
12
 Nonconceptualists with this view include Tolley (2013, pp. 122f.), Matherne (2015, pp. 32f.), McLear (2015, 
pp. 100f.) and Allais (2017, pp. 32f.). 
13
 Cf. Tolley (2013, pp. 122f.), McLear (2015, pp. 98–106) and Allais (2017, pp. 37–44). 
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flower. “Synthesis of imagination” denotes the sequences of processing that convert these 
neural signals into a complex perceptual representation. The “schema” of the concept 
<daffodil> would be a representation of the type of synthesis that is required if we are to 
generate an intuition of a daffodil. 
2.2 Evidence 
Why should we accept the claim that, for Kant, a schema is a rule for synthesis of 
imagination? The first reason is the overwhelming textual evidence: 
The schema of the triangle […] signifies a rule of the synthesis of the imagination 
with regard to pure shapes in space. (A141/B180) 
Now this representation of a general procedure of the imagination for providing a 
concept with its image is what I call the schema for this concept. (A140/B179f.) 
In the first passage, Kant explicitly characterizes the schema as a “rule of the synthesis of the 
imagination”. In the second passage, Kant identifies the schema with a “general” 
“representation” (i.e. a rule) of a “procedure of the imagination”—the context makes it clear 
that this “procedure” is one of synthesis of imagination. Numerous other passages, which I 
lack space to analyze here, also support the conclusion that schemata are rules for synthesis 
of the imagination.
14
 
The second reason for thinking that schemata are rules for synthesis of the 
imagination is that there are serious unresolved objections to the two main rival accounts, 
namely (i) that schemata are themselves intuitions and (ii) that schemata are rules of 
subsumption, and thus a kind of concept.
15
 Kant claims that schemata are needed to overcome 
the difference between the specificity of intuitions and the generality of concepts (cf. 
A141/B180). If schemata were intuitions, they would be unable to capture the generality of 
                                                 
14
 See especially Kant’s characterizations of empirical schemata (A141/B180) and the schemata of 
<magnitude> (A142f./B182, A145/B184), <reality> (A143/B182f. , A145/B184) and <possibility> 
(A144/B184, A145/B184). 
15
 Proponents of the ‘intuition’ view include Gram (1968, pp. 83–129), Allison (1981, 1983, pp. 179–85, 2004, 
pp. 210–8), Gibbons (1994, pp. 53–78) and Pollok (2017, pp. 235–8). (Gram and Allison hold that only the 
schemata of the categories are intuitions; Gibbons and Pollok hold that all schemata are intuitions.) The ‘rules of 
subsumption’ view is favoured by Prichard (1909, pp. 246–55), Bennett (1966, pp. 151f.), Guyer (1987, pp. 
162–81) and Horstmann (2018, pp. 58, 64, 86–96). 
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the representational contents of concepts, and hence would be no help with our initial 
problem—the relation between schema and concept seems just as puzzling as the relation 
between intuition and concept that we initially set out to explain. On the other hand, if 
schemata were concepts or rules of subsumption, then the same problem would arise in the 
opposite direction—the relation between intuition and schema now seems just as puzzling as 
the relation between intuition and concept, for which we wanted an explanation.
16
 In contrast, 
it seems fairly unproblematic that a rule for producing intuitions could guarantee the presence 
of certain features whilst leaving leeway over other features (just as a cake recipe can 
guarantee the presence of ginger without fixing the cake’s shape). 
Admittedly, these briefly stated considerations are unlikely to win over advocates of 
rival interpretations.
17
 So, for the purposes of this article, the claim that schemata are rules for 
synthesis of imagination should be taken as an assumption rather than an established 
interpretative fact. Nevertheless, I hope to have shown that this assumption is well motivated. 
Let’s now proceed to the task of deciding what role these rules play in cognition. 
3. What Role Do Schemata Play in Cognition? 
Why does Kant claim that schemata, i.e. mentally represented rules of synthesis, are required 
for intuitions to correspond to concepts? Although several commentators have endorsed the 
view that schemata are rules of synthesis of the imagination,
18
 none have adequately 
answered this question—or so I will argue in this section. 
3.1 Suggestive Metaphors 
Let’s begin with two prominent commentators who endorse the view that schemata are rules 
for synthesis of imagination: Martin Heidegger and Béatrice Longuenesse. Heidegger and 
Longuenesse both explain the function of schemata in metaphorical terms. Heidegger 
describes them as “governing [regeln]” or “dictating [diktieren]” the production of images 
                                                 
16
 Cf. A133/B172 and KU 5:169, where Kant explicitly warns that the ability to apply concepts cannot be 
explained by positing rules of subsumption. 
17
 I make the case at greater length in further work. 
18
 Cf. Heidegger (1929, pp. 88–113), Young (1984, 1988), Pendlebury (1995) , Longuenesse (1998) and 
Matherne (2015). Longuenesse’s position is somewhat equivocal: many of her remarks suggest that schemata 
are rules of synthesis of imagination (pp. 13, 50, 116, 39) but other remarks seem to conflict with this (pp. 245, 
250, 273, 332, 369, 371). Note also that Allison (2004) holds that empirical and mathematical schemata are 
rules of synthesis of imagination (but that transcendental schemata are intuitions). 
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(1929, p. 96). Similarly, Longuenesse describes these rules as “guiding” synthesis of the 
imagination (1998, p. 117).  
These suggestions seem to be on the right track interpretatively speaking: Kant 
himself describes the imagination as receiving “guidance [Anleitung]” from rules (KU 5:317). 
However, Heidegger’s and Longuenesse’s suggestions are metaphorical, and it is far from 
obvious how to unpack them in literal terms. Heidegger’s choice of terms might suggest 
interpersonal forms of legislation or administration, in which a rule pronounced by one 
person becomes legally binding on others. On the other hand, metaphors of governance can 
be used in completely different contexts, as when we say that a planetary orbit is “governed 
by gravitational force”. Longuenesse’s metaphor “guidance” can be interpreted in similarly 
divergent ways: are schemata akin to guidelines—represented standards which people consult 
and follow—or guide rails—steel tracks that mechanically lead a train in a certain direction? 
Heidegger and Longuenesse use suggestive language, but neither of them resolves this 
ambiguity. Without a univocal, literal account, we have clearly not yet reached an adequate 
understanding of the function of schemata. 
3.2 Rule-Exemplification or Rule-Following? 
Some authors go beyond Heidegger’s and Longuenesse’s metaphors, explaining the relation 
between schemata and our synthesizing activities in literal terms. As suggested above, the 
main choice concerns whether to understand this relationship on the model of a planet, whose 
orbit exemplifies a rule of motion, or on the model of an agent, whose actions follow 
represented rules. 
It will be helpful to map these two options onto notions from Kant’s own philosophy. 
In the Groundwork, Kant claims that there is an essential difference between merely regular 
processes and an agent’s following of mentally represented rules. All kinds of object “work 
according to” rules, in the minimal sense of exemplifying causal rules. But “rational beings” 
are distinguished by the fact that they possess “the capacity to act in accordance with the 
representation of” rules (GMS 4:412, Kant’s emphasis).19 These mentally represented rules 
that we act “in accordance with” are called “maxims” (GMS 4:400n.). It is worth noting that 
Kant includes some quite sophisticated behaviour within the former, rule-exemplification 
category. For example, in the third Critique, Kant discusses beavers’ ability to construct 
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 The passage puts the point in terms of “laws” rather than “rules”, but note that for Kant a law is simply a 
“necessary rule” (A216/B263, KU 5:184). 
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dams. Unlike Descartes, Kant holds that animals like beavers are not mere automata—from 
the complexity of their activities, we can infer that such animals “act in accordance with 
representations” (KU 5:464n, Kant’s emphasis). Nevertheless, Kant insists that non-human 
animals do not have faculties of reason or understanding
20
 and hence do not possess 
represented rules. Their actions should be understood as stemming from “instinct” (KU 
5:464n.), not from following maxims. So despite being much more complex than the orbit of 
a planet and despite being governed by a basic kind of mental representation, the behaviour 
of a beaver is, according to Kant, a case of rule-exemplification but not a case of rule-
following: action in accordance with a rule, but not in accordance with a representation of the 
rule. 
With these clarifications in place, we can now express the two options for spelling out 
Heidegger’s and Longuenesse’s metaphors as follows: 
The Rule-Exemplification Model: Synthesis of imagination exhibits regular patterns 
that exemplify schema-rules, but we do not follow represented rules when 
synthesizing. 
The Rule-Following Model: Schemata guide synthesis of the imagination in the 
same way that maxims guide intentional action. When we synthesize, we follow 
mentally represented rules. 
Which model gives us the right account of schemata? To my knowledge, four commentators 
have taken up this question to date, and all four endorse the Rule-Exemplification Model. J. 
Michael Young (1988, p. 153) explicitly claims that synthesis of imagination is carried out 
“in accordance with a rule” but not “in accordance with the conception of a rule”, and the 
same view is endorsed by Michael Pendlebury (1995, p. 786), Henry Allison (2004, p. 189) 
and Samantha Matherne (2015, p. 771). On this interpretation, our synthesizing activities are 
governed by schematic rules in the same sense that an orbiting planet is governed by laws of 
motion, or a beaver’s activities are governed by behavioural rules: our synthesizing activities 
exhibit regularities which can be described in terms of rules, but we do not follow 
                                                 
20
 There are many passages in which Kant denies that non-human animals possess reason or understanding (e.g. 
A546/B574, MS 6:434, V-Met-K3E/Arnoldt 29:949, 1017). This is because non-human animals lack self-
consciousness, and therefore cannot recognize the similarities between different representations on which 
general representations depend (Anth 7:127, H 7:397, V-Anth/Mron 25:1215, Vo-Met/Mron 29:888f., V-Met-
L1/Pölitz 28:277f.). 
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representations of these rules when synthesizing. To return to the daffodil example: the 
schema of <daffodil> represents a certain procedure of synthesis of imagination. On the 
Rule-Exemplification model, my synthesis matches the procedure the schema represents, but 
the schema (qua mentally represented rule) plays no active, directing role in bringing this 
about. 
Admittedly, there is some prima facie motivation for the Rule-Exemplification 
Model. Its rival, the Rule-Following Model, draws a parallel between synthesis of 
imagination and intentional action, but the two seem deeply dissimilar. Perhaps the most 
obvious difference is that we are fundamentally unaware of the mental processes that take us 
from sensory stimulations to unified perceptions of objects. (In Kant’s words, synthesis of 
imagination is a “blind” process, A78/B103.) In contrast, many paradigm cases of intentional 
action involve consciousness of what one is doing. When I bake a cake, I am typically aware 
of my actions and could tell you what I was doing. I will return to this apparent contrast in 
Section 6.1 (where I argue that the unconsciousness of synthesis is actually no barrier to 
modelling it on intentional rule-following). For the moment, let me concede that this is a 
prima facie problem for the Rule-Following Model. 
However, the Rule-Exemplification Model faces a more serious problem: it seems to 
make schemata redundant. As already noted, Kant holds that all processes are governed by 
rules in the minimal sense of exemplifying regularities:  “Everything in nature works in 
accordance with [rules]”21 (GMS 4:412). Yet he does not postulate a “representation of a 
general procedure” for every one of these processes. A planet needs no representation of the 
rules of its motion. A beaver needs no representation of the rules exhibited by its dam-
building activities. If the mind merely exemplifies a certain rule of synthesis of imagination, 
then Kant would have no reason to postulate a “representation of [this] general procedure of 
the imagination” (A140/B179f.), i.e. no reason to posit a schema.  
To approach the same point from another direction: if I possess a represented rule of 
synthesis, but don’t follow it when synthesizing, then this representation seems totally idle. If 
we think of the relation between synthesis and schemata on the model of mere 
exemplification, then no function has yet been given to the latter. Therefore, the Rule-
Exemplification Model seems a very long way from explaining how schemata underwrite 
relations of correspondence between intuitions and concepts. Even more seriously, it makes it 
fundamentally mysterious why Kant would have postulated schemata at all. Perhaps the 
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 See fn. 18. 
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Rule-Exemplification Model could be modified in some way to meet this challenge; however, 
no existing versions of the interpretation offer any clues for how this could be done, nor do I 
see any promising lines of response. For the time being, then, the Rule-Exemplification 
Model faces a serious, unanswered problem. I therefore propose that we pursue the Rule-
Following Model, which has so far gone unexplored. 
In coming sections, I will argue that the Rule-Following Model has the potential to 
deliver a satisfying account of why schemata are necessary for establishing relations of 
correspondence between intuitions and concepts. My focus will be on developing a positive 
account, rather than arguing against possible alternatives. Other interpretations might be 
possible, but given the lack of promising suggestions on the table, my aim will be to develop 
an account which is both philosophically attractive and consonant with Kant’s texts. 
4. Schemata and Normativity in Mathematical Construction 
According to the Rule-Following Model, schemata guide synthesis of imagination in the 
same way that maxims guide actions. In his practical philosophy, Kant casts maxims as the 
mental correlates of normative standards (“imperatives”). As a result of being governed by 
mentally represented rules, human actions can be assessed with reference to these norms: 
unlike the motions of a planet or the behaviour of a beaver, human actions can be classified 
as right or wrong, depending on whether the mental rules that guide the actions line up with 
the norms that apply to them. My positive proposal will be that Kant invokes schemata to 
fulfil an analogous function in the domain of cognition. Practical maxims connect our actions 
with moral norms; schemata connect our synthesizing activities with epistemic norms. To 
make this plausible, I need to explain how schemata, so construed, establish relations of 
correspondence between intuitions and concepts (Section 5). I must also address objections to 
this comparison (Section 6). Before proceeding to those tasks, I present textual evidence that 
Kant conceived of schemata as connecting our synthesizing activities with normative 
standards. This evidence comes from his remarks about normative constraint in mathematics. 
4.1 Practical Propositions in Mathematics 
Throughout the “Critical” period, Kant makes remarks about “practical propositions” in 
mathematics. I will begin by arguing that Kant conceives of these as normative requirements 
for certain acts of mathematical construction (this subsection), before examining how they 
relate to schemata (Section 4.2). 
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In the Critique of Pure Reason, he writes: 
Now in mathematics a postulate is the practical proposition that contains nothing 
except the synthesis through which we first give ourselves an object and generate its 
concept, e.g., to describe a circle with a given line from a given point on a plane[.] 
(A234/B287; cf. Br 11:53) 
In line with the methodology of his time period, Kant conceives of mathematical inquiry as 
centring on activities of ‘construction’, in which one represents particular mathematical 
objects (e.g. circles) in imagination or through diagrams. Kant thinks of mathematical 
construction as constitutively involving synthesis of imagination.
22
 In the quoted passage, he 
asserts that a “practical proposition” in mathematics concerns one of these acts of 
construction, e.g. the act of synthesis through which we represent a circle. It is commonplace 
that Kant’s conception of mathematics is thoroughly informed by the paradigm of Euclidean 
geometry; consequently, it is fruitful to compare the quotation with Euclid’s Elements. On 
inspection, it seems likely that Kant is talking about the “postulates” from the beginning of 
that work. Euclid’s postulates are commands (written in the imperative mood) calling for the 
basic kinds of construction on which the whole proof-structure of the Elements depends: 
1. To draw a straight line from any point to any point. 
2. To produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight line. 
3. To describe a circle with any centre and distance. (Euclid, 300BC, p. 154)
23
 
So, when Kant talks about “practical propositions” in mathematics, he has in mind the 
instructions to perform certain constructions that lay at the basis of the mathematical sciences 
of his era. 
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 “The image-forming [bildende] synthesis through which we construct a triangle in imagination is precisely the 
same that we exercise in the apprehension of an appearance” (A224/B271). It is less obvious that construction 
with pencil and paper requires a species of synthesis of imagination; but recall that we must carry out synthesis 
of imagination to perceive diagrams—and presumably also to construe imperfect diagrams as presentations of 
perfect mathematical objects. Therefore, a demand to make and use a diagram is a fortiori a demand to perform 
certain acts of synthesis of imagination. 
23
 I omit Euclid’s fourth and fifth postulates, which less clearly match Kant’s notion of a “practical proposition”. 
Note that most 18
th
 c. editions of Euclid included these under the heading of “axioms” rather than “postulates” 
(Dunlop, 2009, pp. 35f.). It is therefore highly likely that, to Kant’s knowledge, Euclid had only three postulates, 
all of which were imperatival commands for construction.  
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Why does Kant call these propositions “practical”? They are commands calling for a 
certain activity, so they certainly have something to do with ‘practice’. But in the second 
Critique, Kant explains that they are “practical” in the further sense of making normative 
demands on the will. In contrast to the imperatives of morality, mathematical practical 
propositions do not make categorical normative demands. Nevertheless, they are “practical 
rules under a problematic condition of the will” (KpV 5:31), i.e. “hypothetical imperatives” 
(cf. GMS 4:414f.). This means that practical propositions in mathematics are normative rules 
that are binding on individuals who have adopted certain ends.
24
 
What kind of end would I have to adopt, in order to acquire the normative obligation 
to construct a circle? In the third Critique, Kant discusses the fact that “geometrical figures 
that are drawn in accordance with a principle” serve the “purpose [Zweck]” of “solving many 
problems [Aufgaben]” (KU 5:362; cf. GMS 4:415). From the perspective of Euclidean 
mathematical practice, it is clear what Kant means. As the reader or student works her way 
through a treatise like Euclid’s Elements, she is continually called on to pursue certain 
“problems”: tasks which she is commanded (in the imperative mood) to complete, e.g. to 
construct an equilateral triangle with a given base. After setting a certain problem, the text 
then details a “solution”, in which the reader is commanded to carry out certain constructions 
(either the basic constructions specified in the “postulates”, or by complex chains of these 
provided by the solutions to earlier “problems”). The commands contained in the “solution” 
will be normatively binding on anyone who has adopted the aim of solving the “problem”. 
Far from being peculiar to Euclid’s Elements, this structure of problems and solutions is a 
common feature of virtually all mathematical science up to Kant’s day, not least Newton’s 
Principia.
25
 In effect, when we practice mathematical science as Kant knew it, we 
successively adopt a series of pre-specified goals (or “ends [Zwecke]”). We then encounter 
imperatival commands, demanding certain acts of construction. If the author has done his or 
                                                 
24
 In a footnote earlier in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that practical propositions in 
mathematics “have nothing to do with determining the will” (KpV 5:26n). In light of the passage quoted in the 
main text, it seems most plausible to read this as emphasising that these practical propositions, like all 
hypothetical imperatives, are only ever contingently binding on agents and only due to non-practical matters of 
fact. 
25
 For example, “Problem 1” commands the reader to find a certain point and its solution commands the reader 
to construct a series of lines, the last two of which intersect at the required point (Newton, 1687, p. 99). A 
further illustration of the ubiquity of the Euclidean architecture of “theorems” and “problems” in the 18th c. is 
the fact that Kant himself adopts it in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science and Critique of 
Practical Reason. 
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her job correctly, the commands will propose actions that we really ought to carry out, given 
the goal we have just adopted. The mathematical practitioner continually adopts certain 
epistemic ends and ipso facto inherits the various normative demands for construction 
contained in the “practical propositions” of the treatise. (For someone composing a new 
treatise, part of the challenge would be to identify what one ought to do in order to solve 
some new series of problems.) 
4.2 Practical Propositions and Schemata 
Having shown that “practical propositions” are epistemic-normative demands structuring 
mathematical inquiry, I now need to explicate their relation to schemata. The first thing to 
note is that, according to Kant, the mathematical constructions demanded by practical 
propositions are kinds of synthesis of imagination. This was explicit in our first quotation 
about practical propositions: they “contain nothing except the synthesis through which” 
mathematical objects are constructed (A234/B287, emphasis added). So the practical 
proposition mentioned in this passage is a hypothetical imperative to perform the kind of 
synthesis of imagination that results in an image of a circle. 
What is the relation between the normative demand contained in the practical 
proposition, and the relevant mathematical schema? If the Rule-Following Model were 
correct, we would expect this to parallel the relation between a maxim and a moral demand in 
Kant’s practical philosophy. That would mean that the schema would have the same kind of 
content as the practical proposition, so as to be capable of meeting or failing to meet the 
normative demand. The argument of Section 2 supports this conclusion: the schema of the 
concept <circle> is a mentally represented rule for producing an intuition of a circle (cf. 
A718/B746). Therefore, if I perform a construction in accordance with this schema, the 
mental rule guiding my acts of synthesis will have precisely the same content as the 
normative demand that applies to it. On the other hand, if I accidentally follow the schema of 
<ellipse> when I ought to construct a circle, there will be a mismatch between the normative 
demand and my rule of activity, and I will have failed to meet my practical-cum-epistemic 
obligations. So in terms of content, the relation between mathematical practical propositions 
and schemata fits the Rule-Following Model. 
Further evidence that schemata play a parallel role to maxims comes in a letter from 
Kant to Marcus Herz in 1789. In it, Kant discusses mathematical concepts, and why 
possessing them makes us susceptible to normative demands for construction: 
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 [I]t is not the case that the possibility of a circle has a merely problematic status prior 
to the practical proposition: to describe a circle by moving a straight line around a 
fixed point. The possibility of a circle is given [Kant’s emphasis] in the definition of a 
circle, due to the fact that the circle can be constructed by means of the definition 
itself, i.e. portrayed in intuition [...] in the imagination (a priori). [...] The proposition: 
to describe a circle is a practical corollary from the definition (termed a postulate), 
which could not be demanded [emphasis added] were it not the case that the 
possibility, and even the way that the figure is possible, is already given in the 
concept. (Br 11:53) 
The first important claim concerns the relation between the concept <circle> and the mental 
rule for constructing circles, i.e. the schema. In asserting that “the circle can be constructed 
by means of the definition itself”, Kant is implying that, when we define a mathematical 
concept, we fix not only its logical marks but also the schema that accompanies it (cf. 
A729/B757): no one has grasped the definition of the concept <circle> unless they have 
acquired the schema for that concept. The next important claim concerns the relation between 
the schema of <circle> and the practical proposition which demands that a circle be 
constructed. Kant asserts that if the definition didn’t already supply us with the rule of 
construction (i.e. schema), it “could not be demanded” of us to construct a circle: the 
normative demand contained in the practical proposition only applies to us because we 
possess the relevant schema. One dimension of this is simply Kant’s famous dictum that 
“ought implies can”:26 I could not be obligated to construct a circle if it were not possible for 
me to do so. But another dimension is the implication that it is the schema that puts my 
activities in touch with normative demands: if I did not possess this mentally represented rule 
of construction, then I could not be subject to the normative demand to construct a circle. 
Here we have a further respect in which the schema parallels the role of a maxim. Only 
because our activities are “guided” by these rules are those activities normatively assessable 
with respect to imperatives. This means that mathematical schemata put our constructing 
activities in touch with normative standards—they render those activities susceptible to 
normative assessment in comparison with imperatives. This will be at the core of my positive 
account of the function of schemata, and clearly supports the idea that schemata stand to 
synthesis as maxims stand to action. 
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 Cf. KpV 5:31. 
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5. Representation, Normativity and Rule-Following 
I have now offered reasons for pursuing the Rule-Following Model, i.e. the interpretation that 
schemata guide synthesis in the same sense that maxims guide action. My task now is to 
explain how schemata, construed in this way, could establish the relations of correspondence 
between intuitions and concepts that make cognition possible. This section argues that, by 
connecting synthesis of imagination with normative constraints, schemata make it possible 
for intuitions to have new kinds of content. Only intuitions whose production is led by 
schemata can represent objects as having kind-properties and objective temporal structures 
(explained below). Because these are the features that concepts represent, only synthesis 
guided by schemata can yield intuitions that correspond to concepts. 
My argument comprises the following steps. (1) Intuitions need to represent ‘kind-
properties’ and ‘objective temporal structures’, in order to correspond to concepts. (2) 
Synthesis of imagination is needed in order to produce intuitions of sufficient complexity to 
have these contents. (3) Synthesis of imagination needs to be subject to normative constraint 
for these intuitions to have objective representational purport, rather than being a “subjective 
play of imaginings”. (4) Schemata, guiding synthesis in the same sense that maxims guide 
action, are needed for synthesis to stand under normative constraints. 
5.1 Correspondence Requires ‘Conceptual Content’ 
At the beginning of the Schematism chapter, Kant gives the following gloss on the notion of 
correspondence: 
[T]he concept must contain that which is represented in the object that is to be 
subsumed under it, for that is just what is meant by the expression “an object is 
contained under a concept.” (A137/B176) 
For it to be appropriate to subsume an object under a concept, the concept must match the 
content of our other representations of said object. The object must be represented as 
exemplifying whatever features are “contained” in the concept, i.e. the features that figure in 
the intension or content of the concept. Let’s return to our main example to see what these 
features would be. The concept <daffodil> represents a certain property (viz. daffodil-hood) 
which is possessed by a certain kind of object (viz. daffodils). The same goes for all concepts, 
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because, according to Kant, all concepts are general in their content.
27
 Every concept 
represents some property, which is exemplified by a certain kind of object (henceforth a 
“kind-property”). 
So what would it mean for an object presented in an intuition to be “contained under” 
some concept? Well, “that which is represented in the object” must match the content of the 
concept. In other words, the intuition has to represent the object as exemplifying the relevant 
kind-property. For example, for an intuition to correspond to the concept <daffodil>, it 
would have to represent its object as possessing the property of daffodil-hood. In general, an 
intuition can only correspond to a concept if it represents its object as having the relevant 
kind-property. 
It will be instructive to consider a class of concepts with a special status for Kant: the 
categories. The categories are a set of a priori concepts deriving from the logical structures 
that pervade our propositionally-structured thoughts. Kant holds that the categories include 
concepts such as <substance>, <cause> and <quantity>, and that all of these concepts can 
connect with perceptible objects by dint of being associated with certain temporal structures. 
(As we will see, Kant holds that schemata play a crucial role in this association.) For 
example, in order for an object to fall under the concept <substance> it must have the 
temporal property of permanence, i.e. it must go on existing throughout time despite changes 
in its other properties. This is an objective temporal property of the object—it pertains to the 
temporal structure it actually has in the objective, public world of experience (not just the 
temporal structure of some individual’s perception of it). So, for an intuition to correspond to 
a category, the kind-property it must represent is an objective temporal property (henceforth 
an “objective temporal structure”). Kant holds that all of the objects we perceive stand under 
categories (e.g. B161f.), so the representation of these objective temporal structures will be a 
pervasive feature of perception. 
To sum up, for an intuition to correspond to any concept, it must represent its object 
as possessing the relevant kind-property. For it to correspond to a category, it must represent 
its object as possessing the relevant objective temporal structure. Let me use the term 
“conceptual content” to refer to these, i.e. the kinds of content in virtue of which intuitions 
correspond to concepts (or equivalently, the kinds of content pertaining to features that can be 
represented by concepts). 
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 Cf. Kant’s insistence that there are no “singular” concepts, only singular uses of concepts (Log 9:91; V-
Lo/Pölitz 24:567; V-Lo/Wiener 24:904f., 908f.). Cf. Thompson (1972) for helpful discussion. 
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5.2 Conceptual Content Requires Synthesis of Imagination 
Let me now highlight the ways in which synthesis of imagination is required, in order for us 
to produce intuitions that represent kind-properties and objective temporal structures.
28
 
Firstly, to represent an object as bearing a property, an intuition would need to represent the 
object as something over and above any one property it possesses. This might be achieved by 
linking this property to a certain impenetrable region of space, or to other properties. Let’s 
return to the daffodil: to perceive its petals as yellow, I need to perceive them as things over 
and above their yellowness. Perhaps I do this seeing the petals not only as yellow, but also as 
having a certain texture and smell, or as filling a certain region of space. Kant holds that this 
requires synthesis of imagination, because “the combination […] of a manifold […] can 
never come to us through the senses” (B129): a serious amount of mental processing is 
required before the diverse streams of sensory information coming from our sense-organs can 
represent a plurality of features as co-present in one object.
29
 
Secondly, the intuition would need to represent its object as persisting through time. 
This is fairly obvious in the case of the objective temporal structures that correspond to the 
categories. For example, to perceive something as persisting through time (and hence as a 
substance), one would need to join together temporally dispersed sensory information relating 
to the present and the past. But a similar point holds for more everyday properties. Imagine 
someone whose eyes track a seagull as it swoops around, but who is unable to construe this 
stream of sightings as belonging together or forming a unity. Even if we allow that this 
person is in some sense seeing an object, it seems highly doubtful that they are seeing it as a 
seagull: intuitively, to construe something as a seagull, one must show an implicit grasp that 
seagulls are things which fly around, showing up in perception as moving figures.
30
 Kant 
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 For related discussion, cf. Strawson (1971), Sellars (1978), McLear (2015, pp. 99f.) and Allais (2017, pp. 
39f.). 
29
 Note that Allais (2017) disputes whether the “binding” of different streams of sensory information counts as 
“synthesis”, but does not dispute the key claim that synthesis is required for us to perceive a thing as a bearer of 
properties. 
30
 Is this just because <seagull> is a substance-concept? No. Consider an event-concept such as <lightning>. If 
I didn’t link the forked flash of light with the darkness that precedes and follows it, I would not be construing it 
in a manner that differentiates it from the very different optically possible phenomenon of a fork of light 
lingering in the sky for hours on end. If so, it seems doubtful that I would genuinely be construing it as 
lightning. 
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refers to this function of linking present and past material as “synthesis of reproduction”, and 
assigns it to the imagination (e.g. A102). 
 Thirdly, to represent a property as belonging to an object, an intuition will oftentimes 
have to represent the property as continuing to exist even during moments when it is not 
manifest. For example, I will continue to be aware of the stem of a daffodil as a unified streak 
of green even while it is partly occluded by my hand. It’s plausible that if one totally fails to 
represent objects as having a property with this minimal kind of constancy, then one fails to 
represent it as having a property at all (and one is at best aware of the subjective character of 
one’s state of mind).31 It’s also plausible that, to achieve this minimal constancy, the 
imagination would have to supplement the patchy stream of incoming sensory impressions 
with material from past sensation. 
Fourthly, at least in the vast majority of cases, perceiving properties is bound up with 
having certain types of expectation. To see something as made of glass is in part to have 
certain expectations about how it would feel to the touch or how it would change if I dropped 
it onto a stone floor. To perceive something as a tomato is in part to have expectations about 
how it would look from another direction. When a lump of metal feels heavy, this not just a 
simple tactile sensation; it is bound up with diverse expectations about how you can 
manipulate it with your hands, what it would feel like to do so, and how it would move if 
dropped or placed on a slope. Once again, it’s plausible to think of the imagination as 
supplying the material for these expectations (and Kant certainly thinks of expectation as 
relying on the imagination, Anth 7:185–7). 
In all of these ways (and more
32
), Kant would insist that the imagination must actively 
synthesize sensory impressions to yield an intuition of an object as bearing a kind-property or 
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 Might there be some concepts that pick out properties lacking this ‘minimal constancy’, e.g. the concept 
<currently tastes of pistachio to me>? In the human case, it’s plausible that such concepts are logically 
constructed out of concepts that do represent minimally constant properties. If a creature’s basic perceptual 
construals grouped objects along the lines of such non-constant properties, it seems arguable that the creature 
would fail to perceive the objects as bearing properties, rather than merely responding to the subjective character 
of its perceptions (cf. Burge, 2010). 
32
 The most important dimension of synthesis of imagination not explored in the main text is Kant’s claim that 
we need to perform synthesis in order to perceive shape, an activity which he apparently models on geometric 
construction (A102, B137f., B162). It is fully orthodox in modern cognitive science that pre-perceptual 
processing is required before we can construe objects in terms of lines and edges or as having three-dimensional 
form. However, some Nonconceptualist readers have recently questioned whether Kant includes the spatial 
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objective temporal structure: intuitions with conceptual content presuppose synthesis of 
imagination.
33
 From a contemporary vantage point, it also seems plausible that the mind is 
active when we perceive things as bearing properties and as temporally structured. We might 
shy away from using the term “imagination” to refer to the capacities that perform this pre-
perceptual processing, but aside from that terminological difference, we can more or less 
endorse Kant’s ideas. 
5.3 To Produce Conceptual Content, Synthesis Must Be Normatively Constrained 
Although synthesis of imagination is a necessary condition for producing intuitions with 
conceptual content, I will now argue that not every kind of synthesis can achieve this feat. If 
synthesis unfolds in an arbitrary manner (in a sense to be sketched below), the result is a 
complex representational vehicle but one which fails to represent its object as a unified 
complex. 
To see why, we need to draw a distinction between jointly representing a plurality of 
features, and representing that plurality as objectively unified. This distinction is best 
illustrated with an example. Consider Jones, who for many years predominantly saw daffodils 
in a garden where they stood alongside a Japanese maple. Nowadays, whenever he sees a 
daffodil, he is reminded of the Japanese maple and the deep red of its leaves. The result is 
that Jones’s imagination actively combines the sensory material pertaining to daffodils with 
extraneous sensory material pertaining to the Japanese maple: whenever he has an intuition of 
a daffodil, he also imaginatively recalls the splashes of red that so often accompanied them in 
the past. Now, it seems compatible with all of this to suppose that Jones does not perceive 
daffodils as instantiating the redness of the Japanese maple, or even as standing in any 
genuine objective connection to that colour. When Jones’s imagination fuses sensory 
information into a perception of a daffodil, it also reproduces sensory information pertaining 
to the maple’s redness, but this joint representation of daffodils and redness does not entail 
that he perceives them as objectively unified. 
One might at first suspect that Jones fails to represent the daffodil as bearing redness 
because he doesn’t link the redness with the spatial region occupied by the daffodil. But if we 
                                                                                                                                                        
ordering of sensible material under the umbrella of synthesis of imagination (e.g. Allais, 2017, p. 32). It’s 
beyond the scope of this article to address this controversial point. 
33
 At the risk of repeating myself, this claim is endorsed even by the Nonconceptualist interpreters who think 
Kant endorses a more rudimentary kind of intuition that does not depend on synthesis. 
Perception and Rule Following 
77 
 
vary the example, we can see that this is not the decisive factor: whenever Jones’s nephew 
visits, he playfully pretends that a certain potted daffodil is speaking in a gruff Welsh accent. 
Now, when he glances at the daffodil on his shelf, he imagines that gruff voice emanating 
from it. For all this, we clearly don’t need to think of Jones as undergoing a perceptual 
illusion. This playful or habitual imaginative combination needn’t amount to representing the 
daffodil as speaking. 
So what does account for the difference between joint representing and representing 
as objectively unified? I propose that the difference comes down to the presence or absence 
of certain normative constraints. When the imagination’s combinations are a function of 
Jones’s personal history or his playful, arbitrary choices, they obviously do not reflect 
anything about the object. This has a causal dimension: a different upbringing might have 
caused him to associate daffodils with the blueness of bluebells instead (or to imagine a New 
Jersey accent instead of a Welsh one). But it also has a normative dimension: Jones is not 
normatively assessable for the features he associates with the daffodil. There is nothing either 
defective or appropriate about his linking of daffodils with the Maple’s redness or with the 
Welsh accent. He could have linked daffodils with different features, and he could have done 
so faultlessly. In contrast, when Jones construes the daffodil as firm in texture, it seems that 
he does so in a manner that makes this mental activity normatively assessable (such that it 
would be inappropriate to construe the daffodil as blazing hot to the touch, for example). 
Therefore, the difference between merely jointly representing these features and representing 
them as objectively unified in the object seems intimately connected with whether the 
combinations are normatively assessable. 
My proposal is that it is in virtue of not being assessable as appropriate or 
inappropriate that Jones’s playful and habitual imaginings fail to represent combinations in 
the object. Conversely, synthesis of imagination can only represent combinations in the 
object when it is subject to normative constraint. This proposal is of course controversial: not 
everyone would accept that objective perceptual representation requires normative constraint. 
On the other hand, it is not without its proponents. Particularly in the wake of certain readings 
of Wittgenstein’s ‘rule-following considerations’, the idea that objective representational 
purport is bound up with normativity has found many defenders.
34
 Reflecting on Jones and 
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 E.g. Sellars (1954), Kripke (1982), Blackburn (1984), McDowell (1984b, 1994), Wright (1984), Burge 
(1986), Boghossian (1989, 2003), Brandom (1994), Haugeland (1998, Chapter 13), Gibbard (2003, 2012), 
Wedgwood (2007, Chapter 7) and Ginsborg (2012). 
NORMATIVITY AND REPRESENTATION IN KANT’S THEORY OF COGNITION 
78 
 
his daffodils, this certainly seems like a promising way to explain the difference between 
jointly representing and representing as unified. 
There is also evidence that Kant himself thinks about the relation between synthesis, 
representation and rule-following in this way. In the Second Analogy of Experience, Kant 
focuses on the kind of synthesis required for us to perceive an event, i.e. an object as 
undergoing a change from one state to another.
35
 Firstly, to perceive an event, we must put 
together a representation of the object’s initial state (e.g. an intact snowman) and its final 
state (e.g. a melted snowman). The imagination needs to connect the images of these two 
states into a temporally extended complex. But the imagination has the power to connect the 
images either way round: it “can combine the two states in question in two different ways, so 
that either one or the other precedes in time” (B233). In this sense, the “connection of the 
manifold” threatens to be “entirely arbitrary” (A193/B238). If nothing removes this 
arbitrariness then the resulting perception, although complex, would be  
only a subjective play of my imaginings, and if I still represented something objective 
by it I would have to call it a mere dream. (A201f./B247) 
On this basis, Kant argues that we would be unable to perceive events were it not for the fact 
that the understanding imposes a kind of “necessity” on the imagination (in contrast to the 
“arbitrariness” it would have if left to its own devices). As I have argued at length 
elsewhere,
36
 the “arbitrariness” of synthesis is removed because the understanding imposes a 
structure of epistemic normativity on the imagination’s activities. In particular, the concept 
<cause> is bound up with certain normative rules for inference: “what the concept of cause 
says” is “that one thing [is] such that, if it is posited, a second thing must thereby necessarily 
be posited” (Prol 4:257). When I make certain causal presuppositions, I incur an obligation to 
infer that a certain event occurs. Because making an empirical judgment involves a certain 
“synthesis of perceptions” (B218, A764/B792), this obligation also applies to my 
imagination: it becomes epistemically obligatory to combine the perceptual material one way 
rather than another (e.g. to place the image of the intact snowman before that of the melted 
snowman).With this framework in place, the imagination’s combinations are no longer 
arbitrary but normatively necessary, in the sense of being assessable as rationally appropriate 
or inappropriate. It is in this way that the concept <cause> is indispensable for representing 
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 That all events are changes of state in enduring objects is a conclusion from the First Analogy. 
36
 Hutton (2018) = Chapter 1. 
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objective temporal sequence. By imposing normative constraints on the imagination’s 
synthesis, it allows us to perceive an objective temporal structure that could not otherwise be 
represented. 
If this reading of the Second Analogy is correct, then Kant himself endorses the need 
for normative constraint in order for synthesis of imagination to yield representations of a 
certain kind of objective unity. My proposal in this subsection is simply that we should 
generalize this point to all of the kinds of conceptual content. If the imagination combines 
sensory material according to arbitrary or potentially idiosyncratic patterns of association, the 
end-product is an intuition that fails to represent a complex of features as objectively unified. 
The imagination’s synthesis must be subject to normative constraints for the resulting 
intuition to represent an object as having a kind-property or exhibiting an objective temporal 
structure. I hope to have shown that this proposal is both philosophically attractive and 
plausible as a reading of Kant. 
5.4 Normative Constraint Requires Schemata 
So far, I have presented a case for thinking that, unless synthesis is normatively constrained, 
intuitions cannot have conceptual content, and hence cannot stand in relations of 
correspondence to concepts. The final step is to explain why this creates a need for schemata, 
guiding synthesis in the same way that maxims guide action. 
We have already highlighted the fact that Kant draws a fundamental distinction 
between those processes that merely “work according to” rules and those processes that 
happen “according to representations of” rules. Kant holds that the blind workings of 
nature—the orbits of planets or even the activities of beavers—cannot be subject to 
normative constraints: 
It is impossible that something in [nature] ought to be other than what […] it in fact 
is; indeed, the ought, if one has merely the course of nature before one’s eyes, has no 
significance whatever. (A547/B575) 
This is because the notion of normativity presupposes a “ground” of action that is different 
from the efficient causation of nature: 
Now this “ought” expresses a possible action, the ground of which is nothing other 
than a mere concept, whereas the ground of a merely natural action must always be an 
appearance. (A547f./B575f.) 
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This distinction between “the ground of a merely natural action” and “the ground […] which 
is nothing other than a mere concept” parallels the aforementioned distinction between 
“working according to” rules and working “according to representations of” rules. Kant is 
asserting that there cannot be normative constraint in the former category of mere rule-
exemplification, but only in the latter category of rule-following. 
Synthesis of imagination needs to be subject to normative constraints in order to 
produce intuitions with conceptual contents; for an activity to be subject to normative 
constraints, it must be guided by a mentally represented rule. It follows that, by Kant’s lights, 
we need to follow mentally represented rules of synthesis—schemata—in order to achieve 
intuitions with conceptual contents. Schemata, functioning in the way predicted by the Rule-
Following Model, are needed to remove the arbitrariness of synthesis of imagination and 
render synthesis normatively assessable. 
With this final part of the proposal in place, we can now explain how schemata 
establish relations of correspondence between intuitions and concepts. Every concept is 
associated with a schema (excluding any “ideas” that are incapable of being applied to the 
world encountered through perception). The schema is a mentally represented procedure of 
synthesis for producing a certain kind of complex intuition, so when I synthesise according to 
the schema, the end product is an intuition that jointly represents a plurality of sensible 
features. What’s more, when I synthesize according to the schema, my synthesizing is 
normatively assessable as appropriate or inappropriate. This makes it possible for the 
combinations introduced through synthesis to have the semantic significance of representing 
objective unities, including representing objects as bearing kind-properties or exhibiting 
objective temporal structures. In this way, intuitions produced according to a schema can 
have certain kind of conceptual content. We will need to explain in a moment how it is that 
the concept of <F-ness> gets associated with the right schema (i.e. the one that, when 
followed, results in an intuition of F-ness). But taking that link for granted for a moment, we 
can specify the following interesting biconditional: 
Correspondence: An intuition corresponds to a concept iff it was produced in 
accordance with the schema of that concept. 
Let’s return to our example. The concept <daffodil> is linked to a certain schema. The 
schema is a mental representation of how to produce a certain kind of complex intuition, viz. 
by linking sensations of yellow and green into a certain three-dimensional spatial form 
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(roughly a foot tall); by supplying expectations about how this object would look from the 
back or feel to the touch; by uniting present visual information with that from a moment ago; 
etc.. When the imagination carries out this procedure “in accordance with” the schema, its 
activities become normatively assessable (as appropriate in x and y respects, but inappropriate 
in z respect). This imbues the resulting complex intuition with the semantic significance of 
representing a whole range of features—the yellow, the green, the texture—as co-present in 
an object and objectively linked in various determinate ways—into a flower-shaped whole 
which more-or-less persists through time, but which might wilt or get trampled. 
Consequently, the intuition represents its object as having the property of daffodil-hood. This 
means that an intuition produced according to this schema will correspond to the concept 
<daffodil>: it will present an object in a way that renders it classifiable as a daffodil. 
Now, what explains how the concept <daffodil> gets linked up with exactly the right 
schema (so that intuitions produced according to that concept’s schema match the content of 
the concept)? In the case of sensible concepts like <daffodil>, we can actually think of the 
schema as fixing the content of the concept. The word “daffodil” and its mental correlate 
would not represent daffodil-hood if they were not associated with the rule for arranging the 
sensory manifold into intuitions of that property. If that kind of linguistic or mental vehicle 
were instead related to the schema for producing intuitions of pineapples, then it would be the 
concept <pineapple> and not the concept <daffodil>. Consequently, we are entitled to take 
for granted the association between schema and concept. Being associated with that schema 
is part of what makes it the concept <daffodil>, and it does not make sense to ask of that 
concept how it came to be associated with that schema. This means that schemata not only 
facilitate subsumption but fix the semantic relations between concepts and perceptible 
objects. 
In contrast to sensible concepts, there does seem to be a genuine question about the 
association between the categories and their schemata. What links the logical content that is 
essential to the category with the objective temporal structure one represents by following its 
schema? (E.g. what links the logical property of being a substance, viz. being something that 
can never be predicated of something else, with the temporal structure of being permanent?) 
It seems non-trivial that the schema matches the content of the concept, so we need an 
explanation of why intuitions synthesized according to the schema are guaranteed to 
instantiate the concept. I lack space to pursue this question here. One promising response, 
proposed by Allison (1981, pp. 76–82), is that Kant’s list of transcendental schemata 
presupposes a set of (synthetic a priori) facts to the effect that everything with such-and-such 
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temporal form (e.g. which persists throughout time) also instantiates such-and-such logical 
criteria (e.g. it can never be predicated of anything else, but can only serve as a subject of 
predication). 
 
To sum up the argument of this section (1) an intuition will only correspond to a concept if it 
has conceptual content (matching the content of the concept); (2) such intuitions presuppose 
synthesis of imagination; (3) merely associative synthesis of imagination would not result in 
intuitions with conceptual content; only if synthesis of imagination is subject to normative 
constraint can it could produce intuitions with conceptual content; (4) by connecting 
synthesis of imagination with normative standards, schemata make possible intuitions with 
conceptual content, and thereby underwrite the relations of correspondence between 
intuitions and concepts that make cognition possible. On this reading, schemata play an 
indispensable role within Kant’s theory of cognition, and Kant has solid motivations for 
positing them. 
6. Objections and Replies 
In this section, I deal with what I take to be the two most pressing objections, arising from 
apparent disanalogies between synthesis of imagination and rule-following pertaining to 
unconsciousness and freedom. 
6.1 Unconsciousness 
We are not typically aware of the pre-perceptual processing that takes us from sensory 
stimulations to complex perceptions of objects. In so far as we can become aware of them, 
this is only by means of the hard graft of philosophical and scientific reflection, and does not 
afford us first-person, conscious awareness of those activities. Kant freely admits this fact 
about synthesis of imagination, characterizing it as “a blind […] function of the soul” 
(A78/B103) and “a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can 
divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty” (A141/B180f.).37 
The unconsciousness of synthesis of imagination apparently stands in sharp contrast 
to paradigm cases of intentional action. To repeat an example given earlier, when I bake a 
cake, I am typically aware of my actions and could tell you what I was doing. We might even 
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 The latter is a characterization of “schematism”, i.e. the mental operations in which concepts and schemata 
work in tandem. I take it that this involves a kind of synthesis of imagination. 
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think that the very idea of intentional action—of carrying out the plan embodied in an 
intention—entails consciousness of what one is doing. According to the Rule-Following 
Model, schemata guide synthesis in the same way that intentions (or maxims) guide action. 
Doesn’t the unconsciousness of synthesis of imagination, and our lack of immediate access to 
the procedures we are carrying out, show that the Rule-Following Model is ill conceived? 
As mentioned in Section 3.2, I believe this prima facie problem can be dispelled: 
firstly, because there is evidence that Kant does not understand rule-following as involving 
consciousness; and secondly, because contemporary philosophy of action provides accounts 
of rule-following that seem applicable to pre-perceptual processing. 
I begin with the interpretative point. It is sometimes assumed that, because of his 
focus on “acting on maxims”, Kant’s whole conception of human life is at odds with the 
findings of modern psychology (Greene, 2007; Haidt, 2001). Kant, it is assumed, thinks of 
human life as dominated by conscious reflection on rules, whereas modern psychology shows 
that relatively few of our everyday activities are under conscious, reflective control (cf. Bargh 
& Chartrand, 1999; Wilson, 2002). A more careful reading of Kant gives the lie to this 
interpretation. Kant holds that we are not typically aware of the maxims we are acting on. Far 
from having direct, conscious access to our maxims, Kant writes that it takes “the most 
strenuous self-examination” to reach conclusions about our motives and that even this is at 
best an unreliable guide to “those inner principles of action, that one does not see” (GMS 
4:407; cf. MS 6:392f.). It follows that acting on a maxim does not involve consciousness of 
what one is doing. Like synthesis of imagination, the “true operations” of our practical rule-
following can be “[laid] unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty” (A141/B180f.).38 
Therefore, in Kant’s eyes, the unconsciousness of synthesis of imagination should be no 
barrier to equating schema-guidance with maxim-guidance. 
Having shown that even Kant’s practical philosophy calls for a notion of rule-
following without consciousness, the question still remains of whether we can make 
philosophical sense of this idea. To my mind, Kant gives us no worked-out account of this 
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 Further illustration comes in the Anthropology, where Kant considers “a musician play[ing] a fantasy on the 
organ with ten fingers and both feet and also speak[ing] with someone standing next to him” (7:136). Kant 
infers that the organist’s harmonious choice of notes must be based on “judgment[s]” of “appropriateness”. Yet 
the organist is certainly not consciously guided by these judgments—this is the point of mentioning the added 
distraction of holding conversation, and the fact that the organist is unable to convey what he was playing in the 
form of “written notation”. On the contrary, Kant uses the example to illustrate the pervasive role of 
unconscious representations in our mental lives (7:135). 
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idea, so we need to look beyond his work to allay this worry. Contemporary philosophers 
sometimes appeal to the idea that when someone is absorbed in an activity that they can 
handle without much effort, they lack a kind of conscious awareness of what they are doing. 
When I cycle the familiar route home from the library, I might not even notice the bends in 
the road to which I respond, or the way that I change gears and vary the rhythm of peddling 
to cope with the rolling gradients. Nevertheless, it seems that these very activities are things I 
do in the course of carrying out my intention to cycle home. (As mentioned above, empirical 
findings suggest that many more of our everyday activities fall into this category of 
unconscious doing than we might have expected.) Some philosophers respond to cases like 
these by denying that human action typically involves anything like following mentally 
represented rules (cf. Dreyfus & Dreyfuss, 1988). However, another possible route is to give 
an account of rule-following that does not presuppose conscious, reflective awareness of 
what one is doing. This route has been pursued by Peter Railton, who develops a notion of 
being guided by a mentally represented ‘norm’ in terms of a disposition 
to notice failures to comply with [the norm], to feel discomfort when this occurs, and 
to exert effort to establish conformity with [the norm] even when the departure from 
[the norm] is unsanctioned and non-consequential. (2006, p. 13) 
This looks like a promising way to capture the phenomena of everyday life while preserving 
the idea that we are often guided by mentally represented rules. 
Is it plausible that pre-perceptual processing (i.e. synthesis of imagination) involves 
rule-following in something like this sense? I lack the space to explore this fully, but here is a 
kind of case which supports thinking of pre-perceptual processing in these terms. Every so 
often, we encounter scenes that do not immediately make perceptual sense, so that we are not 
initially sure what we are seeing. When this happens, we feel a kind of low-level discomfort 
as we ‘strain our eyes’ and ‘rack our brains’ to get the disparate shapes and colours to snap 
into a place. Commenting on Kant’s views of synthesis of imagination, Maurice Merleau-
Ponty describes the experience of walking “along a shore towards a ship which has run 
aground, and the funnel or masts merge into the forest bordering on the sand dune”: one can 
see the funnel and masts, but doesn’t initially see them as parts of a ship. Initially, one has “a 
vague feeling of uneasiness”, a feeling “that something [is] imminent in this tension”. But 
then “these details suddenly become part of the ship, and indissolubly fused with it”; they 
“c[o]me together to form a continuous picture of the upper part of the ship” (1945, p. 20). 
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Once this happens, one is no longer seeing nonsensical shapes and colours, but perceiving a 
ship by means of them. 
Combining Railton’s account of rule-following with my proposed reading of Kantian 
schemata, we can explain this phenomenon as follows. To begin with, your unconscious, pre-
perceptual processing puts the perceived material together in some haphazard way. So far, 
this processing doesn’t conform to any schema you possess (except perhaps a few highly 
abstract transcendental schemata and low-level schemata relating to visual qualities of shape 
and colour). Consequently, the resulting perceptual experience fails to represent the things 
seen as falling under any concept (except perhaps certain categories and basic visual 
concepts). This causes you a vague discomfort, and you exert some effort to push your pre-
perceptual processing into conformity with some schema-rule. You gather more perceptual 
material and play with different ways of associating it, until suddenly your unconscious, pre-
perceptual processes hit on the solution of following the schema of <steam ship>. Now you 
enjoy a perception of the object as a steam ship. 
If my reading of schemata is accepted, then there is more work to be done here. We 
would need to specify which schematic rules an individual is typically following in the course 
of everyday experience, and what epistemic structure provides the impetus to construe 
objects in ways that cohere with our broader understanding of the world (e.g. that steam-ships 
sometimes run aground, but that funnel-shaped blobs don’t float in the air). Nevertheless, 
Railton’s account of rule-following gives us a promising line of approach, one that seems 
consonant with Kant’s own position. It seems that there is plenty we can say to reconcile the 
unconsciousness of synthesis of imagination with rule-following.  
6.2 Freedom 
Having dealt with unconsciousness, let’s move on to freedom. Kant holds that, for an activity 
to be subject to normative constraint—at least the kind of normative constraint that can be 
expressed in “should” statements—that activity must be free (e.g. A534/B563). In the moral 
domain, Kant argues that our actions stem from the will, which is free in the full practical 
sense of being autonomous. However, it seems questionable whether the faculties responsible 
for synthesis of imagination are free in the same sense. But if synthesis of imagination is not 
free, then it cannot be normatively constrained in the way I have suggested. 
The least ambitious way to respond to this objection is to point out that, at least some 
of the time, activities of synthesis of imagination are under control of the will, and hence are 
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just as free as any other actions attributable to that faculty. A case in point would be the 
deliberate acts of mathematical construction discussed in Section 4: one can actively decide 
to perform one specific kind of construction, e.g. constructing a hexagon. There might also be 
dimensions of visual perception that are similarly under volitional control. For example, 
when viewing an ambiguous drawing such as a Necker cube or duck-rabbit, one can switch 
back and forth at will between the two kinds of aspect-seeing the drawings afford. Forms of 
synthesis of imagination that are freely chosen in these ways seem clearly capable of being 
subject to normative standards, e.g. hypothetical imperatives relating to the ends the 
individual adopts. 
However, it’s plausible that such cases—in which synthesis is under volitional 
control—are the exception rather than the rule. In the vast majority of cases, we cannot alter 
the way we assemble and construe perceptual material at will. In our example of seeing a 
daffodil, there is little or no possibility of shifting between perceptual aspects; it presents 
itself to me as a daffodil whether I like it or not. And yet this is exactly the kind of case that 
my proposed account of schemata is supposed to cover. So is it tenable to claim that synthesis 
of imagination has the freedom requisite for normative constraint even when it is not under 
volitional control? 
To make this plausible, let me begin with a clear case in which Kant attributes 
normative constraint (and a fortiori the kind of freedom requisite for normative constraint) 
without voluntariness: aesthetic judgment. Kant holds that when we judge that x is beautiful, 
this “must be combined with a claim to subjective universality” (KU 5:212). This “claim” 
“does not say that everyone will concur with our judgment but that everyone should agree 
with it” (KU 5:239, Kant’s emphasis; cf. KU 5:237). Aesthetic judgments implicitly contain 
normative judgments about the aesthetic judgments of others. If I’m right to judge this 
greyhound as beautiful, then this means that everyone else ought also to judge it beautiful.
39
 
Kant evidently thinks that some aesthetic judgments are valid—he is not an error-theorist 
about beauty. It follows that he thinks there are some normative facts about what objects we 
should judge beautiful, and a fortiori that our capacity for aesthetic judgment is subject to 
normative constraint. Yet Kant insists aesthetic judgment is not linked to volition: anything 
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 Kant cashes out this normative demand via the idea of “sensus communis”: anyone who doesn’t feel 
disinterested pleasure towards a beautiful object must be lacking the “disposition [Stimmung]” of imagination 
and understanding that is “optimal for the animation of both powers of the mind […] with a view to [in Absicht 
auf] cognition” (KU 5:238). 
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grounded in empirical desire or moral resolution is ipso facto not an aesthetic judgment.
40
 It 
follows that Kant credits not just the will but also the capacity for aesthetic judgment with the 
kind of freedom requisite for normative constraint. 
Does he extend this to the faculties responsible for synthesis of imagination? I think 
there is reason to conclude that he does. I will first argue that synthesis of imagination is 
ultimately attributable to the understanding, at least when it is governed by rules; then I will 
argue that there are good reasons for thinking that the understanding is free in a manner that 
renders it normatively assessable. 
Obviously, Kant holds that synthesis of imagination is carried out by the imagination; 
however, he also maintains that it is “an effect of the understanding on sensibility” (B152) 
and that 
It is one and the same spontaneity that, there [in “synthesis of apprehension”] under 
the name of the imagination and here [in “synthesis of apperception”] under the name 
of understanding, brings combination into the manifold of intuition. (B162n; cf. 
A79/B104f., B153) 
To make sense of this idea, think of Smith ‘building a house’ on some land she has bought, 
but using contractors for all of the building work. Smith is not capable of acquiring the 
building materials and building a house out of them on her own; she needs to take on the 
contractors to get the job done. Nevertheless, because she is directing the process, setting the 
parameters according to which it happens and supplying the impetus to the workers, it is 
correct to say that she is building the house as well as saying that the contractors are building 
the house. Similarly, the understanding cannot produce intuitions on its own, but it can 
employ the imagination to do this work on its behalf, and even control the imagination’s 
operations through mentally represented procedural rules (i.e. schemata). Given that synthesis 
of imagination is ultimately an effect of the understanding, the question we need to address is 
whether the understanding exhibits the kind of freedom needed for normative constraint. 
Kant characterizes the understanding’s activities as involving “spontaneity”. To some 
commentators, this suggests a kind of freedom parallel to the autonomy of the free will (esp. 
McDowell, 1994). While some commentators have played down this parallel (e.g. Friedman, 
1996:438), Markus Kohl (2015) has recently argued—to my mind convincingly—that there 
are no real textual barriers for taking the spontaneity of the understanding to be equivalent to 
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 This is the import of Kant’s claim that beauty involves “disinterested pleasure” (e.g. KU 4:204f.) 
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full autonomy. Kohl argues that Kant credits the understanding with full control over the 
empirical judgments it makes, and hence with normative responsibility for making them. 
Furthermore, Kant sometimes explicitly characterizes the understanding’s activities of 
making empirical judgments as being subject to normative constraint,
41
 which entails that the 
understanding has the kind of freedom needed for normative constraint. This makes it viable 
to maintain that the “spontaneity” responsible for synthesis of imagination is free in the sense 
needed for normative constraint. If my proposal is accepted, the idea that synthesis of 
imagination exhibits freedom would ultimately need to be explicated and defended at greater 
length; for the moment, I hope to have shown that this idea is not untenable, and that it is not 
a weakness of my reading that it relies on it. 
7. Conclusion 
I have argued that, in order to understand the role of schemata in Kant’s theory of cognition, 
we need to read him as proposing that synthesis of imagination involves rule-following. On 
my proposed reading, schemata connect our activities of synthesis to normative constraints, 
which make it possible for the mind to represent objective connections between disparate 
sensory material. Only in this way can we produce intuitions with conceptual content, 
intuitions that stand in relations of correspondence to concepts. 
What assumptions lead Kant to the surprising conclusion that we need mentally 
represented rules for pre-perceptual processing (i.e. schemata)? To what extent do his 
assumptions seem plausible from a contemporary standpoint? 
(1) There is the claim with which we began, that thought cannot make contact with 
the objects around us except through connection with perception. This claim remains 
highly attractive. 
(2) There is the claim that most, if not all, dimensions of complexity that show up in 
perceptual experience depend on the mind actively processing sensory material. 
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 In the Prolegomena, Kant claims that when I make a judgment of experience, I “intend that the judgment 
should [soll] also be valid at all times for us and for everyone else” (4:298). Similarly, in the Critique of 
Judgment, Kant equates the “claim[s] […] to be valid for everyone” made by “the judgment of taste” and “all 
other empirical judgments” (5:191). In doing so, he affirms that empirical judgments are subject to normative 
constraints: “An individual judgment of experience, e.g., one made by someone who perceives a mobile droplet 
of water in a rock crystal, rightly demands that anyone else must also find it so, since he has made this 
judgment, in accordance with the general conditions of the determining power of judgment, under the laws of a 
possible experience in general” (ibid.). 
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Again, this claim remains highly plausible—it lies at the heart of modern cognitive 
science and has acquired strong empirical support via that discipline’s successes. 
(3) Next, there is the claim that ‘arbitrary’ mental processes can jointly represent 
pluralities of features, but cannot represent them as objectively unified, and—
consequently—that normative constraint is needed for us to represent kind-properties 
and objective temporal structures. From a contemporary standpoint, this is certainly 
controversial; however, it is in line contemporary theories according to which various 
objective representational purport depends on normative constraint. 
(4) Kant’s fourth assumption is that only when we “act according to a representation 
of a [rule]” are our activities liable for normative assessment. I suspect that it remains 
attractive for many to think that, when we respond (or fail to respond) to reasons, our 
activities need to be mediated by rule-like mental representations. Alternatively, this 
might be a fruitful place to part ways with Kant: if we endorse different criteria for 
normative assessability, we ought to explore whether these criteria are met in the case 
of pre-perceptual processing. 
(5) The fifth and final assumption that motivates Kant to posit schemata is this: 
concepts are always general, so objects must be perceived as bearing kind-properties 
in order to be subsumable under concepts. In the wake of Kripke (1980), this 
assumption seems highly questionable. We are more likely to think that some of our 
concepts (e.g. those expressed by proper names and indexical phrases) immediately 
represent particular objects, without general features figuring in their semantic 
content.
42
 Since the argument of Section 5 was focused on the preconditions for 
representing kind-properties, it does nothing to show that such de re concepts would 
require schemata. In response, we might firstly explore whether the argument of 
Section 5 can be broadened to cover further kinds of perceptual content, so that 
synthesis of imagination is required for us even to perceive things as objects. (This 
would involve defending a ‘Conceptualist’ reading of Kant’s views.) Secondly, even 
without this broadening, the restricted conclusion that all non-de re concepts require 
schemata is extremely significant. If a being could apply only de re concepts, then its 
thoughts would be extremely impoverished; thought without general concepts would 
be thought without predication or quantification, and perhaps wouldn’t even deserve 
the name “thought” at all. Therefore, even if Kant’s conclusions only apply to general 
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 Note that this view is even accepted by many neo-Fregeans about content, e.g. McDowell (1984a). 
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concepts, they still have extremely significant ramifications for our cognitive contact 
with the world. 
In sum, Kant has good reasons to posit schemata. They play an important role in his 
account of how we can have thoughts about objects encountered through perception. 
Moreover, the concerns that motivate this part of Kant’s theory of cognition still seem urgent 
from a contemporary perspective. Anyone who holds that objective representation 
constitutively depends on normativity, and that normative constraint requires rule-following, 
faces significant pressure to join Kant in postulating schemata. 
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4 
Answering the Question: What Is a 
Schema? 
Abstract: Kant holds that cognition requires not only concepts and intuitions, but a 
third representation called a “schema”. To understand Kant’s theory of cognition, we 
need to know what a schema is. Three competing accounts persist in the literature: 
schemata are either intuitions, or rules for subsuming objects under concepts, or rules 
for synthesis of imagination (i.e. for producing complex intuitions). I aim to settle the 
dispute through a close reading of the Schematism and related texts. Cumulatively, 
the texts strongly support the conclusion that schemata are rules for synthesis of 
imagination. Furthermore, the rival interpretations face serious objections. 
1. “The Deeply Obscure and Infuriating Chapter” 
Part of the enduring interest of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is the novel theory of 
cognition it presents. Famously, Kant holds that cognition, i.e. thoughts about perceptible 
objects, can only arise through “uniting” two more basic kinds of mental representation: 
intuitions, i.e. singular representations of sensibility, and concepts, i.e. general 
representations of the understanding (e.g. A51/B75f.). For example, to have the thought that 
the animal that just ran past was a fox, I must encounter the relevant thing in a sensory 
representation (an intuition) and classify it under the concept <fox>.
1
 
Somewhat less famously, Kant holds that I can only achieve this feat of uniting 
intuitions and concepts if I possess a third kind of mental representation, which Kant calls a 
“schema”. Kant introduces “schemata” while discussing how we can apply the special class 
of a priori concepts he calls the “categories”: “the schema of the concept of the 
understanding,” Kant writes, “mediates the subsumption of the latter [i.e. “appearances”] 
under the former [i.e. “the category”.]” (A139/B178). But he is equally clear that schemata 
are needed for all other kinds of concept that find application in experience: 
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 I would also have to classify it under the concept <the animal that just ran past>. For brevity, I abstract from 
this complication. 
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[I]t is not images of objects but schemata that ground our pure sensible concepts. […] 
Even less does an object of experience or an image of it ever reach the empirical 
concept, rather the latter is always related immediately to the schema of the 
imagination[.] (A140f./B180) 
So in order to classify (or “subsume”) an intuited object under a concept, an individual needs 
the mental representation Kant calls a “schema”. Returning to our example, to think of the 
animal as a fox, I need three things: an intuition of the animal, the concept <fox> and the 
schema of that concept. 
It follows that we cannot understand Kant’s account of cognition—of how thoughts 
can be directed at the objects around us—without understanding schemata. Yet there are 
serious barriers to deciphering Kant’s account of schemata. In the decades after its first 
publication, the Schematism chapter (in which schemata are introduced) gained a reputation 
for being one of the most “obscure” parts of the Critique of Pure Reason (cf. Jacobi, 1816, p. 
96; Schopenhauer, 1818, p. 533). The chapter maintained this reputation throughout the 19
th
 
c. and 20
th
 c., with Erich Adickes pronouncing it “the most obscure part of the Critique” 
(1889, p. 171), Geoffrey Warnock dubbing it “bewilderingly vague” (1949, p. 81) and Ralph 
Walker calling it “the deeply obscure and infuriating chapter” (1978, p. 88). In the 21st c., the 
ill-repute of the Schematism has led many commentators, otherwise deeply interested in 
Kant’s account of the relation between concepts and intuitions, to take the drastic step of 
setting aside schemata altogether.
2
 One author writes: 
Now, I would like to say as little as possible about the Schematism chapter [...], since 
practically nothing in the Critique of Pure Reason is subject to so much controversy 
as that chapter. (Grüne, 2009, p. 213) 
While it might have proved a fruitful tactic to set schemata aside temporarily, we cannot 
ultimately exclude them from our reconstructions of Kant’s theory of cognition. Consider the 
tantalizing note written by Kant in 1797: “The schematism is one of the most difficult points 
                                                 
2
 Recent authors who focus on the relation between intuitions and concepts but have little or nothing to say 
about schemata include McDowell (1994, 2009), Land (2006, 2011, 2014, 2015), Allais (2009, 2015, 2017), 
Griffith (2012), Tolley (2013, 2017, 2018), Gomes (2014, 2016; Gomes & Stephenson, 2016) and McLear 
(2015, 2016b, 2016a). 
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of all. – Even Herr Beck3 struggles to find his bearings in it – I hold this chapter to be one of 
the most important” (Refl 6359, 18:686). 
The present article aims to shed light on Kant’s schemata by answering one disputed 
question: what kind of mental representation is a schema? To date, this issue remains 
unresolved, with three competing interpretations persisting in the literature: 
INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION. Schemata are intuitions. 
SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATION. Schemata are rules for subsuming intuited 
objects under concepts. 
SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION. Schemata are rules of synthesis of imagination 
(i.e. for producing complex intuitions). 
Only when we have settled this dispute can we move on to explaining how they are supposed 
to facilitate the subsumption of intuited objects under concepts.
4
 I will argue that the textual 
evidence cumulatively provides much stronger support for the SYNTHESIS-RULES 
INTERPRETATION than for either of its rivals, and that the rival interpretations face serious 
unanswered objections. Along the way, I will offer a close reading of the most important 
passages on schemata: a secondary aim of this article is to clear up some of the obscurity of 
these texts by suggesting ways to untangle Kant’s sometimes unhelpful formulations. 
Section 2 presents the three competing interpretations in more detail. Section 3 offers 
a close reading of the central passages of the Schematism. I argue that a wealth of passages 
unequivocally support the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION. Section 4 considers a range of 
prima facie evidence against that reading. I argue that some of this evidence is undermined 
when the texts are examined more carefully, and that the remaining evidence can be 
explained away. It is a cost for the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION that it has to explain 
away certain texts rather than taking them at face value. However, none of the interpretations 
can avoid this cost, and the weight of evidence cumulatively favours the SYNTHESIS-RULES 
INTERPRETATION. Section 5 confirms this interpretative judgment by arguing that the rival 
interpretations are untenable in their own right. I argue that the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION 
struggles to accommodate the intended generality of schemata; that it risks identifying 
                                                 
3
 Jakob Sigismund Beck (1761–1840), one of Kant’s students in Königsberg and later an important proponent of 
Kant’s philosophy. 
4
 I pursue the latter task in further work (presented here as Chapter 3). 
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schemata with “images”; and that it faces an insurmountable dilemma over the status of the 
schemata of the categories. I argue that the SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATION is deeply 
uncharitable: it saddles Kant with confusions over the nature of sensible schemata, and 
renders transcendental schemata useless. The Conclusion summarizes these results and 
briefly argues that more work is needed to explain the role played by schemata, qua rules for 
synthesis of imagination. 
2. Three Interpretations 
I begin by presenting the three accounts that dominate the literature. 
2.1 The INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION 
According to the first account, schemata are intuitions. This view is defended by Moltke 
Gram (1968, pp. 83–129), Henry Allison (1981, 1983, pp. 179–85, 2004, pp. 210–8) and 
Sarah Gibbons (1994, pp. 53–78), and endorsed by Konstantin Pollok (2017, pp. 235–8). 
These interpreters differ over the scope of the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION: Gram and 
Allison claim only that the schemata of the categories (i.e. the “transcendental schemata”) are 
intuitions, whereas Gibbons and Pollok seem to hold that all schemata are intuitions. 
On this reading, a schema represents a certain pattern or set of features that typifies 
the objects falling under the relevant concept. Since an intuition is a representation of a 
particular not a general feature, a schema so construed would present a token-instance of this 
pattern or feature.  For example, the schema of the concept <fox> would be a “singular 
intuitive representation” of the distinctive features of foxes.5 Perhaps this intuition would 
present the brownish-redness, the pointed ears and the ambling movements that make foxes 
so recognizable. (As I argue in Section 5.1, I suspect that this proposal collapses into the idea 
that the schema is a mental image of some paradigm fox—a view which Kant clearly rejects.) 
In the case of a category, the schema would be an “intuitive exhibition” of a certain temporal 
structure, e.g. something continuing to exist while its properties change in the case of the 
concept <substance>. 
The rationale for thinking of schemata in this way comes from a mixture of structural 
and textual considerations. Gram (1968) and Gibbons (1994) argue that this is the only 
available way to render Kant’s account of judgment coherent (mainly by giving arguments 
against the SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATION); Gram (1968) and Allison (1981, 1983, 
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 Cf. Gibbons (1994, pp. 61, 74). 
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2004) emphasise Kant’s remarks about some of the categories’ schemata (discussed below in 
Section 4.2), and some asides relating to schemata from the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 Critiques (discussed 
below in Sections 4.3–4). 
2.2 The SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATION 
According to the second account, schemata are rules for subsuming intuited objects under 
concepts. The SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATION is defended by Harold A. Prichard 
(1909, pp. 246–55), Jonathan Bennett (1966, pp. 151f.), Paul Guyer (1987, pp. 162–81) and 
Rolf-Peter Horstmann (2018, pp. 58, 64, 86–96).  
On this reading, a schema is a rule specifying the features that typify the objects 
falling under the relevant concept. For example, the schema of the concept <fox> would be a 
rule stating that things with reddish-brown fur, pointed ears, ambling movements, etc. are to 
be subsumed under the concept <fox>. In the case of a category, the schema would specify 
that objects with a certain temporal structure are to be subsumed under a certain category, e.g. 
that things which continue to exist while their properties change are instances of the concept 
<substance>. A schema qua subsumption rule would be a representation of a mental act, i.e. 
the act of “subsuming” or classifying an object under a concept, which Kant attributes to the 
power of judgment (A132/B171). However, it would represent this act by specifying features 
that objects must exemplify in order to fall under the relevant concept: as well as representing 
a mental act, it would represent features of objects. Unlike an intuition, such a rule would be 
general in content, so a schema thus construed would represent a kind of mental act (and 
general features of objects). 
Many commentators think that, for Kant, concepts are rules for subsuming objects, 
and contain marks specifying the features exhibited by the objects that fall under them (e.g. 
Allison, 2004, p. 79; Guyer, 1987, p. 164; Longuenesse, 1998, p. 50; cf. A68/B93, A106). 
For this reason, proponents of the SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATION often explicitly 
equate schemata with a kind of concept (Bennett, 1966, p. 151; Horstmann, 2018, pp. 58, 89; 
Prichard, 1909, p. 248). This further illustrates the fact that a subsumption-rule is 
simultaneously a representation of a mental procedure and a representation of a type of 
object. In the case of the categories, the schema takes the merely logical content of the 
category and adds further temporal content, resulting in a concept which falls under the 
category, but also has sensible objects falling under it. In the case of sensible concepts (i.e. 
empirical and mathematical concepts), the schema is really just the same representation as the 
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concept it schematizes (Bennett, 1966, p. 151; Guyer, 1987, pp. 163–5). Insofar as Kant 
differentiates sensible concepts from their schemata, he is just “half-heartedly generalis[ing] 
in order not to look excessively ad hoc” (Chipman, 1972, p. 42). 
The motivation for thinking that schemata are rules of subsumption is mainly 
contextual. In the short section preceding the Schematism, Kant raises the issue of how 
agents are capable of subsuming particular objects under concepts. Then the Schematism 
chapter opens with a discussion of subsumption. Kant even refers to this part of the Critique 
as ‘The Transcendental Doctrine of the Power of Judgment’—the power of judgment being 
“the capacity to subsume under rules, i.e. to decide whether something stands under a given 
rule” (A132/B171, Kant’s emphasis). So, by the time we reach Kant’s characterizations of 
schemata, it is natural to expect him to be focusing on the power of judgment’s activity of 
subsuming intuited objects under concepts. And indeed some of Kant’s remarks are 
compatible with such a reading: to say that a schema is a “representation of a general 
procedure […] for providing a concept with its image” (A140/B179f.) might well be read as 
meaning that it is a representation of how to find or identify an image that falls under a given 
concept. In what follows, I will argue that other ways of reading such passages are ultimately 
more satisfying. Nevertheless, the view is not without its prima facie appeal. 
2.3 The SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION 
According to the third account, schemata are rules for synthesis of imagination. On this view, 
schemata are neither intuitions nor concepts, but rules for producing intuitions that fall under 
concepts. This view is espoused by Martin Heidegger (1929, pp. 88–113), J. Michael Young 
(1984, 1988), Michael Pendlebury (1995), Béatrice Longuenesse (1998) and Samantha 
Matherne (2015).
6
 
What would it mean for a schema to be a rule for synthesis of imagination? In this 
context, a rule is simply a general representation of a repeatable activity. Certain token-
activities fall into kinds; there can be mental representations of these activity-types; such 
representations can be called “rules”. (I intend the term “rule” to be neutral regarding the role 
these representations play, e.g. whether they merely describe an activity-type or whether they 
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 Longuenesse’s position seems rather equivocal: many of her remarks favour the SYNTHESIS-RULES 
INTERPRETATION (pp. 13, 50, 116, 39) but other remarks seem to conflict with it (pp. 245, 250, 273, 332, 369, 
371). Note also that Allison (2004) endorses the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION for empirical and 
mathematical schemata (but the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION for transcendental schemata). 
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play some role in bringing the activity about.) Kant’s notion of synthesis of the imagination is 
a large topic, but here is a brief (and hopefully relatively unpartisan) characterization. 
Synthesis of the imagination can be understood in functional terms as the mental operation 
that “bring[s] the manifold of intuition into an image” (A120). We can represent this 
functional structure with a flowchart (fig. 1). 
By the “manifold of intuition”, Kant means the plurality of states (“sensations”, 
“impressions”) that arise when the faculty of sensibility is affected by objects (A120f.). These 
can be equated with the physiological changes that our sense-organs undergo when 
stimulated by objects.
7
 Kant holds that we can also produce images of numbers and 
geometrical objects without drawing on sensations, in which case the structural features of 
the mind’s receptive capacities serve as a “pure” manifold of intuition (cf. A99f., B137). So 
the input of synthesis of imagination is a plurality of non-representational
8
 sensory states. 
The output of synthesis of imagination is an “image”, i.e. a complex intuition.9 An 
intuition is a singular representation of a particular object, a representation with spatial and 
temporal structure. Kant gives the examples of perceiving a house (B162) and “drawing” 
                                                 
7
 Kant talks about “impressions” in physiological terms in his Anthropology (7:176). Cf. Horstmann (2018, pp. 
18f.). 
8
 Note that some interpreters hold that these sensations jointly constitute a representation of an object, even prior 
to synthesis. See below. 
9
 “Image (which means an intuition that contains a manifold in certain relations, consequently a figure)” (ÜE 
8:201f.). N.b. we shouldn’t assume that by “image”, Kant means an internal mental intermediary, rather than a 
mental state directed at the outer world. For example, Heidegger (1929, pp. 90f.) argues that Kant uses the term 
“image [Bild ]” in the sense of “view” or “sight” (“Anblick”). Cf. Matherne’s (2015). 
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lines and groups of dots in the mind’s eye (A102, B137f., A140/B179). In each case, the 
resulting intuition is complex in the sense of having components, which each represent 
different features of the object. This complex structure can be mereological, as when the 
different parts of an intuition of a line each represent a different part of the line; and it can 
also be non-mereological, as when the visual and tactile sensations that make up my intuition 
of a lump of cinnabar jointly represent the lump as red and as heavy (cf. A100f.). 
Let me flag up a disagreement in contemporary Kant-scholarship that bears on this 
discussion. It is controversial whether Kant thinks that all of our intuitions depend on 
synthesis of imagination, or whether we possess some intuitions prior to synthesizing. Some 
“Nonconceptualist” interpreters hold that the “manifold of intuition” constitutes an intuition 
even prior to synthesis (despite the fact that the individual “sensations” making it up are non-
representational).
10
 Nevertheless, these interpreters agree that synthesis is required in order 
for us to reach certain kinds of complex intuitions, and certainly the kinds of representation 
that Kant calls “images”.11 They also agree that synthesis is required in order to reach 
intuitions that present objects in a way that allows them to be subsumed under concepts.
12
 
The (alleged) intuitions that precede synthesis have a kind of “sensible unity”, but they do not 
present us with things exhibiting the kinds of unity needed for us to be able to take them up 
into thought. In effect, all parties agree that “images”—the kinds of intuition that can be 
subsumed under concepts—are products of synthesis. For the purposes of this essay I will 
therefore remain neutral on the issue of whether all intuitions presuppose synthesis, and 
simply rely on the consensus view that synthesis is needed to get us from passively received 
“sensations” to unified “images” of objects. 
We can now sum up the import of the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION. To claim 
that a schema is a rule for synthesis of imagination is to claim that it is a general 
representation of a procedure for converting sensory stimulations (“sensations”) into a 
unified, complex perceptual representation of an object (an “image”). Returning to our 
example of seeing a fox, the “manifold of intuition” consists of the many firings of 
photoreceptors caused by light reflected from the animal; “synthesis of imagination” denotes 
the sequences of processing that convert these neural signals into a complex perceptual 
representation (i.e. an image); and the schema of the concept <fox> is a representation of the 
                                                 
10
 Nonconceptualists with this view include Tolley (2013, pp. 122f.), Matherne (2015:32f.), McLear (2015, pp. 
100f.) and Allais (2017, pp. 32f.). 
11
 See Tolley (2013, pp. 122f.) and Matherne (2015, pp. 755f.). 
12
 See McLear (2015, pp. 98–106) and Allais (2017, pp. 37–44). 
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process of synthesis of imagination required to produce an image matching that concept, i.e. 
one that presents its object as having reddish-brown fur, pointed ears, ambling movements, 
etc. 
3. Reading the Schematism 
With these three views on the table, I will now offer a close of the key passages in which 
Kant introduces schemata. The majority of these passages support the SYNTHESIS-RULES 
INTERPRETATION but conflict with both the INTUITIONS and SUBSUMPTION-RULES 
INTERPRETATIONS. (In Section 4, I will discuss the passages which do not easily fit with the 
SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION.) First, let me provide some orientation by outlining the 
Schematism chapter as a whole. 
The Schematism consists of twenty paragraphs. Paragraphs 1–5 contain introductory 
remarks centred on the question of how intuited objects could be subsumed under the 
categories. Kant begins with some general remarks about the subsumption of objects under 
concepts (para. 1, A137/B176) and claims that there is a special problem concerning how 
intuited objects can be subsumed under the categories (para. 2, A137f./B176f.). He suggests 
that this problem can be dissolved by appealing to a third kind of representation, which he 
terms a “transcendental schema” (para. 3, A138/B177) and argues that a transcendental 
schema must be a “time-determination”, a notion which he does not fully explain (para. 4, 
A138f./B177f.). He then explains that this account agrees with the earlier conclusion from the 
Transcendental Deduction that the categories only have objective validity for appearances—
his account of schemata shows that only objects with temporal form can be subsumed under 
the categories (para. 5, A139f./B178f.). The next twelve paragraphs contain the bulk of 
Kant’s characterization of what schemata are: a general characterization (para. 6, 
A140/B179f.); remarks about the schemata of mathematical concepts, empirical concepts and 
the categories (para. 7, A140–2/B180f.); a characterization of the schema for each category 
(paras. 8–16, A142–5/B181–4); and a summary of this list (para. 17, A145/B184f.).  The final 
three paragraphs relate this account to the unity of apperception (para. 18, A145f./B185), and 
further explain the restriction of the categories to the domain of appearances, beyond which 
they have “merely logical meaning” (paras. 19–20, A146f./B185–7). Since my goal is to 
establish what kind of mental representation a schema is, I will focus on the central twelve 
paragraphs (paras. 6–17), with some discussion of paragraph 4. Some of these passages fairly 
obviously support the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION, but others will take significant 
effort to decipher. 
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3.1 Schemata in General 
I begin with Kant’s general characterization of schemata in paragraph 6. Kant intends this 
paragraph to apply to all schemata, including the schemata of the categories but also those of 
empirical and mathematical concepts. Here is the paragraph in full: 
The schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination; but since the 
synthesis of the latter has as its aim no individual intuition but rather only the unity in 
the determination of sensibility, the schema is to be distinguished from an image. 
Thus, if I place five points in a row, . . . . . , this is an image of the number five. On 
the contrary, if I only think a number in general, which could be five or a hundred, 
this thinking is more the representation of a method for representing a multitude (e.g., 
a thousand) in accordance with a certain concept than the image itself, which in this 
case I could survey and compare with the concept only with difficulty. Now this 
representation of a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with 
its image is what I call the schema for this concept. (A140/B179f.) 
Kant begins by stating that a schema is “a product of the imagination”. He then quickly 
pivots to warding off a misunderstanding: the most familiar “products of the imagination” 
(for someone who has been reading the Transcendental Analytic up to this point) are the 
images or complex intuitions that are generated through synthesis of imagination, e.g. an 
image of “five points in a row”. But “the schema is to be distinguished from an image”—it is 
not this kind of product of synthesis of imagination, but something else. Moving beyond this 
negative point, Kant contrasts the image of the number five (i.e. the “five points”) with “the 
representation of a method for representing a multitude”. Skipping ahead to the final 
sentence, we see that this “representation of a method” or “representation of a general 
procedure” is the schema: a schema is a representation of a certain course of mental activities. 
We can immediately note that this is at odds with the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION (according 
to which a schema represents a pattern exemplified by objects, rather than a kind of mental 
operation).  
What kind of procedure or process of mental activities does a schema represent? Well, 
“[a] general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image”. On the 
basis of our earlier characterization (Section 2.3), it seems highly likely that this “procedure 
of the imagination” which provides us with “images” is none other than synthesis of 
imagination. This surmise is further supported by the context. Kant began the paragraph by 
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reminding the reader about “synthesis of [“imagination”]”, and his example of “plac[ing] five 
points in a row” to form “an image of the number five” is clearly an example of this. 
Therefore, this passage provides clear support for the view that schemata are representations 
of processes of synthesis of imagination, i.e. the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION. In 
contrast, it clashes with the SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATION, according to which a 
schema ought to represent a procedure of the power of judgment through which an object is 
subsumed under a concept. I therefore contend that this paragraph—Kant’s first attempt to 
explain what schemata are—strongly supports the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION, but is 
incompatible with either of the rival interpretations. 
To be fully explicit, let me comment on how the passage supports the claim that 
schemata are rules. Kant describes a schema as representing a “general procedure”—a type 
of process rather than a token act. He also writes that a schema represents a “method”, i.e. a 
repeatable procedure. So a schema is a general representation of a repeatable procedure, i.e. a 
rule. So according to this first characterization, the schema of the concept <fox> would be a 
rule representing the kind of synthesis of imagination required to produce an image of a fox. 
3.2 Mathematical Schemata 
Proceeding to paragraph 7, we find further unequivocal evidence that schemata are rules for 
synthesis of imagination. Here is Kant’s account of the schemata of mathematical concepts: 
In fact it is not images of objects but schemata that ground our pure sensible concepts. 
No image of a triangle would ever be adequate to the concept of it. For it would not 
attain the generality of the concept, which makes this valid for all triangles, right or 
acute, etc., but would always be limited to one part of this sphere. The schema of the 
triangle can never exist anywhere except in thought, and signifies a rule of the 
synthesis of the imagination with regard to pure shapes in space. (A140f./B180) 
Again, Kant begins by contrasting schemata with images. Then he offers a criticism of the 
idea that a mathematical concept could relate to the plurality of objects falling under it by 
means of an image. The choice of example suggests that Kant’s target is Locke’s theory of 
abstract ideas: an image of a triangle must have a determinate shape, so it cannot be “valid for 
all triangles” which come in different shapes.13 Next comes the positive point—the 
                                                 
13
 Here Kant echoes Berkley’s (1710, pp. 9–17) criticisms of Locke, and perhaps also Hume’s similar discussion 
(1738, pp. 17–25). The example of “the general Idea of a Triangle […] [which] must be neither Oblique, nor 
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characterization of schemata, which are the representations that really mediate between 
concepts and the objects that fall under them. A schema “signifies a rule of the synthesis of 
the imagination”. This sentence unequivocally supports the SYNTHESIS-RULES 
INTERPRETATION, and directly contradicts the other two interpretations. So according to this 
passage, the schema of the concept <triangle> would be a representation of the procedure of 
synthesis of imagination through which images of triangles are produced. 
3.3 Empirical Schemata 
Following this characterization of mathematical schemata, Kant proceeds to the schemata of 
empirical concepts. His remarks follow the same pattern as the previous two quotations, and 
again decisively support the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION: 
Even less does an object of experience or an image of it ever reach the empirical 
concept; rather the latter is always related immediately to the schema of the 
imagination, as a rule for the determination of our intuition in accordance with a 
certain general concept. The concept of a dog signifies a rule in accordance with 
which my imagination can specify the shape of a four-footed animal in general, 
without being restricted to any single particular shape that experience offers me or 
any possible image that I can exhibit in concreto. (A141/B180) 
Kant starts off by insisting that images and the objects they represent are related to empirical 
concepts by schemata. He characterizes the schema as “a rule for the determination of our 
intuition”. It is sometimes assumed that Kant uses the term “determining” to mean subsuming 
under concepts (which would imply that this characterization supports the SUBSUMPTION-
RULES INTERPRETATION). However, in the course of explaining synthesis of imagination, 
Kant explicitly describes the imagination as “a faculty for determining the sensibility” (B152, 
emphasis added); indeed, there are many passages in which Kant describes synthesis of 
imagination as “determining” “sense” (B151, B153, B154, B155) or “the manifold” (B154). 
So the first sentence of the passage fits well with the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION 
(though this sentence can probably also be accommodated by the SUBSUMPTION-RULES 
INTERPRETATION). 
                                                                                                                                                        
Rectangle, neither Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalenon; but all and none of these at once” is introduced by 
Locke (1689, p. 596, emphasis in original), and picked up by Berkeley (1710, pp. 14–7) and Hume (1738, pp. 
19f.). 
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Next, he offers an example. The schema of the concept <dog> is “a rule in 
accordance with which my imagination can specify [verzeichnen] the shape of a four-footed 
animal in general”.14 The schema represents a process carried out by the imagination, 
resulting in a representation with spatial form. I see no option other than to think that this is 
synthesis of the imagination, so all in all this passage decisively supports the SYNTHESIS-
RULES INTERPRETATION: the schema of the concept <dog> is a representation of the kind of 
synthesis of imagination that would result in an image of a dog. 
To briefly take stock, Kant’s general characterization of schemata and his 
characterizations of mathematical and empirical schemata all unequivocally support the 
SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION. Let’s now proceed to the more difficult material on the 
transcendental schemata. 
3.4 Transcendental Schemata 
The remainder of paragraph 7 discusses transcendental schemata (i.e. the schemata of the 
categories). This is followed in paragraphs 8–17 by characterizations of the schema of each 
category. Before turning to this texts, let’s consider what we might expect to find. Since the 
SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION has emerged as the frontrunner up to this point, let’s spell 
out what we would expect if this account were correct. 
In the Analytic of Concepts, Kant claims that the categories are related to certain 
forms of synthesis of the imagination: the categories “give […] unity” not only to acts of 
judgment, but also to acts of “the synthesis of this manifold [i.e. “the manifold of pure 
intuition”] by means of the imagination” (A78f./B104). This is summed up in the infamous 
dictum: “The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment 
also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition” 
(A79/B104f.). In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant appeals to this link between categories 
                                                 
14
 Strictly speaking, the passage associates this “rule” with the concept <dog>, rather than that concept’s 
schema. This has led some commentators to conclude that Kant intends empirical concepts to be identical with 
their own schemata (Bennett, 1966, p. 151; Chipman, 1972, p. 42; Guyer, 1987, p. 163). However, the first 
sentence of the quoted passage contrasts the objects’ relation to empirical concepts with their relation to 
empirical schemata, thus presupposing the non-identity of concept and schema. Since the phrase “rule in 
accordance with which my imagination can specify the shape of a four-footed animal in general” so closely 
matches Kant’s previous characterizations of schemata, we should therefore conclude that Kant is simply 
misstating his point slightly (cf. Allison, 2004, p. 208). 
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and “condition[s] of the synthesis of all apprehension” in order to support the conclusion 
that 
all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the 
categories, and since experience is cognition through connected perceptions, the 
categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are thus also valid a 
priori of all objects of experience. (B161) 
Each category is associated with a certain kind of synthesis of imagination. Therefore, on the 
SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION, we would expect to find Kant characterizing the 
transcendental schemata as rules for these kinds of synthesis. Because these syntheses are 
carried out on “the manifold of pure intuition” (A78f./B104, emphasis added), we should 
expect those schemata to concern certain spatial or temporal features. According to the 
SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION, a transcendental schema should be a representation of 
the procedure of synthesis of imagination that results in images of objects falling under a 
certain category, and should pertain to the pure form of such images. 
To what extent is this hypothesis borne out in the Schematism? The paragraphs on 
transcendental schemata are probably the murkiest in the whole chapter. As we will see, 
Kant’s statements seem rushed and are beset by numerous unhelpful conflations of vehicle 
and content (appearing to identify the schema with some x, when on inspection he must mean 
that the schema is a representation of x). Moreover, much of what he writes presupposes 
familiarity with later sections of the book (especially the System of Principles), thus making 
his remarks all but indecipherable to the first-time reader. I will try to cut through this 
obscurity by bringing in the relevant material from other sections and by correcting the 
vehicle/content conflations. Once the passages are cleared up in this way, a number of them 
unequivocally support the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION—or so I will argue. 
Due to its relative clarity, I begin with the schema of <magnitude>: 
The pure schema of magnitude (quantitatis) […]15 is a representation that 
summarizes the successive addition of one (homogeneous) unit to another. [It] is 
nothing other than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous 
intuition in general[.] (para. 9, A142f./B182) 
                                                 
15
 I omit Kant’s difficult remarks about the relation between this schema and “number”, which are not germane 
to our discussion. 
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Let’s take this step by step. This schema “is a representation that summarizes 
[zusammenbefasst]” some process. The process in question is “the successive addition of one 
(homogeneous) unit to another”. Looking ahead to the relevant part of the System of 
Principles (viz. the Axioms of Intuition), we find Kant discussing what is clearly the same 
process: “the synthesis of the manifold […] through the composition of that which is 
homogeneous and the consciousness of the synthetic unity of this manifold (of the 
homogeneous)” (B202f.). This is the process through which we generate sensible 
representations of quantities. For our purposes, the most important lesson is this: Kant 
explicitly attributes this “successive synthesis” to the “productive imagination” (A163/B204). 
Therefore the schema of <magnitude> is a representation of a kind of synthesis of 
imagination (through which we produce images of quantities). The schema pertains to this 
kind of synthesis “in general” rather than to some token act: it is a rule of synthesis of 
imagination. 
Additional evidence for the same conclusion is found in paragraph 17, where Kant 
summarizes his account of the transcendental schemata: “The schema of [magnitude] 
contains and makes representable […] the generation (synthesis) of time itself, in the 
successive apprehension of an object” (A145/B184). This confirms that the schema of 
<magnitude> is a representation of a kind of synthesis. The term “apprehension” shows that 
this is synthesis of imagination.
16
 In sum, Kant’s characterizations of the schema of 
<magnitude> decisively support the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION and are 
incompatible with the other two interpretations. 
Let me briefly comment on a confusing formulation from the first passage. As well as 
being “a representation that summarizes the successive addition of one (homogeneous) unit to 
another”, Kant also describes the schema of <magnitude> as “the unity of the synthesis of 
the manifold” (A142f./B182, emphasis added). We can see from the context that these two 
characterizations are meant to be equivalent. With that in mind, Kant’s usage here seems a 
little misleading. Strictly speaking, we would expect “unity” to designate a property 
exemplified by the synthesis-type, rather than a representation of the synthesis-type. 
However, Kant clearly intends “the unity of the synthesis of the manifold” to mean the latter, 
i.e. the rule of synthesis. We should bear this potentially misleading phrasing in mind when 
approaching Kant’s other statements. 
                                                 
16
 Cf. e.g. “There is thus an active faculty of the synthesis of this manifold in us, which we call imagination, and 
whose action exercised immediately upon perceptions I call apprehension” (A120). 
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Let’s now turn to the somewhat murkier remarks on the schema of <reality>: 
Now every sensation has a degree or magnitude, through which it can more or less fill 
the same time, i.e., the inner sense in regard to the same representation of an object, 
until it ceases in nothingness (= 0 = negatio). Hence there is a relation and connection 
between, or rather a transition from reality to negation, that makes every reality 
representable as a quantum, and the schema of a reality, as the quantity of something 
insofar as it fills time, is just this continuous and uniform generation of that quantity 
in time, as one descends in time from the sensation that has a certain degree to its 
disappearance or gradually ascends from negation to its magnitude. (para. 10, 
A143/B182f.) 
The schema of [quality] contains and makes representable […] the synthesis of 
sensation (perception) with the representation of time, or the filling of time” (para. 17, 
A145/B184).
17
 
Starting with the latter quotation, Kant states that the schema of <quality> is a representation 
of a kind of synthesis. To decide whether this supports the SYNTHESIS-RULES 
INTERPRETATION, we need to determine what exactly this involves. Once again, we can 
clarify matters by consulting the corresponding part of the System of Principles, viz. the 
Anticipations of Perception. There, Kant describes “a synthesis of the generation of the 
magnitude of a sensation from its beginning, the pure intuition = 0, to any arbitrary 
magnitude” (B208). The magnitudes in question are clearly intensive magnitudes, as opposed 
to the extensive magnitudes that pertain to the schemata of quantity.
18
 It is clear (from the 
context and the similar characterizations) that this “synthesis of the generation of the 
magnitude of a sensation” described in the Anticipations is the same process as the 
“continuous and uniform generation of” the “magnitude” of a “sensation” described in 
Schematism paragraph 10 (and “the synthesis of sensation” described in paragraph 17). Now, 
in the Anticipations, this synthesis is explicitly attributed to “the productive imagination” 
(A170/B211). Therefore, the schema of <reality> is a representation of a kind of synthesis of 
imagination. This unequivocally supports the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION, while 
                                                 
17
 I set aside Kant’s seeming imprecision in treating his description of the schema of <reality> as an elucidation 
of all three schemata of quality. Cf. A168f./B210f. for some discussion of how <reality> relates to <negation> 
and Longuenesse (1998, pp. 203–10) for a discussion of the schemata of <negation> and <limitation>.  
18
 Cf. ‘Größe, intensive’ in Willaschek et al (eds.) (2015). 
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posing significant problems for both the INTUITIONS and SUBSUMPTION-RULES 
INTERPRETATIONS. (On the former, the schema ought to represent a pattern exemplified by 
objects, rather than a mental process. On the latter, it ought to represent a procedure through 
which the power of judgment subsumes objects under concepts, rather than a process through 
which the imagination generates sensible representations.) 
Again, it will be helpful to make explicit some of the sources of obscurity in these 
quotations. As we have seen, we can only get a grip on what Kant means by drawing on later 
passages. But this is not all: Kant also creates barriers through carelessness over the 
vehicle/content distinction. We know from everything Kant has said up to this point that a 
schema is a mental representation.
19
 However, at A143/B183 he equates the schema of 
<reality> with the act of “generation” itself, rather than with a representation of this act. 
Only in paragraph 17 does he correct this slip, clarifying that the schema is not the synthesis 
itself but a representation of it.
20
 We should therefore be on the lookout for other cases in 
which Kant accidentally identifies the schema with the procedure it represents, rather than 
keeping vehicle and content distinct. 
With this warning in mind, let’s look at how Kant characterizes the schema of 
<possibility>: 
The schema of possibility is the agreement of the synthesis of various representations 
with the conditions of time in general (e.g., since opposites cannot exist in one thing 
at the same time, they can only exist one after another), thus the determination of the 
representation of a thing to some time. (A144/B184) 
On the face of it, this schema is either a property of a kind of synthesis (viz. its “agreement 
[…] with the conditions of time”) or else the act of synthesis itself (viz. “the determination of 
the representation of a thing”). But as we have noted, Kant consistently classifies schemata as 
mental representations, not mental acts.
21
 In order to remove this inconsistency, we should 
                                                 
19
 Schemata are consistently characterized as “representations” throughout the Schematism and beyond 
(A138/B177, A140/B179f., A142/B182, A144/B183, A156/B195). All three interpretations of schemata accept 
this fact. 
20
 I.e. by writing that the schema “contains and makes representable […] the synthesis of sensation” 
(A145/B184). 
21
 See fn. 19. For further confirmation that the schema of <possibility> is a representation, cf. “the schema of 
[each modal category] contains and makes representable […] time itself, as the correlate of the determination of 
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conclude that Kant means to identify the schema of <possibility> with a representation of a 
kind of synthesis, namely the kind of synthesis that produces representations agreeing with 
the conditions of time. 
Exactly what kind of synthesis is represented by the schema of <possibility>? What 
mental operation needs to agree with “the conditions of time” in order for an object to fall 
under the concept <possible>? When we look ahead to the Postulates of Empirical Thought, 
we find evidence that the operation in question is synthesis of imagination. There, Kant asks 
what must be the case for a concept to have possible objects falling under it. He starts with 
the basic necessary condition “that in such a concept no contradiction must be contained” 
(A220/B267f.): there must be no contradictions between the logical marks that constitute the 
concept in question. However, Kant claims that this is not sufficient for possibility. He 
illustrates this with the example of “the concept of a figure that is enclosed between two 
straight lines” (A220/B268). This concept is free from logical contradictions, yet there is still 
no possible object that falls under it. Kant argues that this impossibility rests on the fact that 
the kind of synthesis of imagination that would be required to generate a “figure” 
corresponding to this concept does not agree with “the conditions of space and its 
determinations” (A221/B268).22 Shapes with two sides, both of which are straight, are 
impossible; this is because we cannot synthesize images of them without (per impossibile) 
violating the geometrical structure of space. In this example, Kant focuses only on constraints 
imposed by the formal structure of space, but his later remarks show that synthesis must also 
agree with the formal conditions on apprehending sensible material (A223f./B271f.). In 
general, Kant’s picture seems to be that for a concept to have possible objects, the synthesis 
of imagination needed to produce images corresponding to that concept must agree with the 
formal conditions of intuition. Since only outer intuitions are subject to the conditions of 
space, while all intuitions are subject to the conditions of time, the most general constraints 
will be “the conditions of time in general” (A144/B184). 
Switching our focus to the concept <possible>, what we have just said implies that 
objects will fall under this concept if and only if images of them can be produced through 
                                                                                                                                                        
whether and how an object belongs to time” (para. 17, A145/B184). The latter part is hard to decipher, but the 
former part clearly states that the schemata of the modal categories are representations.  
22
 Kant puts the point in terms of the “construction” of a “figure”, rather than using the phrase “synthesis of 
imagination”. But since Kant introduces the notion of synthesis of imagination with examples of geometrical 
construction (cf. A102, B137f., A140/B179), it should be uncontroversial that construction is a form of 
synthesis of imagination. Cf. A223f./B271. 
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acts of synthesis of imagination that agree with the formal conditions of intuition. We thus 
have good reason to conclude that the schema of <possibility> is a representation of a very 
broad kind of synthesis of imagination, viz. the kind that agrees with the formal conditions of 
time. So Kant’s characterization of the schema of <possibility> also seems to support the 
SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION. In contrast, the characterization is clearly incompatible 
with the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION—the schema of <possibility> represents a kind of 
synthesis, not a pattern exhibited by objects. Perhaps the passage could be reconciled with the 
SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATION, but this would require an explanation of what it 
would mean for the process of subsumption to “agree[] […] with the conditions of time in 
general” (A144/B184). No such explanation is provided by existing defences of the 
SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATION, so the passage presents a challenge for that account. 
Now we can turn to Kant’s general characterization of the transcendental schemata: 
“The schema of a pure concept of the understanding […] is […] the pure synthesis, in accord 
with a rule of unity according to concepts in general, which the category expresses” 
(A142/B181). As with the schema of <possibility>, the literal wording suggests that a 
schema is an act of synthesis. But once again, because of the weight of evidence that a 
schema is a mental representation, we should suspect a conflation of vehicle and content. 
Indeed, Kant draws our attention to the fact that this synthesis is governed by a “rule of 
unity”. Might Kant mean that transcendental schemata are the rules of synthesis, rather than 
the acts of synthesis? This hypothesis is confirmed by the summary in paragraph 17: “Now 
one sees from all this that the schema of each category contains and makes representable: in 
the case of magnitude, the generation (synthesis) of time itself, in the successive 
apprehension of an object [etc.]” (A145/B184, emphasis added). Here it is explicit that the act 
of synthesis is the content that is represented by the schema, not the schema itself. Since that 
content pertains to some kind of synthesis, we have further unambiguous evidence against the 
INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION. Admittedly, what Kant says about transcendental schemata in 
general doesn’t tell us whether this synthesis is subsumption or synthesis of imagination, so 
this doesn’t give us any additional evidence against the SUBSUMPTION-RULES 
INTERPRETATION. Still, it is perfectly consistent with the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION 
and at odds with the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION. 
Paragraph 17 also contains another general characterization of transcendental 
schemata. They are described as:  
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nothing but a priori time-determinations in accordance with rules, and these concern, 
according to the order of the categories, the time-series, the content of time, the 
order of time, and finally the sum total of time in regard to all possible objects. 
(A145/B184f.) 
This echoes Kant’s earlier remark that transcendental schemata are “transcendental time-
determinations” (para. 4, A138/B177, A139/B178). We noted that earlier in the Analytic, 
Kant suggested that the categories are associated with kinds of synthesis carried out on “the 
manifold of pure intuition” (A78f./B104), leading us to expect them to concern spatial or 
temporal features. We now see confirmation of this expectation; the transcendental schemata 
are rules for determining perceptions with respect to their temporal features.
23
 Admittedly, 
the rival interpretations have their own ways of explaining in what sense schemata are “time-
determinations” (e.g. Allison, 2004, pp. 214–8; Guyer, 1987, pp. 167f.), but it is worth noting 
that the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION can explain this important data-point. 
As a final piece of evidence: Kant’s initial notes for the Schematism chapter further 
support the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION: “That under each of our pure concepts of the 
understanding we must lay a schema, a way of compounding [zusammensetzen] space and 
time” (Refl 5552, 18:220). It is highly plausible that “compounding space and time” means 
carrying out synthesis of imagination on the manifold of pure intuition, e.g. when I “so to 
speak draw the shape” of a house (B162). So the transcendental schema is a (representation 
of) a “way” of conducting synthesis of imagination. 
 
I have now argued that many passages unequivocally support the SYNTHESIS-RULES 
INTERPRETATION, including Kant’s general remarks about schemata (para. 6); his 
characterizations of mathematical and empirical schemata (para. 7); his characterizations of 
the schemata of <quantity>, <reality> and <possibility> (paras. 9, 10, 14, 17); and his initial 
notes for the chapter. This constitutes a wealth of material, encompassing almost everything 
in the central paragraphs of the Schematism. If the reader accepts the elucidations I have 
offered, he or she ought to accept that there is a great deal of support for the SYNTHESIS-
                                                 
23
 He also describes transcendental schemata as “a priori formal conditions of sensibility (namely of the inner 
sense)” (A139f./B179); “formal and pure condition[s] of the sensibility” (A140/B179); as “concern[ing] the 
determination of inner sense in general, in accordance with conditions of its form (time)” (A142/B181); and as 
representing acts of “pure synthesis” (A142/B181).  
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RULES INTERPRETATION. Of course, before we can reach a final assessment, we need to 
consider any potential evidence in the other direction. 
4. Problems for the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION 
In this section, I will consider a number of passages that present prima facie problems for the 
SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION. In each case, I argue that the evidence is overridden by 
other considerations. 
4.1 Schemata as “monograms” 
I begin with one remaining characterization of the schemata of “sensible concepts” (i.e. 
empirical and mathematical concepts). In paragraph 7, Kant writes: “the schema of sensible 
concepts (such as figures in space) is a product and as it were [gleichsam] a monogram of 
pure a priori imagination” (A141f./B181). This has led some commentators (e.g. Matherne, 
2015, pp. 763–5) to conclude that schemata are imagistic representations, a conclusion that is 
more easily reconciled with the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION than the SYNTHESIS-RULES 
INTERPRETATION.
24
 Before unpacking the metaphor, let’s get crystal clear about what a 
monogram is. A monogram is a logo composed of a person’s initials, often used to display 
who made or who owns some product or document. For example, the renaissance artist 
Albrecht Dürer used a monogram to differentiate his own prints from those of imitators (fig. 
2; cf. MacGregor, 2016, pp. 303–5). 
 
Figure 2. Albrecht Dürer's monogram 
As this example shows, a monogram is indeed an imagistic representation. So if schemata are 
just like monograms, this suggests that they are intuitions rather than rules for mental 
operations. 
                                                 
24
 Note that Matherne herself tries to combine the claim that schemata are imagistic representations with a 
SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION: “the monogram contained in a schema is a representation that serves as 
something like a stencil that guides imaginative synthesis” (2015, p. 73). However, since a stencil must have a 
determinate shape, it is unclear how to unpack this in a way that allows for the “generality” of schemata. Cf. 
Section 5.1. 
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4.1.1 Reply 
However, Kant does not literally equate schemata with monograms in the passage in 
question; the comparison is metaphorical, as indicated by the phrase “as it were [gleichsam]”. 
We can explain why this metaphor is apt without assuming that schemata are imagistic 
representations. On the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION, a schema is a generalized 
procedure that ensures the presence of certain features in the images produced. In spite of the 
diversity of those images, this common feature ensures that they are all recognizable as 
instances of a certain concept. Schemata are significantly different from monograms: they are 
not stylized images borne by different products. Nevertheless, they serve an analogous 
function: they facilitate the recognition of commonality among diverse products. Because 
Kant repeatedly insists that “the schema is to be distinguished from an image” (A140/B179), 
we have no reason to take the monogram metaphor any more literally than this. Despite initial 
appearances, the “monogram” remark does not pose a genuine problem for the SYNTHESIS-
RULES INTERPRETATION. 
4.2 Schemata of <substance>, <cause>, <reciprocity>, <actuality> and <necessity> 
A more serious challenge comes from Kant’s characterizations of the remaining five 
transcendental schemata, which went undiscussed in Section 3.4. Consider Kant’s 
characterization of the schema of <substance>: 
The schema of substance is the persistence of the real in time, i.e., the representation 
of the real as a substratum of empirical time-determination in general, which therefore 
endures while everything else changes. (para. 11, A144/B183) 
This passage’s two clauses present two divergent characterizations of the schema of 
<substance>, neither of which equates it with a rule for synthesis of imagination. Both 
clauses make reference to a certain temporal structure encountered in phenomena: “the 
persistence of the real in time” or “the real as a substratum of empirical time-determination”. 
Let’s compare this with the First Analogy (the corresponding part of the System of 
Principles). There, Kant argues that every event is constituted by an alteration in the 
properties of a persisting, unchanging substrate, and that this permanent substrate is 
substance. So the temporal structure described in Schematism paragraph 11 seems to be the 
“real” insofar as it “persists”, i.e. phenomenal substance. 
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How does the schema of <substance> relate to this temporal structure? According to 
the first clause, the schema is this temporal structure; according to the second, it is the 
representation of this temporal structure. Once again, Kant seems to be paying little heed to 
the vehicle/content distinction. As it’s now a familiar point that Kant consistently asserts that 
schemata are representations, we should assume that the second clause is closer to Kant’s 
intended meaning. Nevertheless, this does not agree with the SYNTHESIS-RULES 
INTERPRETATION. If schemata are rules of synthesis of the imagination, the schema of 
<substance> should be a representation of the procedure for producing perceptions of 
objects exemplifying this temporal structure, not a representation of the temporal structure 
itself. Therefore, the passage conflicts with the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION. 
The same is true of the passages about the schemata of the remaining four categories: 
The schema of the cause and of the causality of a thing in general is the real upon 
which, whenever it is posited, something else always follows. It therefore consists in 
the succession of the manifold insofar as it is subject to a rule. 
The schema of community (reciprocity), or of the reciprocal causality of substances 
with regard to their accidents, is the simultaneity of the determinations of the one with 
those of the other, in accordance with a general rule. 
[…] 
The schema of actuality is existence at a determinate time. 
The schema of necessity is the existence of an object at all times. (A144f./B183f.) 
The schemata of <cause>, <community>, <actuality> and <necessity> are seemingly 
identified with the temporal features exhibited by the phenomena that fall under those 
concepts. Given the parallelism with the paragraph on the schema of <substance> and the 
fact that schemata are supposed to be representations, we should probably take the correction 
“i.e. the representation of [these features]” to be tacitly implied. Even so, this representation 
would not be a rule for synthesis, but a representation of a feature of objects. Consequently, 
Kant’s characterizations of these five schemata pose problems for the SYNTHESIS-RULES 
INTERPRETATION. 
How do they compare with the two rival interpretations? They fit fairly well with the 
SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATION. On that view, the transcendental schemata ought to 
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specify the temporal structures that objects must exemplify in order to be subsumed under 
each category. Similarly, they are perfectly compatible with the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION: 
they support the idea that a schema represents a certain pattern exemplified by instances of 
the relevant concept, and that the pattern corresponding to each of the categories is a certain 
temporal structure. So here we have prima facie evidence against the SYNTHESIS-RULES 
INTERPRETATION and in favour of its rivals. 
Let’s compare this with the summaries given in paragraph 17. Starting with the 
schemata of relation (i.e. of <substance>, <cause> and <reciprocity>), we find: “the 
schema [sic] of relation [“contain[s] and make[s] representable”] the relation of the 
perceptions among themselves to all time (i.e., in accordance with a rule of time-
determination)” (A145/B184). This passage could be read as reiterating the account of 
paragraphs 11–13, according to which the schemata of <relation> represent temporal 
structures, and thus as supporting either the SUBSUMPTION-RULES or the INTUITIONS 
INTERPRETATION. Alternatively, by focusing on the latter part of the quotation, we could read 
the passage as equating these schemata with the “rules” for imposing these temporal 
structures on perceptions through procedures of synthesis, i.e. as supporting the SYNTHESIS-
RULES INTERPRETATION. Therefore, this passage is ambiguous between all three readings. 
Proceeding to the schemata of <modality>, Kant writes that these “contain and make 
representable” “time itself, as the correlate of the determination of whether and how an object 
belongs to time.” This is at odds with both the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION, according 
to which the schema should be a representation of a mental activity; “time itself” is not a 
mental activity, but a formal feature of all sensible representations. On the other hand, since 
the subsumption-rules for the categories are supposedly representations of temporal features, 
and since “time itself” can certainly be represented by a pure intuition (cf. A31f./B47), we 
might think this fits with either the SUBSUMPTION-RULES or the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION. 
However, a representation of “time itself” is not a representation of any object’s existence.25 
Consequently, this does not match Kant’s earlier claim that the schema of <actuality> 
represents “existence at a determinate time” and the schema of <necessity> represents “an 
object’s existence at all times”. Nor does it fit with the core tenet of the SUBSUMPTION-RULES 
and INTUITIONS INTERPRETATIONS, according to which a schema should present a pattern 
distinctive of a concept’s objects: “time itself” is not a pattern exemplified by certain objects, 
                                                 
25
 This claim features prominently in the Transcendental Aesthetic (A31/B46). 
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but an infinite structure within which they exist. Therefore, paragraph 17’s characterization of 
the modal schemata cannot easily be squared with any available interpretation. 
4.2.1 Reply 
The evidence of paragraphs 11–13 and 15–16 certainly presents prima facie difficulties for 
the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION. In order to reach an ultima facie judgment, we need 
to put these passages in context. So, to recapitulate our findings, Kant first claims that all 
schemata are rules for synthesis of the imagination (para. 6, A140/B179f.). Then he gives 
characterizations of mathematical and empirical schemata that fit this description (para. 7, 
A140f./B180). Next, he characterizes transcendental schemata as “pure synthes[ese], in 
accord with a rule of unity”, which we read as an infelicitous attempt to characterize them as 
rules for pure synthesis (para. 7, A142/B181). Proceeding to the particular transcendental 
schemata, he describes the schemata of <magnitude> and <reality> as rules for particular 
kinds of synthesis of imagination (paras. 9–10, A142f./B182f.). Then he seemingly equates 
the schemata of <substance>, <cause>, <reciprocity>, <actuality> and <necessity> with 
temporal structures, or representations of them (paras. 11–13 and 15–16, A144f./B183f.). But 
in the midst of these, we find the schema of <possibility> being characterized as (a 
representation of) a kind of pure synthesis (para 14. A144/B184). Then he offers a summary 
which confirms that the schemata of <magnitude> and <quality> are representations of 
kinds of synthesis of imagination, leaves room for doubt over what the schemata of 
<relation> are, and muddies the water over the schemata of <modality> by characterizing 
them in a further divergent way. 
If we take them at face value, there is no way to reconcile all of these remarks: Kant 
states that all schemata are rules of synthesis of the imagination (A140/B179f.) and states that 
some schemata are something other than rules of synthesis of the imagination 
(A144f./B183f.). In order to read his account as consistent, we are therefore forced to read 
some passages as misstatements. (It seems considerably more charitable to convict Kant of 
occasionally misstating his point than of endorsing obvious contradictions.) So we now need 
to judge which statements are the erroneous ones. 
I think there are solid reasons for concluding that it is the passages about the schemata 
of <substance>, <cause>, <reciprocity>, <actuality> and <necessity> which are the 
misstatements, and therefore upholding the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION in spite of 
this prima facie evidence against it. There are two types of reason for this. Firstly, there are 
quantitative reasons. The evidence supporting SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION simply 
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outweighs the evidence conflicting with it. The paragraphs which I have argued support the 
SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION cover 80 lines (in the Akademie edition), whilst those 
that conflict with it cover only 19 lines. In some sense, this must mean that there is more 
textual evidence for the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION than against it, and that when 
push comes to shove we should be more willing to explain away the latter evidence. 
Secondly, there are qualitative reasons. Numerous textual clues suggest that 
paragraphs 11–16 (most of which cause problems for the SYNTHESIS-RULES 
INTERPRETATION) are less carefully formulated than paragraphs 6–10 (which support the 
SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION). Kant begins his enumeration of the transcendental 
schemata by signalling that he is reluctant to explain this part of his account fully: 
Rather than pausing now for a dry and boring analysis of what is required for 
transcendental schemata of pure concepts of the understanding in general, we would 
rather present them according to the order of the categories and in connection with 
these. (para. 8, A142/B181) 
As the list of transcendental schemata unfolds (paras. 9–16), Kant seems to rush more and 
more, with his descriptions becoming increasingly compressed. Even in the unproblematic 
paragraphs on <quantity> and <reality> we have seen how Kant slips into misleading 
phrasing, running together the representation of a kind of process, the property shared by 
processes of that kind, and the process itself. Yet the remarks which cause problems for the 
SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION occur only in the final, hasty paragraphs (paras. 11–16), 
in which Kant’s characterizations are clipped to one sentence per schema. These paragraphs 
are riddled with vehicle/content confusions and fail to present a uniform account of schemata: 
most characterize the schemata as temporal structures; one paragraph explains that he really 
intends representations of these structures; but in the middle of this, the schema of 
<possibility> is characterized as an act of synthesis rather than the structure it produces. All 
of these signals indicate that these paragraphs were written more hurriedly, and therefore 
support the hypothesis that they contain misstatements of Kant’s considered views.26 
                                                 
26
 Should we consider the hypothesis that the reason these later characterizations do not fit the SYNTHESIS-
RULES INTERPRETATION is because there is a principled difference between the schemata of “mathematical” 
categories and those of “dynamic” categories? This seems unappealing because (i) the schema of <possibility> 
fits with the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION (cf. Section 3.4) and (ii) this would still clash with Kant’s 
assertion that all schemata are rules for synthesis of imagination (cf. Section 3.1). Perhaps for these reasons, no 
commentator to date has proposed this hypothesis. 
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Within the Schematism chapter, then, the evidence for the SYNTHESIS-RULES 
INTERPRETATION outweighs the evidence against it. Hence, we should conjecture that when 
Kant writes, for example, “The schema of necessity is the existence of an object at all times” 
(A145/B184), this is an all too hasty attempt to express the thought that “the schema of 
necessity is a rule for synthesizing images which represent the existence of an object at all 
times”. Due to the carelessness of expression that we have seen so frequently throughout 
these paragraphs, this conjecture does not seem too hard to swallow. It is a cost for any 
interpretation if it has to reject the words on the page in favour of ‘what Kant ought to have 
written’. Nevertheless, I think that this is the most parsimonious way to render Kant’s 
statements consistent. I therefore conclude that the prima facie evidence against the 
SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION discussed in this subsection is ultimately outweighed. 
4.3 Schemata in the 2
nd
 Critique 
Looking beyond the first Critique, we find further passages that pose prima facie difficulties 
for the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION. The Critique of Practical Reason contains a 
chapter called ‘Of the Typic of Pure Practical Judgment [Urteilskraft]’, which parallels the 
first Critique’s Schematism chapter—it deals with the question of how the a priori rules of 
pure practical reason can be applied to the concrete cases we encounter in sensibility. Kant 
writes: 
Thus the judgment [Urteilskraft] of pure practical reason is subject to the very same 
difficulties as that of pure theoretical reason, though the latter had means at hand of 
escaping from these difficulties, namely that with respect to its theoretical use it 
depended upon intuitions to which pure concepts of the understanding could be 
applied, and such intuitions (though only of objects of the senses) can be given a 
priori and thus, as far as the connection of the manifold in them is concerned, given a 
priori (as schemata) conformably with pure concepts of the understanding. (KpV 5:68, 
Kant’s emphasis) 
One natural way to read the bracketed phrase “(as schemata)” would be as referring to the 
“intuitions” of the previous clause. This would suggest that schemata are intuitions, not rules 
for synthesis of imagination. Consequently, Allison points to this passage as evidence for the 
INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION (1981, p. 67). 
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4.3.1 Reply 
However, on the following page, Kant writes: 
To a natural law, as a law to which objects of sensible intuition as such are subject, 
there must correspond a schema, i.e. a general procedure of the imagination (by which 
it presents a priori to the senses the pure concept of the understanding which the law 
determines). (KpV 5:69) 
Here the schema is equated with (a representation of)
27
 a “general procedure of the 
imagination” for producing sensible representations: a rule for synthesis of imagination, not 
an intuition. In the light of this apparent contradiction between the two passages, we need to 
rethink whether the former really supports the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION. Consulting the 
German, it also seems viable to read the phrase “(as schemata)” as referring to “the pure 
concepts” rather than the intuitions.28 This would be a slightly imprecise way to state the idea 
that intuitions relate to the categories by means of schemata, and would therefore be 
compatible with the latter passage’s implication that a schema is “a general procedure of the 
imagination”. Therefore, any prima facie evidence against the SYNTHESIS-RULES 
INTERPRETATION presented by this passage is ultimately undermined. 
4.4 Schemata in the 3
rd
 Critique 
The final piece of prima facie evidence against the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION 
comes from the Critique of Judgment. The section On Beauty as a Symbol of Morality 
begins: 
Intuitions are always required to display the reality of our concepts. If the concepts 
are empirical the intuitions are called examples: if they are pure concepts of the 
understanding the intuitions go by the name of schema. (KU 5:351) 
                                                 
27
 Making the usual correction for Kant’s vehicle/content sloppiness. 
28
 Cp. “dergleichen Anschauungen [...] a priori, mithin, was die Verknüpfung des Mannigfaltigen in denselben 
betrifft, den reinen Verstandesbegriffen a priori gemäß (als Schemate ) gegeben werden können.” Here, “the 
pure concepts of the understanding” is the noun phrase that most immediately precedes the phrase “(as 
schemata)”. (Of course, there is a mismatch of case between the two phrases, but it is fairly common for an 
appositional phrase without an article to be written in the nominative; cf. Hennig et al, 2016, p. 92.) 
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According to this passage, “schema” is the name for a certain kind of intuition. It is 
undeniable that this is prima facie evidence for the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION (and against 
the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION). Unlike the passages discussed in Sections 4.2–3, 
there is no chance that Kant really intends the term “schema” to apply to a rule of synthesis of 
imagination. 
4.4.1 Reply 
As with the texts discussed in Section 4.2, my strategy will be to argue that, while the passage 
really does constitute evidence for the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION, this evidence is 
outweighed; and to outline a plausible way of explaining away the apparent conflict. 
In terms of the weight of evidence, it is still the case that we have identified far more 
lines of text unequivocally supporting the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION than 
unequivocally supporting the INTUITIONS VIEW. Therefore, the overall cost of taking this 
passage at face value seems considerably higher than the cost of explaining it away. 
Moreover, it seems reasonable to give less evidential weight to this as a statement about 
Kant’s theory of schemata: this is a tangential remark that occurs in the course of making a 
point that has little to do with the concerns of the Schematism chapter. In contrast the 
evidence for the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION assembled throughout Section 3 came 
from the Schematism itself—Kant’s most sustained attempt to explain the nature and function 
of schemata. 
How might we explain the words on the page without adopting the INTUITIONS 
INTERPRETATION? The simplest hypothesis is that Kant is using the term “schema” in a 
different sense in this passage: he is applying the term “schema” to something other than the 
things he called “schemata” in the Schematism chapter. Obviously we shouldn’t be too 
trigger-happy about positing ambiguities in Kant’s terminology; I am only claiming that the 
conjecture is justified here because some such move is needed to render his different remarks 
consistent. Nevertheless, interpreters of Kant are quite commonly forced to posit 
terminological inconsistencies in order to find coherence in the underlying account, so it does 
not seem too damning for the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION that it calls for this step.
29
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 Cf. Kemp Smith’s memorable remark: “Kant flatly contradicts himself in almost every chapter; and […] there 
is hardly a technical term which is not employed by him in conflicting senses. As a writer, he is the least exact 
of all the great thinkers” (1918, p. xxix). 
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Sections 4.1 and 4.3 presented material that might be thought to undermine the SYNTHESIS-
RULES INTERPRETATION, but turns out to be compatible with it. Contrastingly, the passages 
discussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.4 really do conflict with the SYNTHESIS-RULES 
INTERPRETATION, if they are taken at face value. Nevertheless, I argued that the overall 
weight of evidence dictates that we should explain these passages away, either as infelicitous 
attempts to state his real meaning or as terminological inconsistencies. 
When there is evidence pointing in different directions, there is an all too human 
tendency to act as if the question cannot be settled. We all have the inclination to cling to the 
shreds of support for our initial beliefs, even as the evidence piles up against them. At this 
point, anyone inclined to go on denying the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION should 
perhaps make a list of all of the passages that unequivocally support their favoured 
interpretation and all those that conflict with it. Textual interpretation always involves 
judgment-calls, but I am firmly convinced that the best grounded judgment is to endorse the 
SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION. 
5. Objections to the Rival Interpretations 
In order to further sure up this judgment-call, let now me present what I think are serious 
problems with the INTUITIONS and SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATIONS. 
5.1 Objections to the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION 
The first stumbling block for the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION is of course the wealth of 
textual evidence against it. Gram addresses this problem by conjecturing that Kant is deeply 
ambivalent about the nature of schemata (1968, p. 91), and that this is a characteristic of a 
broader ambivalence that pervades his theory of judgment (1968, pp. 83f.). Since many other 
commentators have found ways to avoid attributing this deep inconsistency to Kant, it is a 
significant weakness of Gram’s account that he has to take this step. All things being equal, it 
is preferable to charge Kant with misstating his point in a small number of passages, rather 
than trying to fuse two inconsistent positions. Allison attempts to avoid saddling Kant with 
this kind of inconsistency by distinguishing different kinds of schemata. He concedes that 
mathematical and empirical schemata are rules of synthesis (2004, p. 210), but argues that 
transcendental schemata are intuitions. However, as argued in Section 3, Kant’s 
characterizations of schemata as rules of synthesis are not confined to his discussions of 
mathematical and empirical schemata. He characterizes all schemata as “representation[s] of 
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a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image” 
(A140/B179f.), as well as describing the transcendental schemata of <magnitude> and 
<reality> as representations of kinds of synthesis of imagination. Therefore, neither Gram 
nor Allison adequately addresses the weight of textual evidence conflicting with the 
INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION.
30
 
The second problem for the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION is that it struggles to account 
for the “generality” of schemata. Kant states this requirement most clearly in his discussion 
of the schema of <triangle>, which must “attain the generality of the concept, which makes 
this valid for all triangles, right or acute, etc.” (A141/B180). In order to mediate between the 
concept <triangle> and the sensible intuitions that fall under it, the schema must be flexible 
enough to cover the range of different shapes which instantiate that concept. Now, if the 
schema of <triangle> is an intuition of a triangle, it must either have an obtuse angle or a 
right angle or three acute angles (on pain of violating the laws of Euclidean geometry). But if 
the schema has one of these determinate characteristics, then Kant’s theory seems to be 
subject to the very objections that Kant thinks are fatal for the Lockean theory of abstract 
ideas. In the same way that “No image of a triangle would ever be adequate to the concept of 
it”, it seems that no intuition could ever be adequate. 
Since Allison and Gram only hold that transcendental schemata are intuitions, it is 
worth showing that this problem applies for them too. Take the category of <reality>. 
Presumably, the relevant intuition would represent a temporally extended fluctuation of 
intensive magnitudes, e.g. the sight of a coloured patch fading to black or the sound of 
bagpipes getting steadily louder. Again this intuition would have to be determinate in various 
ways which would “limit” it “to one part of th[e] sphere”, making it impossible for it to 
“attain the generality of the concept” <reality>. For example, either the intuition would 
represent the quality as always increasing in intensity, or it would represent it as steady or 
decreasing for some period of time. In either case, this would differentiate it from many of 
the examples to which the concept of <reality> is meant to apply. 
Gibbons acknowledges that the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION must give some 
explanation of how an intuition can attain the relevant sort of generality. She proposes that 
we look to Kant’s account of the role of construction in mathematical proof for an answer to 
this problem (1994, p. 74). Kant holds that to prove synthetic propositions in mathematics, 
we have to construct concrete examples of the relevant concepts, e.g. to prove that all 
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 Gibbons (1994, pp. 53–78) and Pollok (2017, pp. 234–8) offer no solutions to the textual difficulties. 
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triangles’ angles sum to 180º, we construct some specific triangle (A716f./B744f.). The 
triangle used in this proof will have various properties that are not shared by all triangles (e.g. 
having an obtuse angle), but Kant holds that it can still give us knowledge about triangles in 
general. Might a schema be an intuition treated in the same way that a construction is used in 
a mathematical proof, and thus attaining a kind of generality in spite of its particularity? 
Gibbons’ proposal might seem promising, but it quickly runs into problems. The 
INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION needs to find a way to avoid identifying schemata with what 
Kant calls “images”, since Kant carefully contrasts these two kinds of representation (cf. 
Sections 3.1–3). To explain what he means by an “image”, Kant gives the example of 
“plac[ing] five points in a row, . . . . .” to form “an image of the number five” (A140/B179). 
From this, it is clear that Kant would classify the representations produced in mathematical 
construction as “images”. Consequently, schemata cannot be representations of that sort—we 
cannot explain the generality of schemata by appealing to the generality of mathematical 
constructions, on pain of conflating schemata and images. 
This points to a more general problem for the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION: we need 
an explanation of how schemata qua intuitions would differ from “images”. Admittedly, 
some recent work has suggested that, for Kant, not all intuitions are images. Images are the 
complex intuitions that result from synthesis of imagination, and some commentators claim 
that Kant endorses a kind of intuition that does not depend on synthesis (cf. Section 2.3). 
Could proponents of the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION keep schemata and images separate by 
claiming that they are unsynthesized intuitions? Aside from it being controversial whether 
Kant is really committed to the existence of unsynthesized intuitions, this proposal is 
unattractive in its own right. Kant is clear that schemata are “product[s] of the imagination” 
(A140/B179), and proponents of the INTUITIONS INTERPRETATION have rightly emphasized 
that schemata depend on synthesis of imagination (Allison, 1981, pp. 68f.; Gibbons, 1994, p. 
74). 
A final objection applies specifically to transcendental schemata. Consider the 
dilemma: are transcendental schemata empirical or pure intuitions?
31
 There are decisive 
objections to either option. On the one hand, Kant insists that transcendental schemata “must 
be pure (without anything empirical)” (A138/B177; cf. A139f./B178f.), so they cannot be 
empirical intuitions. On the other hand, Kant holds that the transcendental schemata pertain 
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 Gram (1968, p. 101) and Allison (1981, p. 66) claim that they are pure intuitions, while Gibbons seems 
indecisive (1994, p. 72). 
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to sensation. This is obvious in the case of the schema of <reality>, which concerns the 
“generation” of magnitudes of “sensation”. But the relational schemata also make reference 
to the “real” in appearances and the modal schemata concern “the existence of an object”—
neither of which can be represented by pure intuitions. It therefore seems that pure intuitions 
could not exhibit the features required for transcendental schemata (with the possible 
exception of the schemata of the quantitative categories).
32
 If transcendental schemata can 
neither be empirical intuitions nor pure intuitions, the only available conclusion is that they 
are not intuitions at all.
33
 
5.2 Objections to the SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATION 
The SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATION faces two main problems. Firstly, it faces a 
dilemma over the schemata of sensible concepts (i.e. mathematical and empirical concepts). 
Are these distinct from the concepts they schematize, or are they identical to them? If the 
schema is distinct from its concept, this threatens to open up a rule-regress. The schema (qua 
subsumption-rule) is supposed to explain how we can relate particular objects to a general 
representation, viz. the concept. But wouldn’t a further rule be needed to explain how we can 
connect these particulars with the subsumption-rule itself? After all, the subsumption-rule is 
just as general a representation as the concept it allegedly schematizes. Kant himself points 
out the threat of this kind of regress and hence warns against explaining the power of 
judgment via rules for judging (A132–4/B171–4, KU 5:169). It therefore seems thoroughly 
uncharitable to accuse Kant of having made this mistake. On the other hand, Kant does seem 
to insist that sensible concepts have separate schemata (cf. Section 3.2–3). When he writes: 
Even less does an object of experience or an image of it ever reach the empirical 
concept; rather the latter is always related immediately to the schema of the 
imagination (A141/B180) 
                                                 
32
 Cf. Kant’s insistence that the categories can’t be exemplified in pure intuition via construction, which is why 
philosophy must have a different methodology from mathematics (A722/B750). This latter issue is discussed by 
Gram (1968, pp. 124–8) and Allison (1981, pp. 72f.), but neither deals satisfactorily with the basic point that an 
intuition corresponding to a category must present something “real”, and therefore involve sensation. 
33
 In contrast, on the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION, we can say that a transcendental schema is an a priori 
rule (i.e. one that deals only with temporal structure) for generating a certain kind of empirical intuition (i.e. 
intuitions in which that temporal structure is imposed on sensations). 
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he is clearly presupposing the non-identity of schema and concept. Proponents of the 
SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATION are therefore forced to claim that Kant is thoroughly 
confused about the relation between sensible concepts and their schemata.
34
 All things being 
equal, we should prefer more charitable readings, so this is a serious weakness for the 
SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATION. 
The second problem concerns transcendental schemata. According to the 
SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATION, a transcendental schema takes the merely logical 
content of a category and adds further sensible conditions. The schema thus picks out a 
restricted class of the objects to which the category applies and makes explicit what their 
sensible features are. On this reading, it is at least clear how a transcendental schema differs 
from the concept it schematizes. However, the account faces a more serious problem. 
Semantically speaking, a schema so construed is useless for establishing relations between 
categories and objects of experience. This is because adding extra marks to a concept cannot 
increase the sphere of possible objects falling under that concept—adding further necessary 
conditions always results in a subset of the initial range of objects. Hence, the schema would 
only apply to intuited objects if the category itself already applied to those objects, 
independently of the schema. Understood in this way, the schema does nothing to explain 
why the categories apply to certain appearances.  Given how unsatisfying a theory of 
transcendental schemata this would be, the principle of charity obliges us to pursue the 
SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATION only as a last resort. 
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that there is strong textual evidence for the SYNTHESIS-RULES 
INTERPRETATION, and that this outweighs the small amount of evidence that initially seems to 
clash with it. Moreover, I have argued that both of the alternatives—the INTUITIONS and 
SUBSUMPTION-RULES INTERPRETATIONS—has serious internal problems. I therefore hope to 
have established beyond reasonable doubt that schemata are rules for synthesis of 
imagination. 
Despite this, there is still more work to be done before we fully understand the place 
of schemata within Kant’s theory of cognition. It is an important first step to have determined 
what kind of mental representations schemata are, but we still need an account of how 
schemata are involved in the process of subsuming intuited objects under concepts. 
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 Bennett (1966, pp. 146–7) and Chipman (1972, pp. 43–6) are explicit in this regard. 
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Proponents of the SYNTHESIS-RULES INTERPRETATION have made some important initial 
proposals regarding this latter issue. The main suggestion is that a schema “guides” the 
process of synthesis of imagination, specifying how sensible material is to be put together 
into a complex intuition (e.g. Longuenesse, 1998, p. 117). This seems promising: it is 
plausible that fixing certain parameters of the process of synthesis would guarantee that the 
resulting intuition has certain characteristics, while leaving leeway over a range of other 
factors. The schema would thus stand in a special relation to a class of particular intuitions, 
viz. those whose production was “guided” by that schema, but it would nevertheless have the 
“generality” needed to cover the whole “sphere” of the relevant concept (A141/B180). For 
example, the schema of <fox> would stand in a clear relation to numerous intuitions, all of 
which would present objects as having reddish-brown fur, pointed ears, ambling movements, 
etc., yet these intuitions would be diverse enough to allow for foxes of different ages, sizes, 
etc.. 
These are promising beginnings, but more needs to be said about what it means for a 
schema to “guide” synthesis. Is this meant to be full blown rule-following, as when we “act 
on a maxim”? Or do my acts of synthesis merely instantiate the rule specified by the schema, 
without being regulated by the represented rule? Interpreters have tended to favour the latter 
option (Allison, 2004, p. 189; Matherne, 2015, p. 771; Pendlebury, 1995, p. 786; Young, 
1988, p. 153), but it is unclear why the mind would have any need for a schema qua mental 
representation if this were the case. More work is therefore needed to clarify the function of 
schemata qua rules for synthesis of imagination. 
Though there is more work to be done, I hope to have achieved a not insignificant 
goal in this article. I hope to have established once and for all that schemata are rules for 
synthesis of imagination, and given readers the tools to make sense of the central paragraphs 
of the Schematism chapter.
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5 
Kant, Animal Intuitions and 
Conceptualism 
Abstract: Kant holds that some non-human animals “are acquainted with” objects, 
despite lacking conceptual capacities (i.e. “understanding”). What does this tell us 
about his theory of human cognition, particularly the relation between sensibility and 
understanding? Numerous authors have argued that this is a significant point in favour 
of Nonconceptualism (the claim that, for Kant, sensible representations of objects do 
not depend on the understanding). Against this, I argue that Kant’s remarks about 
animal minds can be readily accommodated by a Conceptualist reading of a suitably 
nuanced kind. Conceptualists have good reason to accept that, for Kant, (i) humans’ 
sensible representations necessarily have thinkable contents and (ii) representations 
with thinkable contents depend on the understanding. This allows Conceptualists to 
maintain that humans’ sensible representations depend on the understanding, while 
admitting that sensible representations of a different kind are possible in the absence 
of the understanding: a restricted form of Conceptualism is consistent with Kant’s 
remarks about animal minds. We must therefore reassess both the warrant for 
Nonconceptualism and the bounds within which Conceptualism ought to operate. 
1. Introduction 
The Critique of Pure Reason advances a rich and complex account of human cognition. 
Central to Kant’s account are two related ideas: 
(1) Intuitions and Concepts. Cognition (i.e. thoughts that have objective 
representational purport) requires us to unify two kinds of mental representation, viz. 
intuitions (i.e. sensible representations of particulars) and concepts (i.e. general 
representations deriving from the understanding). 
(2) Sensibility and Understanding. Cognition requires the interaction of two distinct 
mental capacities, viz. sensibility (i.e. the capacity to acquire representations through 
being affected by objects) and understanding (i.e. the capacity to form concepts and 
thoughts). 
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Interpreters of Kant still disagree about how these two distinctions line up with one another. 
Does Kant believe that our intuitions require only sensibility, or do they also depend on a 
contribution from the understanding? The two opposing sides of this debate can be 
characterized as follows: 
Conceptualism: According to Kant, intuitions depend on acts of the understanding as 
well as sensibility. 
Nonconceptualism: According to Kant, intuitions do not depend on acts of the 
understanding, but are produced by sensibility on its own.
1
 
Clearly, if we think there is value in making sense of Kant’s theory of cognition, then we 
need to try and make headway with the Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism debate. 
Recently, a number of commentators have tried to do just this by drawing on Kant’s 
remarks about non-human animals (henceforth “animals”). Kant holds that animals lack the 
capacity of understanding; therefore, his remarks about them promise to shed light on what 
he thought sensibility could accomplish on its own. In the past few years, something of a 
consensus has emerged that Kant’s remarks about animals “clearly support 
Nonconceptualism”.2 This is because Kant appears to credit animals with sensible 
representations of objects (i.e. intuitions), despite lacking understanding. 
In what follows, I will argue that Kant genuinely does credit animals with intuitions, 
but that an attractive form of Conceptualism can accommodate this. Therefore, contrary to 
the consensus, Kant’s views about animals do not provide evidence for Nonconceptualism—
they are equally compatible with Conceptualism. Nevertheless, they do impose strict limits 
on what kind of Conceptualist interpretation is viable. A proper understanding of this issue 
leads to a reassessment of the warrant for Nonconceptualism but also of the bounds within 
which Conceptualism ought to operate. 
                                                 
1
 See McLear (2014, p. 772) and Gomes (2016a, p. 540, pp. 550f.) for this way of framing the debate. I hereby 
set aside related questions which have also featured prominently in the debate, such as the content of intuitions 
(Allais, 2009; Tolley, 2013) and their dependence upon concept-possession (Ginsborg, 2008, pp. 71–5; Grüne, 
2009, ch. 5). 
2
 The quotation is from Allais (2016, p. 8) and echoes Gomes (2014, pp. 6f.). This consensus has been 
challenged by two articles which are discussed below (Land, 2018; van den Berg, 2018). My approach bears 
affinities with that of Land (2018), but I intend to go beyond his short discussion by motivating a detailed 
account of how Conceptualists can accommodate animal intuitions; by explaining how the resulting 
interpretation upholds not just the letter but the spirit of Conceptualism; and by critically engaging with the 
alternative response of denying Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions. 
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In Section 2, I explain why we should take seriously the suggestion that Kant’s views 
about animals support Nonconceptualism. I present an argument for Nonconceptualism based 
on Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions. In Section 3, I argue that Kant genuinely credits 
animals with intuitions: I analyze a wide range of texts (some of which have previously been 
overlooked) and argue that, even though the relevant sources are inherently unreliable, the 
sheer number and coherence of these passages makes it implausible that they are all errata. 
Section 4 begins explaining how Conceptualists can accommodate Kant’s commitment to 
animal intuition, by identifying the logical space for a “Restricted Conceptualism”. On this 
view, human intuitions are produced by the understanding, and belong to a kind that could 
not be produced in its absence. Section 5 fleshes this out by arguing that this view is well 
motivated by Kant’s texts and broader considerations about his theory of cognition. In 
particular, there are good reasons to accept (i) that all human intuitions have thinkable 
contents and (ii) that all representations with thinkable contents depend on acts of the 
understanding. This renders it plausible that human intuitions do depend on acts of the 
understanding, despite the fact that intuitions of a different kind are possible in the absence of 
that capacity. Conceptualists therefore have an attractive way to uphold the dependence of 
human intuitions on the understanding, while accommodating animal intuitions. I conclude 
(Section 6) by highlighting the substantive differences between Nonconceptualism and 
Restricted Conceptualism, on which future research must focus. 
2. The Argument from Animal Intuitions 
Why would Kant’s supposed commitment to animal intuition be thought to support 
Nonconceptualism? Consider this argument: 
The Argument from Animal Intuition 
(1) Kant holds that animals lack the capacity of understanding. 
(2) Kant holds that animals are capable of having intuitions. 
(3) Therefore, it is incoherent to ascribe to Kant the view that intuitions depend on 
acts of the understanding. 
Arguments of this kind are endorsed by Lucy Allais (2009, pp. 405–7, 2016, pp. 8f.), Colin 
McLear (n.d., 2011, p. 14, 2014, p. 773) and Anil Gomes (2014, pp. 6f.). These authors 
present the argument more-or-less in passing, devoting only a few lines to it, but it’s easy to 
see why they think it poses a problem for Conceptualists. The conclusion is tantamount to a 
denial of Conceptualism. And the inference has serious intuitive appeal: if the premises are 
true, the intuitions of animals cannot possibly depend on acts of the understanding. This 
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makes it hard to see how we could go on denying that intuitions are independent of the 
understanding. 
Insofar as Conceptualists are unwilling to capitulate to this argument, they have two 
options: either deny one of its premises, or question its validity. Before moving on to my 
main discussion, let me note the strong textual support for premise (1), which is not typically 
taken to be controversial. 
Although Kant credits animals with more complex mental lives than did some of his 
predecessors (cf. Naragon, 1990), he is nevertheless unequivocal in denying them the 
capacity of understanding. Kant writes that “a human being has, in his understanding, 
something more than [“the rest of the animals”]” (MS 6:434; cf. A546/B574, V-Met-
K3E/Arnoldt 29:949, 1017). This is reaffirmed and explained in the Metaphysik Mrongovius 
(1782–3): 
A concept is the consciousness that the [same] is contained in one representation as in 
another, or that in multiple representations one and the same features are contained. 
[…] Animals indeed compare representations with one another, but they are not 
conscious of where the harmony or disharmony between them lies. Therefore they 
also have no concepts, and also no higher cognitive faculty, because the higher 
cognitive faculty consists of these. (29:888) 
Animals can identify and discriminate objects by means of mental representations (as we will 
see in Section 3), but they cannot identify or discriminate dimensions of similarity or 
difference among objects. This renders them incapable of forming general representations, 
i.e. concepts. In lacking this ability, Kant states that they lack a “higher cognitive faculty”.3 
In other passages, Kant identifies the kind of consciousness which animals lack as 
“consciousness of ourselves” or “apperception” and explains that our capacity for concepts 
depends on our distinctive capacity for self-consciousness. For instance, he remarks in the L1 
Metaphysics (mid 1770s) that “animals […] will forgo only those representations which rest 
[…] on the consciousness of oneself, in short on the concept of the I. Accordingly they will 
have no understanding and no reason”(28:277; cf. ibid. 28:278, Anth 7:127, H 7:397, V-
Anth/Mron 25:1215, V-Met/Mron 29:878f.). In sum, Kant clearly and consistently denies that 
animals possess the capacity of understanding, both in published works and in lecture 
                                                 
3
 Kant characterizes the understanding as a “higher cognitive faculty” (e.g. Anth 7:196, Refl 210a 15:81). 
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transcripts. It follows that Conceptualists must either deny that Kant really credits animals 
with intuitions, or else deny that the Argument from Animal Intuition is valid. 
3. Kant’s Commitment to Animal Intuitions 
Is it viable to deny that Kant credits animals with intuitions? To assess this, we need to 
consider the relevant textual evidence. I begin by presenting the full range of relevant 
passages (Section 3.1). Since Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions is a controversial 
matter, I will take the time to consider more passages and analyze them at greater length than 
has been done in previous discussions. After presenting the passages, I address the fact that 
they are all drawn from unreliable sources, namely lecture transcripts and the Jäsche Logic 
(Section 3.2). I argue that, despite their questionable origin, these passages cumulatively 
amount to very strong evidence that Kant credits animal with intuitions—given their number 
and coherence, it is highly unlikely that they are all errata. 
3.1 Textual Evidence 
I begin with three passages indicating that Kant attributes intentional
4
 mental states to 
animals, followed by three passages confirming that these states are intuitions. The first 
passage comes from the Jäsche Logic (1800): 
In regard to the objective content of our cognition in general, we may think the 
following degrees, in accordance with which cognition can, in this respect, be graded: 
The first degree of cognition is: to represent something; […] 
The third: to be acquainted with something (noscere), or to represent something in 
comparison with other things, both as to sameness and as to difference; 
The fourth: to be acquainted with something with consciousness, i.e., to cognize it 
(cognoscere). Animals are acquainted with objects too, but they do not cognize them. 
(9:64f., Kant’s emphasis)5 
                                                 
4
 I intend “intentionality” to be equivalent to Kant’s notion of a representation’s “relation to the object 
[Beziehung auf das Objekt]”. “Intentional” therefore corresponds to Kant’s term “objective” in one of its uses 
(e.g. A320/B376). 
5
 “In Ansehung des objectiven Gehaltes unserer Erkenntniß überhaupt lassen sich folgende Grade denken, nach 
welchen dieselbe in dieser Rücksicht kann gesteigert werden: / Der ers te  Grad der Erkenntniß ist: sich etwas 
vorstel len; […] / Der dr i t te : etwas kennen (noscere) oder sich etwas in der Vergleichung mit andern 
Dingen vorstellen sowohl der Einer leihei t  als der Verschiedenheit  nach; / Der vier te : mi t  Bewußtse in  
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There is strong reason to think that in this passage Kant credits animals with mental states 
exhibiting intentional “relation to an object”. Kant writes that “animals are acquainted with 
objects”. It seems reasonable to suppose that “acquaintance [kennen]” picks out an intentional 
mental state and that “to be acquainted with something” means that the “something” is the 
intentional object of the mental state. This impression is confirmed by several facts. (i) Kant 
characterizes “acquaintance” as a way of “represent[ing]” the object in question. (ii) The 
remark about animals occurs in the course of making divisions within the domain of the 
“objective content” of “cognition [Erkenntniß]”. Earlier in the Logic, Kant stated that “all our 
cognition has […] a relation to the object” (9:33, emphasis in original; cf. Log 9:91, 
A320/B376);
6
 so by introducing “acquaintance” in a list of different kinds of “cognition” 
with “objective content”, Kant is classifying “acquaintance” as a representation with relation 
to an object. (iii) The “first degree” of the list—“to represent something”—seems already to 
be a state with intentionality. Since each stage in the list appears to be more demanding than 
the previous stages, this suggests that the higher “grades” also exhibit intentionality. (iv) Kant 
also introduces the notion of “acquaintance” in a similar graded list from the pre-critical 
Blomberg Logic (early 1770s), characterizing it in the same way, and explicitly classifying it 
as a way of “cognizing” a thing (24:135). Altogether, this amounts to a very strong case that 
“acquaintance” is a kind of representation with intentional relation to an object. In attributing 
“acquaintance with objects” to animals, Kant is crediting them with mental representations 
exhibiting intentionality.
7
 
                                                                                                                                                        
etwas kennen, d. h. erkennen (cognoscere). Die Thiere kennen auch Gegenstände, aber sie erkennen sie 
nicht.” 
6
 Kant uses the term “cognition” in two different senses (see below). “[C]ognition in general” at the beginning 
of the passage appears to be cognition in the broad sense; “cognizing” in the “fourth degree” is most likely 
cognition in the narrow sense. There are no grounds for thinking that Kant ever uses the term to designate non-
intentional states. 
7
 Caution is required when using the Jäsche Logic: the notes on which it is based span much of Kant’s teaching 
career, so one can doubt whether a given passage in Jäsche’s text represents Kant’s mature views. However, 
Kant uses the notion of “acquaintance [Kenntnis]” in published works from the critical period (e.g. A207/B252, 
A540/B568, G 4:451, KpV 5:51). Moreover, the corresponding Reflection (Ref 2394 16:342f.) bears evidence of 
continued revision, suggesting that it is not a relic of Kant’s pre-critical thought. The remark about animals is 
absent from the Reflection, suggesting that it is drawn from the lost lecture transcript, “presumably derived from 
[…] late in [Kant’s] career”, on which scholars think much of the Jäsche Logic is based (Young, 1992, p. xviii–
xix). 
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 The next passage comes from the Wiener Logic (1780–1). Once again, Kant offers a 
graded list of mental representations: 
1. The lowest degree is to represent something. When I cognize that which relates to 
the object, I represent the object. 
2. To cognize, percipere, is to represent something in comparison with others and to 
have insight into its identity or diversity from them. […] For animals also cognize 
their master, but they are not conscious of this. (24:845f.)
8
 
What Kant here describes as “cognizing” seems to correspond to “acquaintance” in the 
previous list: it is an intentional representation which allows for the identification and 
discrimination of objects. As argued above, Kant’s choice of the term “cognize” favours 
interpreting this as an intentional state. This is again confirmed by the context: (i) slightly 
earlier in this set of lecture notes, Kant is recorded as affirming that “all our cognitions” 
exhibit “relation to the object” (24:805); (ii) the “lowest degree” on this list already requires 
“represent[ing] an object”, indicating that the list catalogues divisions within the domain of 
intentional states; and (iii) Kant explicitly glosses “to cognize” as a way “to represent 
something”. Therefore, when Kant affirms in the final quoted sentence that “animals also 
cognize their master”, we have overwhelming reason to think he is ascribing a kind of 
intentional mental state to animals, the “master” being the intentional object of that state. 
Why the discrepancy in terminology between the Jäsche and Wiener passages? In the 
former, Kant states that “animals […] do not cognize [objects]” (Log 9:65, Kant’s emphasis); 
in the latter, that “animals […] cognize their master” (Vo/L-Wiener 24:846). Does this 
apparent contradiction suggest unreliable transcription? We should not draw this conclusion, 
because there are strong independent reasons for thinking that Kant uses the term “cognition” 
in two different senses. In the broad sense, “cognition” means a representation with relation 
to an object, e.g. a concept, intuition or judgment, while “cognition” in the narrow sense 
means an objectively valid synthetic judgment (cf. Grüne, 2009, p. 29; Watkins & 
Willaschek, 2017, pp. 84–7). Even within the Jäsche passage, Kant uses the term in these two 
different senses: the list as a whole deals with different kinds of cognition in the broad sense, 
                                                 
8
 “1.) der niedrigste Grad ist sich etwas vorstellen. Wenn ich das, was sich auf den Gegenstand bezieht, erkenne: 
so stell ich mir den Gegenstand vor. / 2.) erkennen, percipere, heißt sich etwas in Vergleichung mit andern 
vorstellen, und seine identitaet oder Verschiedenheit davon einsehen. […] Denn Thiere erkennen auch ihren 
Herrn aber sind sich deßen nicht bewußt.” 
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while the “fourth degree” isolates cognition in the narrow sense. (Cf. fn 6.) Consequently, we 
can easily reconcile the two passages: in the Jäsche passage, Kant denies that animals have 
cognition in the narrow sense, i.e. objectively valid synthetic judgments; in the Wiener 
passage, he affirms that animals have cognition in the broad sense, i.e. intentional 
representations of objects.
9
 
Is it significant for our purposes that the Wiener passage denies that animals are 
“conscious of” “cognizing their master”? In a famous passage in the Critique of Pure Reason 
(the “Stufenleiter”), Kant appears to categorize “cognition” and “intuition” as forms of 
“perception [Perzeption]”, i.e. “representation with consciousness” (A320/B376f.; cf. Log 
9:91). Therefore, there is a prima facie tension between Kant’s denial that animals’ 
cognitions are conscious and his affirmation that they are cognitions. However, there are 
various other passages in which Kant affirms the existence of unconscious cognitions (Refl 
1705 16:88, V-Lo/Wiener 24:805, V-Lo/Busolt 24:635) and intuitions (Anth 7:135, Refl 1705 
16:88).
10
 Hence, there are good reasons for explaining away the tension, rather than reading 
Kant as denying the possibility of unconscious cognitions or intuitions. Here are three 
possibilities for reconciling unconscious cognition with the “Stufenleiter” passage: (i) the 
passage could be read not as defining “cognition” as “objective perception”, but merely 
asserting that all “objective perceptions” are “cognitions”. This leaves open the possibility 
that some cognitions are not perceptions. (ii) Since Kant is interested in multiple different 
kinds of consciousness, perhaps the kind of consciousness that animal (and other 
unconscious) cognitions lack is different from the kind of consciousness required for 
cognition (cf. McLear, 2011). (iii) Perhaps Kant uses the terms “cognition” and “intuition” in 
a non-standard way in the “Stufenleiter”, e.g. because (general and transcendental) logic 
excludes unconscious representations from consideration (cf. V-Lo/Busolt 24:635). I conclude 
that the apparent tension in Kant’s attribution of unconscious cognitions to animals can be 
diffused. 
                                                 
9
 The proposal that “cognition” is used in different senses is further supported by the fact that Kant translates 
“cognition” with two different Latin terms in the two passages—“cognoscere” and “perscipere”. Thanks to Reed 
Winegar for this point. 
10
 Furthermore, there are copious passages in which Kant endorses the existence of unconscious concepts, which 
also constitute a species of unconscious cognitions (cf. Grüne, 2009, pp. 84–102). 
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A further remark supports the same conclusion: “Animals do have representations of 
the world but not of their I. Consequently, they are not rational beings” (V-Anth/Mron 
25:1215).
11
 To have “representations of the world” is to have intentional mental states. 
Together, these three passages provide extremely strong evidence that Kant ascribes 
intentional states to animals. Are these intentional states intuitions? Since animals possess 
sensibility but lack understanding, their representations of objects must be sensible 
representations of objects, so it is natural to expect that they are intuitions. This expectation is 
borne out by three more passages from lecture transcripts: 
Animals cannot make concepts, there are sheer intuitions with them (V-Met-L2/Pölitz 
28:594).
12
  
Animals are not capable of any concept – intuition they do have (V-Lo/Dohna 
24:702).
13
  
Now how can we conceive animals as beings below human beings? […] [W]e can 
think of things which are below us, whose representations are different in species and 
not merely in degree. We perceive in ourselves a specific feature of the understanding 
and of reason, namely consciousness, if I take this away there still remains something 
left yet, namely, sensation, imagination, the former is intuition with presence, the 
latter without presence of the object[.] (V-Met/Volckmann, 28:449)
14
 
The first two passages simply attribute intuitions to animals. In the third, Kant reflects on 
what capacities an animal would have by imagining a creature lacking understanding and 
reason (and the capacity for apperception on which both depend). He states that such 
creatures would still have the capacity for “intuition with presence […] of the object” and 
“[intuition] without presence of the object”, i.e. that an animal without understanding could 
still have intuitions. 
                                                 
11
 “Die Thiere haben zwar Vorstellungen von der Welt aber nicht von ihrem Ich. Daher sind sie auch keine 
vernünftige Wesen.” 
12
 “Thiere können sich nicht Begriffe machen, es sind lauter Anschauungen bei ihnen.” 
13
 “Tiere [sind] keiner Begriffe fähig — Anschauung haben sie.” 
14
 “Wie können wir nun die Thiere concipieren als Weesen [sic] unter dem Menschen. […] [W]ir [können] uns 
dinge denken, die unter uns sind, deren Vorstellungen der specie nicht blos dem Grad nach unterschieden sind. 
Wir nehmen in uns ein specifisch Merkmahl des Verstandes und der Vernunft, nehmlich das Bewustseyn, wahr, 
nehme ich dieses hinweg so bleibt doch noch etwas übrig nehmlich sensus, imaginatio, erstres ist die 
Anschauung bey der Gegenwart, leztres ohne Gegenwart des Gegenstandes[.]” 
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As hinted above, it is unsurprising that Kant classifies the cognitions of animals as 
intuitions: Kant holds that “besides intuition there is no other kind of cognition than through 
concepts” (A68/B92f.). This is reaffirmed in the numerous passages in which Kant presents 
the contrast between intuitions and conceptual representations as a disjunction, i.e. an 
exhaustive distinction (A320/B376f., Log 9:91, Refl 1705 16:88, Vo-L/Wiener 24:805). Since 
animals lack concepts, it follows that whenever Kant credits them with cognitions he must 
tacitly be crediting them with intuitions.
15
  
3.2 The Reliability of the Textual Evidence 
I have identified six passages which provide evidence that Kant credits animals with 
intuitions. Let me now discuss the possibility of rejecting this textual evidence as inauthentic. 
All of these passages come from sources of imperfect reliability. The Jäsche Logic 
was published in Kant’s lifetime, but was not directly written by Kant. It was compiled by a 
former student of his, using Kant’s marginalia and perhaps one or more lecture transcripts. As 
a result, the consensus is that “one cannot simply assume […] that Jäsche’s manual is a 
reliable statement of Kant’s views” (Young, 1992, pp. xvi–xviii; cf. Boswell, 1988). The 
other sources are more questionable still: they are students’ transcripts from Kant’s lectures. 
They have barely been edited, and were certainly not checked for accuracy by Kant himself. 
Discussing the logic lectures, Young writes that “one cannot look to [them], in general, for 
precise, carefully worded formulations of fundamental points” (1992, p. xix). I have argued 
that the texts display Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions, but it remains possible that in 
doing so they misrepresent Kant’s views. Would it be legitimate for the Conceptualist simply 
to reject the textual evidence I have assembled? 
There are two reasons why this would be inadvisable. Firstly, the evidence from all of 
these sources points in the same direction—I have identified passages from six different 
works asserting that animals have representations of objects, and I am unaware of any 
                                                 
15
 I set aside interesting questions about the “forms” of animals’ intuitions. Although I lack space to argue for it 
here, I believe that Kant would credit animals with quasi-spatial and quasi-temporal forms of intuition: quasi-
spatial to allow for the discrimination of objects without reliance on recognizing qualitative differences, e.g. 
tracking a particular tennis ball despite the presence of other tennis balls; and quasi-temporal to allow for the re-
identification of objects despite manifest qualitative differences, e.g. recognising a particular human whether she 
is standing or sitting. My suspicion is that, while these formal properties of intuition are in some sense a priori, 
Kant would deny animals the capacity to exhibit them in a pure intuition—animals’ capacities for discrimination 
and re-identification suggest certain forms of intuition, but not the possession of formal intuitions (cf. B160–1n). 
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passages that deny this. We would expect any transcription errors to be distributed more or 
less randomly, pointing in divergent directions. On the contrary, these passages all support 
the same conclusion, thus rendering it highly implausible that they are all errata. 
Secondly, historians of philosophy should not be too cavalier about declaring 
passages inauthentic. Our task is to find the most coherent interpretation of the texts we have, 
so we should demand positive reason before excluding any passage from consideration. The 
Conceptualist might reply that these texts are shown to be inauthentic by the very fact (if it is 
a fact) that they cannot be reconciled with Conceptualism. However, this would simply beg 
the question against the Nonconceptualist, as well as conceding that the passages provide 
prima facie support for Nonconceptualism. At this stage, it seems likely that the 
Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism debate can only be settled by weighing prima facie 
evidence: no knock-down arguments have been identified by either side. It follows that 
Conceptualists should be reluctant to concede that they cannot accommodate these passages.  
A further possibility is that there might be more substantive, less baldly circular 
reasons for denying that Kant ascribes intuition to animals. In a recent article, Hein van den 
Berg (2018) argues that Kant does not credit animals with “objective perceptual awareness”, 
by comparing his theory of cognition with two of his predecessors, Reimarus (1694–1786) 
and Buffon (1707–88). The article highlights some very interesting parallels, but its main 
argument seems to rely on an ambiguous use of the term on which it centres, viz. the notion 
of a “blooming, buzzing confusion”. At best, van den Berg gives us reason to conclude that, 
for Kant, animal representations are “blooming, buzzing confusions” in the sense of being 
“confused” or “obscure” (p. 7). Van den Berg seems to conclude on this basis alone that 
animals’ representations are “blooming, buzzing confusions” in the further sense of lacking 
intentionality (p. 8). But as we have already noted, Kant explicitly accepts that some 
unconscious or “obscure” representations are nonetheless intentional representations of 
objects (cf. Section 3.1). Therefore, it is illegitimate to slide from claiming that animal 
representations are “obscure” to claiming that they lack intentionality without further 
argument. In the absence of substantive considerations bridging this gap, van den Berg’s 
argument is not compelling. 
Pending other substantive objections, we must conclude that Kant really does credit 
animals with intuitions. Therefore, the Conceptualist cannot respond to the Argument from 
Animal Intuition by denying either of its premises. The next section begins exploring the 
remaining option, namely questioning the argument’s validity. 
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4. The Logical Space for Restricted Conceptualism 
We have seen that there is strong textual support for both premises of the Argument from 
Animal Intuition, and that the Conceptualist should resist the temptation to reject this 
evidence as inauthentic. This means accepting that: 
(1) Kant holds that animals lack the capacity of understanding; 
and 
(2) Kant holds that animals are capable of having intuitions. 
Does it follow that we should reject Conceptualism (i.e. the view that, according to Kant, 
intuitions depend on acts of the understanding)? This section will argue that there is logical 
space for maintaining a restricted form of Conceptualism while accepting both (1) and (2). 
The inspiration for this way of responding to the Argument from Animal Intuition 
comes from John McDowell (1994, pp. 114–23). Defending an account of perceptual 
experience similar to that ascribed to Kant by the Conceptualist, McDowell considers a 
possible objection: doesn’t his theory, according to which perceptual experience depends on 
activities of one’s conceptual capacities, entail that animals lack “outer experience”?  
McDowell’s response is that animals are capable of a certain kind of experience of outer 
objects, though one that is radically different from our own.
16
 In effect, McDowell’s version 
of conceptualism is restricted in scope: he does not hold that all kinds of outer experience 
depend on acts of conceptual capacities, but he does insist that the outer experience of 
humans depends on such acts, and that the contribution of the understanding makes possible a 
qualitatively different kind of experience. McDowell holds that our kind of outer experience 
depends on acts of our conceptual capacities.
17
 
We needn’t examine the details McDowell’s views about the difference between 
animal and human experience. What matters for our purposes is the general shape of his 
strategy. McDowell wants to reconcile two claims: (a) our outer experience depends on our 
conceptual capacities and (b) animals lacking those capacities are nevertheless capable of 
outer experience. He is able to do so by restricting the dependence claim of (a) to a certain 
kind of outer experience. 
                                                 
16
 McDowell denies that animals have intentional representations; to be clear, I am not proposing reading Kant 
as denying intentionality to animal intuitions. 
17
 A similar view about the relation between experience and conceptual capacities is defended by Boyle (2014). 
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McDowell’s response is not proposed as an interpretation of Kant’s views, but it is 
clearly germane to our exegetical inquiry. To see how this relates to the Argument from 
Animal Intuition, consider again our specification of Conceptualism from Section 1: 
Conceptualism: According to Kant, intuitions depend on acts of the understanding. 
This formulation is indeterminate in its scope, and can therefore be understood in (at least) 
two different ways. 
Universal Conceptualism: According to Kant, intuitions of all kinds depend on acts 
of the understanding. 
Restricted Conceptualism: According to Kant, intuitions of the kind humans possess 
depend on acts of the understanding. 
Universal Conceptualism is vulnerable to the Argument from Animal Intuition. If intuition 
per se were impossible without a contribution from the understanding, then animals lacking 
that faculty would lack intuitions. The importance of this result must not be underestimated—
arguably, the default view among Conceptualists has been to think that no intentional states 
are possible in the absence of the understanding.
18
 The Argument for Animal Intuitions 
shows that this is not the correct way to read Kant. 
However, Restricted Conceptualism upholds the claim that, within Kant’s account of 
human cognition, the understanding plays an active and indispensable role in the very 
production of intuitions. And yet it can be reconciled with the premises of the Argument from 
Animal Intuition, because it does not entail that no intuitions are possible in the absence of 
understanding. If Restricted Conceptualism is a viable reading of Kant, then Kant’s 
commitment to animal intuitions does not support Nonconceptualism, but is consistent with 
Conceptualism. 
The logical space for this form of response to the Argument from Animal Intuition 
has already been noted by a recent short discussion (Land, 2018). In one sense, this is enough 
to defang the argument (by showing that it is formally invalid). However, dialectically 
speaking, more needs to be done than highlighting the logical possibility of this reading. 
Firstly, we need some positive motivation for exploring Restricted Conceptualism, before it 
                                                 
18
 E.g. Ginsborg (2008, p. 65), Bauer (2012, pp. 227–9), Griffith (2012, pp. 2000–6). Grüne also holds that 
relation to an object depends on conceptual capacities, but leaves open the possibility that a being could possess 
a capacity for rule-governed sensible synthesis despite lacking the capacity to judge, and hence have intuitions 
without fully possessing understanding (2009, pp. 202f.). 
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can be seen as a serious alternative to Nonconceptualism. Secondly, one might suspect that 
the Restricted Conceptualist is in danger of giving up the spirit of Conceptualism by reducing 
the dependence of human intuition upon the understanding to the point of triviality: many 
Nonconceptualists accept that the understanding makes possible qualitatively different kinds 
of intuition, so something must be said to convince us that Restricted Conceptualism is more 
than a notational variant of Nonconceptualism. I therefore aim to go beyond the initial 
discussion of Land (2018) by motivating a detailed version of Restricted Conceptualism and 
explaining how it upholds not just the letter but the spirit of Conceptualism.
19
 This account 
will need to make each human intuition dependent on the understanding for its very 
existence. Moreover, it must identify a significant, intrinsic feature that all human intuitions 
possess, which would be impossible in the absence of the understanding. 
5. Fleshing Out Restricted Conceptualism 
I begin by identifying some textual motivations for Restricted Conceptualism (Section 5.1), 
before arguing for a detailed version of the view (Section 5.2). 
5.1 Textual Motivations 
Let me note two passages suggesting that Kant favours the possibility that there is a 
qualitative difference between human intuitions and animal intuitions. (To my knowledge, 
these passages have not previously been discussed in this connection.) I believe these texts 
show that—in the absence of decisive evidence either way—we should take Restricted 
Conceptualism seriously as an interpretative possibility. 
In one of the passages quoted in Section 3.1, Kant writes: 
Now how can we conceive animals as beings below human beings? […] [W]e can 
think of things which are below us, whose representations are different in species and 
not merely in degree (V-Met/Volckmann 28:449, emphasis added) 
If Nonconceptualism were true, then there is no reason that the representations of animals 
would be different from our (most basic
20
) intuitions. But Kant does not identify animals’ 
                                                 
19
 The position defended below is very much in line with the account of human cognition Land develops in 
earlier articles (e.g. 2006, 2011). 
20
 Some Nonconceptualists hold that the understanding is involved in converting basic intuitions into more 
complex intuitions (cf. McLear, n.d.). But on this view it would still be the case that our most basic intuitions 
are untouched by the understanding and hence of the same kind as animals’ intuitions. 
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representations with our intuitions. Instead, he asserts that they are “different in species” from 
any representations humans possess. This amounts to an assertion that the presence of 
understanding transforms the nature of intuitions, with the result that animal intuitions belong 
to a kind which humans lack, and vice versa. Therefore, this passage supports Restricted 
Conceptualism and presents a problem for Nonconceptualism. 
The same idea is repeated in Kant’s initial manuscript for the Anthropology: 
The cow, lacking understanding, may well <perhaps> have something similar to what 
we call representations (because, in terms of effects, they coincide <greatly> with 
representations in humans) but which might be completely different from them. (H 
7:397)
21
 
Kant is more tentative here, but he still avoids assimilating the cow’s representations with our 
own sensible representations. Instead, he raises the possibility that the cow’s representations 
are “completely different” from any of our representations. Again, the Restricted 
Conceptualist can readily explain this, while the Nonconceptualist—who holds that the 
understanding plays no role in generating our (most basic) intuitions—is faced with a puzzle. 
Why would the cow’s intuitions be “completely different” from our own, if our intuitions 
float free from the cognitive differences between ourselves and cows? 
I don’t want to overstate what these passages show. The Volckmann passage 
positively affirms that the intuitions of animals are “different in species” from any 
representations that humans possess. However, as we have already noted, “one cannot look to 
[lecture transcripts], in general, for precise, carefully worded formulations of fundamental 
points” (Young, 1992, p. xix). The Anthropology Manuscript passage is from Kant’s own 
hand, but is much more tentative, raising the possibility that animal intuitions are 
qualitatively different without fully endorsing it. Accordingly, it would be unwise to make a 
positive case for Restricted Conceptualism on the basis of these texts alone. What the 
passages do show is that the burden of proof is by no means stacked against Restricted 
Conceptualism. In the absence of decisive evidence either way we should take seriously the 
hypothesis that, for Kant, the understanding is implicated in the production of human 
intuitions, making them qualitatively different from what animals possess. I have not come 
                                                 
21
 “Das Verstandlose [sic] Vieh hat wohl <vielleicht> etwas dem Ähnliches was wir Vorstellungen nennen (weil 
es den Wirkungen nach mit dem was Vorstellungen im Menschen sind <sehr> übereinkommt) was aber 
vielleicht gantz davon unterschieden seyn mag[.]” 
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across any evidence that Kant denies that there is a qualitative difference between human and 
animal intuitions so, if anything, these two passages make Restricted Conceptualism seem 
more likely than Nonconceptualism. 
5.2 The Broader Case for Restricted Conceptualism 
In this subsection, I will argue that there are good reasons for endorsing Restricted 
Conceptualism, spelling out how and why human intuitions differ from those of animals. 
Along the way, I will demonstrate that the resulting interpretation is genuinely distinct from 
Nonconceptualism: it makes human intuitions dependent on the understanding in ways that 
all Nonconceptualists deny. First, I will argue that there are good reasons for thinking that 
human intuitions depend on the understanding for their existence, because (i) intuitions are 
produced through synthesis of the imagination and (ii) in humans, synthesis of the 
imagination is an act of the understanding. Second, I will argue that human intuitions 
necessarily have “thinkable contents” (explained below), while animal intuitions can never 
have these contents. 
The first component of this broader case for Restricted Conceptualism is the evidence 
that Kant thinks that intuitions are produced by the imagination. This forms a core part of the 
Conceptualist position—anyone already sympathetic to Conceptualism should readily accept 
it. It is also well motivated by Kant’s texts. To my mind, the most compelling piece of 
evidence is Kant’s claim that 
without it [i.e. the imagination’s “synthesis of apprehension”] we would not be able to 
have the a priori representations of space or of time, since these can be produced only 
through the synthesis of the manifold that sensibility […] provides. (A99) 
Here, Kant claims that humans’ a priori representations of space and time are produced by 
the imagination.
22
 The a priori representations of space and time are intuitions, and Kant 
holds that we must possess them to be able to represent the spatial and temporal relations 
exhibited by all empirical intuitions (cf. A23/B38, A30/B46). This suggests that a “synthesis 
of the imagination” is required to generate the formal (i.e. spatial and temporal) features of 
intuitions, whether they are a priori or empirical.
23
 From this vantage point, it becomes 
                                                 
22
 Cf. KU 5:190, where Kant characterizes the imagination as “the faculty of intuitions a priori”. 
23
 In light of the A99 passage, I think there is good reason to read the infamous B160–1n passage as advancing 
the same position. Nonconceptualists have attempted to explain away the B160–1n passage by claiming that it 
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plausible to read Kant’s descriptions of the “apprehension” of sensible material24 as 
describing a process through which empirical intuitions are first produced, so that their 
material features depend on synthesis of imagination too. 
Some Nonconceptualists accept that intuitions depend on synthesis of the 
imagination.
25
 Others deny this, claiming that a basic kind of intuition is possible prior to 
synthesis.
26
 I don’t intend to have established once and for all that, for Kant, intuitions are 
produced through synthesis of the imagination—we might still conclude that, all things 
considered, the evidence I have given is outweighed. Nevertheless, I have shown that there is 
strong prima facie evidence for this first component of the Restricted Conceptualist 
position.
27
  
The second component is Kant’s view that the imagination operates in a profoundly 
different way in beings that possess the faculty understanding (viz. humans), compared to 
beings that do not (viz. animals). In general, Kant holds that the mental capacities of animals 
are qualitatively different from those of humans: “Animals are […] different from human 
souls not in degree but rather in species” (V-Met-L1/Pölitz 28:276; cf. KU 5:464, V-Lo/Dohna 
24:702). In particular, he explicitly contrasts the capacities for “reproductive imagination” of 
humans and of animals. Powers of the reproductive imagination 
can be accompanied by apperception or not. When they are, then they belong only to 
human beings, when not – then animals also have them. We ought, therefore, to have 
two different names for these, but for this [capacity] there is only one [name], namely 
the reproductive power of imagination. (V-Met/Mron 29:884) 
                                                                                                                                                        
applies only to geometrical constructions and not to our most basic intuitions of space and time (Onof & 
Schulting, 2015), but there are no textual grounds for thinking that this is what is going on in the A99 passage. 
24
 E.g. A79/B105, A99, A105, A120, B151, B160. 
25
 This ‘First Wave’ of Nonconceptualists includes Rohs (2001, p. 222), Hanna (2005, p. 249) and Allais’s 
earlier work (2009, pp. 294f.). 
26
 This ‘Second Wave’ of Nonconceptualists includes Tolley (2013, pp. 122f.), Matherne (2015, pp. 32f.), 
McLear (2015, pp. 100f.) and Allais’s later work (2017, pp. 32f.). 
27
 The most serious motivation for denying that the intuitions of space and time are produced through synthesis 
is the argument that their whole-prior-to-part structure of mereological dependence is incompatible with being 
produced through synthesis (cf. McLear, 2015). This merits further discussion (which I must postpone for 
another occasion), but it would be premature to think that the argument is irrefutable (cf. responses by Land, 
2014; Rosefeldt, n.d.; Williams, 2018). 
NORMATIVITY AND REPRESENTATION IN KANT’S THEORY OF COGNITION 
144 
 
By claiming that there ought to be two different names for this capacity, Kant is explicitly 
differentiating two species of it: reproductive imagination with apperception and reproductive 
imagination without apperception. Within his account of human cognition in the Critique of 
Pure Reason—where the imagination is accompanied by apperception—Kant goes so far as 
to describe synthesis of the imagination as “an effect of the understanding on sensibility” 
(B152) and to claim that 
It is one and the same spontaneity that, there [in “synthesis of apprehension”] under 
the name of the imagination and here [in “synthesis of apperception”] under the name 
of understanding, brings combination into the manifold of intuition. (B162n; cf. 
A79/B104f., B153) 
This means that in humans, it is the understanding that is ultimately responsible for the 
sensible synthesis through which (I have just argued) intuitions are produced.
28
 In effect, the 
intuitions of humans are produced by acts of the understanding. 
How can this be reconciled with the possibility of animal intuitions? As we have seen 
Kant holds that animals do possess a faculty of imagination, though one that is different in 
kind from that of a human. An animal’s imagination is capable of combining sensible 
material together through merely receptive and associative processes. Traditionally, 
Conceptualists have tended to think that these kinds of imaginative process could not result in 
a mental representation with intentionality.
29
 However, in the light of the textual evidence 
discussed in Section 3, we should consider another possibility: that these associative 
processes are capable of generating intuitions, i.e. singular representations of objects. On this 
reading, the intuitions of humans are produced by acts of the understanding, whereas the 
intuitions of animals are produced by the associative tendencies of the imagination. This 
interpretative route upholds the dependence of human intuitions on the understanding; in 
doing so, it accommodates the evidence that motivates traditional forms of Conceptualism. 
However, it also accommodates Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions, and thus amounts to 
a promising form of Restricted Conceptualism. 
                                                 
28
 ‘First Wave’ Nonconceptualists typically denied that the understanding was responsible for sensible synthesis. 
In more recent work, Nonconceptualists tend to accept the overwhelming evidence that, in humans, synthesis of 
the imagination is an effect of the understanding (cf. esp. Tolley, 2013, pp. 121–4). 
29
 Cf. fn. 18. 
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This is already enough to ensure that Restricted Conceptualism is genuinely distinct 
from Nonconceptualism. Nonconceptualists deny that human intuitions are produced by acts 
of the understanding (either by denying that the synthesis through which they are produced is 
attributable to the understanding, or by denying that intuitions are produced through synthesis 
at all). But there are also motivations for thinking that human intuitions depend on the 
understanding in an even more profound sense: not only are human intuitions produced by 
that faculty; they possess a feature that would be impossible for intuitions produced in any 
other way. The feature in question is that human intuitions necessarily have “thinkable 
contents”. Let me say more about (a) why human intuitions necessarily have thinkable 
contents, and what this means, and (b) why animal intuitions couldn’t possibly have thinkable 
contents. 
 (a) Let’s begin with evidence that Kant thinks all human intuitions have thinkable 
contents. At A119, after completing the Deduction “from above”, Kant claims that the 
Transcendental Deduction has demonstrated “the necessary coherency [Zusammenhang] of 
the understanding with appearances by means of the categories”. “Appearance” is Kant’s 
general term for the objects given in empirical intuition (A20/B34). So Kant is claiming that 
all of the objects given in intuition will conform to the categories, i.e. that the intuitions of 
humans always present their objects in such a way that they can be subsumed under one or 
other of the categories. In other words, Kant holds that the objects given in human intuitions 
are guaranteed to conform to the necessary structural features of thought.
30
 
On what grounds does Kant assert this bold claim? The question is controversial; it is 
equivalent to asking, “What is the argument of the Transcendental Deduction?” But if we 
accept that the intuitions of humans are produced by the understanding, then there is a 
relatively clear path to finding a cogent argument in the Deduction.
31
 On this reading, the 
understanding is responsible for taking the dispersed material of sensation (delivered through 
affection) and combining it into spatially and temporally unified intuitions of objects. This 
synthesis is guided by rules of synthesis, which are provided by the categories (or their 
“schemata”). The outcome is that all of the intuitions thereby produced exhibit certain kinds 
of unity, particularly in their temporal structure. Specifically, all intuitions produced by the 
understanding will ipso facto exhibit one or more of the temporal structures corresponding to 
                                                 
30
 For the claim that the categories express the necessary structural features of all thought about objects, cf. KpV 
5:136. 
31
 My account is indebted to Gomes (2010). 
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the categories (which are enumerated in the Schematism chapter). It follows that all human 
intuitions will fall under one or other of the categories.
32
 To summarize these steps, the 
understanding always produces intuitions with certain kinds of temporal unity. In virtue of 
these temporal unities, the objects given in these intuitions exemplify the categories. This is 
what I mean by saying that all such intuitions have thinkable contents.
33
 
(b) But why couldn’t an animal’s associative power of imagination produce intuitions 
with the same kinds of temporal unity—intuitions that are intrinsically indistinguishable from 
those of humans? The answer lies in Kant’s views about the preconditions for representing 
objective temporal structure—not only of producing intuitions with a certain subjective 
temporal form, but intuitions that represent objects as having a certain temporal form. Kant’s 
clearest discussion of this comes in the Second Analogy of Experience, where he explains the 
mental operations that underlie our sensible representations of temporal sequences. He 
accepts that associative mechanisms can produce intuitions with subjective temporal form 
(i.e. they can produce a “subjective order of perceptions”), but argues that this is insufficient 
for representing temporal structure in the objects (i.e. they cannot produce representations of 
an “objective order”). This is because a merely associative combination of sensory material 
would be “entirely arbitrary” (A193/B238): for any temporal ordering the imagination 
introduces, it could equally well have produced the reverse order (B233, A201/B246). 
Consequently, a subjective ordering introduced by associative processes will ultimately be 
attributable to contingencies about the perceiver, rather than features of the objects perceived. 
The end result is that the temporal structure of intuitions produced through mere association 
will not have the semantic significance of representing temporal structure in the objects. 
                                                 
32
 It remains a difficult question why, within the human mind, there couldn’t also be merely associative 
production of intuitions, in addition to the rule-governed production of intuitions. If that were possible, it seems 
that we could possess animal-style intuitions as well as intuitions with thinkable contents (contrary to Restricted 
Conceptualism). Perhaps it is ultimately an unargued premise of the Deduction that, in humans, the imagination 
only produces intuitions under the direction of the understanding. Alternatively, perhaps considerations about 
the unity of apperception ensure that no such intuitions could belong to the human being qua thinking subject 
(cf. B131f., Br 10:152). These important issues cannot be addressed on this occasion. 
33
 In contrast, Nonconceptualists have been unable to find in the Transcendental Deduction a cogent argument 
for the conclusion that all appearances must exemplify the categories. They are forced either to charge Kant 
with incoherence (Hanna, 2011) or to read the Deduction as advancing a weaker conclusion than has 
traditionally been thought (e.g. Allais, 2017, pp. 33–7). Since Kant appears to be committed to the stronger 
conclusion, this constitutes a further point in favour of Conceptualism (cf. Gomes, 2014, pp. 9–15). 
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In humans, the imagination’s combination is led by rules provided by the 
understanding, and hence can be rendered “necessary” rather than “arbitrary”. This is what 
enables our intuitions to represent objective temporal structure;
34
 and hence to represent them 
as having the kinds of unity that allow them to be taken up into thought. But in animals, 
nothing can remove the arbitrariness, so temporal structure in the objects can never be 
represented. It follows that the contents of animal intuitions differ from the contents of 
human intuitions. They do not represent objects as having the kinds of temporal unity that 
allow them to become objects of thought. Animal intuitions lack something that all human 
intuitions have, namely thinkable contents. 
To hammer this point home, it is not the case that animals perceive objects in the 
same way we do and merely lack the concepts to think about them. We perceive objects as 
temporally structured unities, whereas animals cannot achieve this cognitive feat. And this 
difference has important consequences: we perceive the world as structured in a way that 
allows us to think about it; animals do not perceive the world as having this structure. The 
fact that human intuitions are generated by the understanding makes them qualitatively 
different from animal intuitions, and no substitute for the understanding could possibly 
produce intuitions of the same kind—intuitions which present objects for thought. 
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that there is overwhelming textual evidence that Kant credits non-human 
animals with intuitions. But contrary to what many commentators have thought, this does not 
provide evidence for a Nonconceptualist reading of Kant. I have argued for a Restricted 
Conceptualism, which claims that human intuitions depend on acts of the understanding but 
that a different kind of intuition can be produced by an animal mind. In support of this view, I 
argued that there are solid textual motivations for thinking: 
(i) That the intuitions of humans are generated by acts of the understanding, whereas 
the intuitions of animals are generated by merely associative activities of the 
imagination; and 
(ii) That human intuitions (qua intuitions produced by the understanding) necessarily 
have thinkable contents, whereas animal intuitions are inherently incapable of being 
taken up into thought. 
I haven’t established these two claims beyond all doubt—to do so would require evaluating 
all of the arguments relevant to the Conceptualism/Nonconceptualism debate, a task which is 
                                                 
34
 I give a detailed account of how this works in Hutton (2018) = Chapter 1. 
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not feasible in one article. Therefore, the main conclusion to be drawn here is a dialectical 
one: contrary to what many commentators have claimed, Kant’s commitment to animal 
intuitions provides no evidence for Nonconceptualism. Animal intuitions can be readily 
accommodated by an attractive and well-motivated form of Conceptualism. 
Correlatively, Conceptualists must shift to Restricted Conceptualism (and accept that, 
for Kant, some forms of intentional mental representation are possible in the absence of 
conceptual capacities). This is the only way for them to deal with the undeniable evidence of 
Kant’s commitment to animal intuitions. My discussion therefore leads to a reassessment of 
the bounds within which Conceptualism must operate, as well as a reassessment of the 
evidence for Nonconceptualism. 
Let me finish by highlighting the remaining bones of contention between Restricted 
Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism. Restricted Conceptualism upholds the dependence of 
all human intuitions on the understanding and affirms that all of our sensible representations 
of objects are transformed by our possession of understanding. Nonconceptualists maintain 
that the understanding is not involved in our initial reception of intuitions, so that humans’ 
(most basic) intuitions don’t depend on the understanding and aren’t importantly different 
from what animals possess. Future research should focus on these points of controversy, 
especially by continuing to examine how Kant thinks intuitions are generated and trying to 
settle the debate about the aims and argumentation of the Transcendental Deduction. Kant’s 
commitment to animal intuitions should no longer be considered a point in favour of 
Nonconceptualism. 
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Conclusion 
1. Conclusions of Each Chapter 
In Chapter 1, I began exploring the role of normativity in Kant’s theory of cognition, by 
interrogating the notion of “necessitation” of the “subjective order of perceptions” 
(A193/B238), which lies at the heart of the Second Analogy of Experience. I argued that this 
necessitation is a form of epistemic normativity, arising from the inferential consequences of 
making certain causal presuppositions: when one forms the beliefs that Xs cause ABs and X 
obtains, it becomes epistemically obligatory to draw the conclusion that AB occurs. In order 
to make this empirical judgment, I must carry out a certain “synthesis of perceptions” (B218, 
A764/B792). So in these circumstances, an act of synthesis on the part of the imagination 
also becomes normatively obligatory. In this way, and in this sense, it can become necessary 
for an individual to synthesize perceptual material into one temporal order rather than 
another. Since Kant holds that this necessitation is required for us to be able to represent 
perceptually the objective temporal order of things, he is therefore committed to the idea that 
a certain kind of representational content constitutively depends on normative constraint. 
In Chapter 2, I explored further the characteristics of the concept <cause>, with the 
aim of shedding light on Kant’s claim that nature operates according to universal causal laws. 
I argued that there is overwhelming textual evidence that, according to Kant, the concept 
<cause> contains the notion of the causal connection being strictly universal and necessary, 
i.e. being a law. From this it follows that, given Kant’s commitments, the apparently ‘Weak 
Causal Principle’ that every event has a cause actually entails the ‘Strong Causal Principle’ 
that every event happens according to a universal causal law. 
Chapter 3 began the task of explaining Kant’s notion of schemata, and the place of 
these mental representations within his theory of cognition. I proposed a new way to 
understand the function of schemata as rules of synthesis of imagination: these 
representations play a parallel function to “maxims” in the moral domain. They actively 
guide how the mind’s activities unfold, and in doing so they qualify those activities for 
normative assessment. The consequence of this normative constraint is that it becomes 
possible to produce intuitions with ‘conceptual content’ (i.e. intuitions that represent the 
kinds of features that fix under which concepts an object is classifiable). On this proposal, 
schemata have a hitherto unrecognized importance for Kant’s account of how we can have 
thoughts about objects encountered through perception. I also argued that many of the 
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premises which lead Kant to postulate schemata have a certain amount of appeal even from a 
contemporary perspective. 
In Chapter 4, I used a more textual approach to try to resolve the ongoing dispute over 
what kind of mental representations schemata are. I analyzed a wide range of relevant 
passages, suggesting strategies for demystifying Kant’s often unhelpful formulations. I 
argued that that there is overwhelming textual evidence that schemata are rules for synthesis 
of imagination (which was a presupposition of my account in Chapter 3). I also argued that 
the rival accounts—(i) that schemata are intuitions and (ii) that they are rules for 
subsumption—have serious internal problems. 
Chapter 5 engaged with the Nonconceptualism debate. I argued that Kant genuinely 
credits some non-human animals with intuitions (i.e. sensible representations of particular 
objects). However, I argued that this can be accommodated by certain ‘Conceptualist’ 
readings of Kant. There are good reasons for reading him as drawing a qualitative distinction 
between the intuitions of animals and those of humans. On this reading, human intuitions are 
produced by the understanding, while intuitions of a different kind are possible for creatures 
which lack that capacity. The resulting account, according to which all human intuitions have 
thinkable contents and all such intuitions are produced by the understanding, is well 
motivated textually and results in a satisfying overall reading of Kant’s aims in the 
Transcendental Analytic. 
2. Kant’s Normative Theory of Representation? 
In the Introduction, I stated that the underlying question motivating the research for this 
dissertation was the issue of whether Kant holds that the mind’s representational content 
constitutively depends on normativity. I will now bring together the implications of the 
preceding chapters for this question. 
In Chapter 1, I argued that (according to Kant) our ability to represent objective 
temporal sequence constitutively depends on normative constraint. Only when synthesis is 
normatively constrained can it create contents with objective representational purport; only 
when our temporal orderings are assessable in the light of epistemic norms do they take on 
the significance of representing objective temporal sequences (i.e. sequences in the public, 
intersubjective world). Since we represent such sequences not only in thought but also in 
perceptions, even the activities that produce these perceptions must be normatively 
constrained. 
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Chapter 1 shows Kant as endorsing a normative theory of one kind of mental content. 
In Chapter 3, I argued for a broader dependence of representational content on normativity. I 
suggested that the same conclusion applies to the representation of all objective temporal 
structure. All temporal complexity in perception is introduced by synthesis of imagination; 
‘arbitrary’ synthesis cannot produce contents with objective representational purport; 
therefore, synthesis must be normatively constrained in order to produce representations of 
any objective temporal structures. 
This conclusion (that normative constraint is a precondition of representing any 
objective temporal structure) has important implications. Kant holds that, when a perceived 
object falls under one or other of the categories, it does so in virtue of being represented as 
exhibiting a certain objective temporal structure (e.g. persistence for <substance>; existence 
at some time for <actuality>). It follows that only when our synthesizing activities are 
normatively constrained will we have intuitions that correspond to the categories. Moreover, 
Kant holds that “all possible perceptions, […] as far as their combination is concerned, stand 
under the categories” (B164f.). It is controversial whether “perceptions” here covers all of 
our empirical intuitions, or only empirical intuitions of a certain complexity; either way, this 
shows that Kant holds that normative constraint is at work in the production of a broad and 
important class of our mental representations. 
Yet the conclusion argued for in Chapter 3 is broader still. Not only is normative 
constraint required for intuitions to represent objects as exhibiting objective temporal 
structures; it is required for them to represent objects as bearing any kind-properties (i.e. the 
general features that, according to Kant, make up the content of all of our concepts). This is 
because (i) synthesis of imagination is required to produce intuitions of the complexity 
needed for representing kind-properties, and (ii) such synthesis must be normatively 
constrained in order for this complexity to represent unity in the objects. This means that our 
mental activities must be normatively structured in order for us to perceive an object as 
instantiating any concept—not just the categories, but empirical and mathematical concepts 
too. If an intuition is to have any ‘conceptual content’ whatsoever (i.e. any content that would 
enable its object to be subsumed under a concept), its production must be normatively 
constrained. Since Kant holds that all of our thoughts are composed of general concepts and 
structured by the categories, it follows that normative constraint is required for us to intuit 
objects in a manner that allows us to have any thoughts about them. Therefore, on my 
interpretation, normative constraint plays an extremely pervasive role in Kant’s account of 
how cognition (i.e. thought directed at perceptible objects) is possible. Only when synthesis 
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of imagination is bound by normative constraints can perception present us with material for 
thought. 
The question still remains of whether all of our intuitions have thinkable contents, or 
whether Kant holds that only a subclass of our sensible representations present objects in a 
way that allows us to think about them. Given the conclusions up to this point, we can think 
of this question as equivalent to the issue of whether normative constraint is at work in the 
production of all our perceptual representations, or whether we can represent objects in ways 
that do not depend on normative constraint. The account in Chapters 1–4 remained neutral on 
this issue, and is therefore compatible with both Conceptualist and Nonconceptualist 
interpretations of Kant. 
However, in Chapter 5, I took up this question and argued that there are good reasons 
for maintaining a Conceptualist reading. On this view, all of our intuitions—all of our 
sensible representations of objects—have thinkable contents. Ipso facto, they all have a kind 
of representational content that constitutively depends on normative constraint. If so, 
normativity is at work in all of our cognitive dealings with the world: whenever we arrange 
passively received material into intuitions, the process is structured by demands of epistemic 
normativity. This guarantees that we will perceive the objects around us in ways that allow us 
to think about them (and from there, to make inferences, to seek explanations, and to build a 
unified, coherent theory of the world). 
Cumulatively then, my dissertation supports the conclusion that all of our 
representations of objects depend on normative constraint. However, it does not follow that 
all representational content depends on normativity. Chapter 5 also indicated that Kant credits 
non-human animals with sensible representations of objects (i.e. intuitions). It is not plausible 
that the mental activities of animals are subject to normative constraints,
1
 so whatever content 
figures in their intuitions cannot be normatively constituted. We can conclude that this 
content is intrinsically unfit for being captured by concepts—these intuitions would not 
correspond to any concept even if, per impossibile, they were transferred into the mind of a 
being who possessed concepts. Therefore, Kant must endorse a form of ‘nonconceptual 
content’ that does not depend on normativity.2 
                                                 
1
 Kant denies that animals have any kind of freedom (e.g. MS 6:213), but holds that freedom is a precondition 
for normative constraint (e.g. A534/B563). 
2
 For simplicity, I set aside the possibility that the intentionality of animal representations is not implemented by 
representational content. If desired, it should be possible to rephrase everything I say about nonconceptual 
content in terms of ‘non-representational intentionality’. 
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Nothing I have argued in this dissertation precludes the possibility that human 
intuitions also have nonconceptual content, in addition to normatively constituted, conceptual 
content. In fact, there are positive reasons for reading Kant as arguing that our intuitions do 
have a kind of content that is not fully capturable by concepts. He holds that sensibility gives 
us the ability to differentiate objects independently of qualitative differences between them—
to represent numerical difference—by representing them as spatially outside each other. The 
features capturable by concepts only pertain to qualitative differences, so this ability 
demonstrates that nonconceptual content is at work in human intuition. Moreover, this kind 
of nonconceptual content is crucial for human cognition. Any qualitative difference that can 
be drawn by means of conceptual content will only distinguish kinds of object: there will 
always be a plurality of possible objects that meet any description that can be given. 
Consequently, our ability to represent particulars is dependent on the nonconceptual content 
of intuition. I would be unable to have thoughts about any particular snowman or daffodil, or 
person, if it weren’t for this nonconceptual content. And there are no reasons for thinking 
that, for Kant, this nonconceptual content is normatively constituted. Far from holding that 
every aspect of mental representation depends on normativity, Kant holds that crucial 
dimensions of our cognitive abilities are founded on nonconceptual content.
3
 
By way of summary, let me compare and contrast my reading of Kant with that of 
John McDowell in Mind and World (1994)—perhaps the most influential discussion of Kant 
on normativity and representation in recent decades. McDowell uses Kant as a springboard 
for his own theorizing, and consequently pays little heed to exegetical disputes; my approach 
has been much more exegetically oriented, and my hope is that it consequently has a much 
stronger evidential basis as a reading of Kant. McDowell reads Kant as an early proponent of 
the idea that, for sensibility to provide us with representations that have any bearing on 
thought, its activities must be subject to normative standards; in this, I agree with McDowell: 
                                                 
3
 Sensibility also allows us to re-identify an object despite qualitative differences—to represent numerical 
identity—by representing it as changing through time. Since concepts of number depend on numerical 
difference, we should also conclude that the whole of mathematical science would be impossible for a creature 
whose intuitions didn’t have nonconceptual as well as conceptual content (cf. Friedman, 1992b, Chapters 1–2; 
Land, 2014). As well as these formal, quantitative varieties of nonconceptual content, there might be scope for 
reading Kant as endorsing material, qualitative nonconceptual content, pertaining to felt qualities which can be 
designated but not fully captured by concepts. The role of “feeling [Gefühl]” in giving us cognitive access to the 
orientation of space (WDO 8:134f.; cf. GUGR 2:380) and the impenetrability of matter (MAN 4:510) suggests 
that this might be the case. I leave this possibility for further inquiry. 
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I read Kant as holding that, only when synthesis of imagination is normatively constrained, 
can we perceive a world of objects structured in a way that allows us to think about them. 
McDowell reads Kant as holding that structures of normativity underlie all of the mental 
activities that generate representations of objects; I read Kant in the same way—our intuitions 
necessarily have conceptual content, so they depend on normatively constrained activities. 
But McDowell reads Kant as holding that conceptual content is the whole story; in contrast, I 
read Kant as holding that the mental activities which enable humans to make cognitive 
contact with the world involve a blending of aspects structured by normative constraints and 
aspects which are not normatively assessable—aspects of what we are like and how the world 
happens to impinge on us. 
I am affected by things around me, by snowmen, daffodils and foxes. This generates a 
multiplicity of sensory signals; my sense-organs ripple with neural stimulations. To make any 
sense of this multiplicity, I need to organize the material, combining different factors together 
into complex mental representations—unified wholes with colour, shape and texture, which 
last through time or melt away. In doing so, my mental activities will only purport to say 
something about how things hang together in the objects if I am normatively responsible for 
the way I organize the material. Only if I am obliged, on pain of irrationality, to put the 
material together in a certain way, do my complex representations purport to say something 
about how these colours, shapes and textures actually hang together, independently of the 
workings of my mind. Only in virtue of these normative obligations can I perceive a world 
that is unified enough for me to think about it. But there are certain brute facts about how the 
world affects me: about what happens when my sense-organs are faced with a snowman, a 
daffodil or a fox, and about the frameworks of space and time through which objects appear 
to me. Without these brute facts—over which I have no control and for which I have no 
responsibility—I would have no access to those objects at all. 
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